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Abstract 
Hate speech is on the rise. Its threat grows daily. Increasingly, reports of hate speech 
enter our daily news, researchers make it a focus of study, legis lators create laws to 
protect us from it, and people fall victim to it. The sites of conflict which hate speech 
creates are difficult and confused; deliberately so.  Such language does not languish on 
the extremes of accepted discourse occasionally breaking through at accidental points of 
destructive horror.  Instead, it stalks the foundations of discourse, relentlessly seeks 
power, and infiltrates institutional frameworks, in order to continually promote violence 
and division.  Hate speech is condemned and yet, it thrives, casting what seems like a 
growing shadow over spaces of communication. 
This thesis journeys from the historical conditions from which the current concept of 
hate speech has evolved, to the established and conventional structures that ensure the 
continued ability of these utterances to inflict appalling harms.  The language of hate 
respects no boundaries, arbitrary or otherwise.  And so, engagement with thinkers 
across disciplines is necessary to draw together the elusive and disingenuous character 
of this language.  The combined might of philosophers, linguists, legal scholars, gender 
theorists, sociologists, and race theorists is needed to illuminate the dark spaces of hate 
speech.  These often complex and diverse academic theories - that are shown to be 
relevant to the hate speech debate - are drawn together through examples of the 
utterances themselves observed in areas such as; politics, literature, theatre, social 
media, news reports, and legal cases.  Ultimately, the argument is made that the 
violence of hate speech is not accidental. It is intentionally reinforced by state 
institutional frameworks.   
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Introduction 
The aim of the thesis is to illuminate the dark shadow that hate speech casts 
through force, violence and institutional frameworks.  A persistent tension is revealed 
between the need for the state to control hate speech through its institutional 
frameworks and, the role those frameworks play in perpetuating the violence of hate 
speech. Considering hate speech through theories of performative language allows the 
paradox to be explained. A mutually exploitative relationship between hate speech 
and institutional frameworks is exposed and used to demonstrate how, state 
institutional frameworks can work to reinforce the violence of hate speech. 
Chapter One, ‘Unnamed’, provides the foundations for understanding hate 
speech in its modern context.  Considering four different definitions of hate speech 
provides the opportunity to uncover common characteristics shared between these 
forms of expression regardless of academic discipline, context, or event.  Seven shared 
characteristics of hate speech are emphasised with the first showing that hate speech 
is not limited to verbal utterances, but can damage and harm through any form of 
expression. Secondly, there is a propensity for the definitions of hate speech to treat 
the concept of hate speech as presupposed.  This leads to a third element that shows 
attempts to describe hate speech always give primacy to the effects of these forms of 
expression.  A fourth characteristic which follows from this is to recognise that hate 
speech is not random but instead is intended to cause harm. The argument is made 
that hate speech is perpetrated both consciously and unconsciously because of the 
way hate speech becomes authorised by an external authority.  Fifthly, and perhaps 
not surprisingly, I argue that the groups most at risk from hate speech are invariably 
constituted as ‘Other’ in some way.  A sixth characteristic, which is more unusual, is 
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that absence and uncertainty are shown to be an essential part of hate speech and 
facilitate part of its force.  The final characteristic that is argued to be consistently 
visible is that hate speech acts in a deliberately divisive way, which is in itself, violent.   
Opening with this chapter serves to illuminate, but not resolve, a range of 
problems that are investigated throughout.  Collectively the characteristics of hate 
speech that are identified can risk generating confusion and so seven key themes are 
employed to navigate a path. The first theme demonstrates that the naming of ‘hate 
speech’ creates an autonomous space in discourse that serves to normalize the 
appearance of this language. Following from this it is argued that, hate speech does 
not require an originator and because of this, hate speech can increase its scope for 
harm.  A third theme unveils the violence that is present in both instances of hate 
speech and within definitions of the term. Fourthly, traditional investigations of hate 
speech are argued to limit how the concept is viewed and potentially contribute to the 
ability of this language to harm.  The fifth theme emphasises that particular histories 
compound the force hate speech is able to exert.  A sixth theme identifies that 
violence, inflicted through creating social divisions and coupled with the stigma of 
‘Otherness’, influences the constitution of linguistic subjects and creates a greater risk 
of vulnerability to the harm hate speech inflicts. Finally, hate speech is argued to be 
both performative and political which in later chapters, will demonstrate how the 
violence of hate speech is reinforced by state institutional frameworks . 
 Chapter Two, ‘Constructing a concept of hate speech’, explores six significant 
influences that have come to shape the modern concept associated with these forms 
of expression.  It is argued that critical moments, drawn from different historical 
periods, heavily influence current work in areas of hate speech and shape how the 
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concept has come to be understood.  To manage complexity and maintain a focus on 
violence, force and institutional frameworks, these influences are considered through 
three interconnected strands.  These strands are academic theory, legal traditions and 
hate speech regulation, and cultural events which, it is argued, shape the relationship 
between hate speech and violence. 
By emphasising six specific moments of hate speech history, I argue that, 
political and social commitments to rights of freedom of expression and equality 
create a particular type of concept of hate speech to arise.  More importantly, these 
overarching rights allow the concept of hate speech to be tolerated. Through the 
context of that toleration, I will demonstrate how hate speech can threaten values of 
freedom of expression.  From this position, a need for states to intervene and control 
hate speech is articulated.  However, such circumstances also generate a 
contradiction. Interventions made by the state to control hate speech are shown to 
simultaneously create an environment whereby, the violence of hate speech is 
inevitably reinforced by institutional frameworks. It is argued that that one way these 
contradictions are made visible is through the forceful separation of and 
differentiation between groups identified as at risk from hate speech.  The apparent 
paradox is resolved through emphasising a political and performative element of hate 
speech. It is argued that hate speech performatives can be considered as violent, 
political, and with an ability to masquerade, that results in hate speech becoming 
inextricably tied to institutional frameworks. Each of the six influences, it is argued, 
always increase the risk hate speech poses to those most vulnerable to its harms.     
To draw together the six key influences that are important for the 
conceptualisation of hate speech, some apparent disconnects are evident and yet 
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necessary.  What is shown through the chapter is that hate speech can become 
dangerous because of its ability, with relative anonymity, to infect all areas of 
discourse.  By combining elements such as enlightenment period ideas of harms and 
toleration, political movements, literature, print media, theatre, laws, performative 
speech acts and genocide, it becomes possible to demonstrate how violence is integral 
to the effects and survival of hate speech.  In addition, it is argued that hate speech is 
never far from political and state influences.  As such, it is indicated that the state does 
not provide people with robust protections from hate speech.  Instead, legal provisions 
aimed at controlling hate speech are argued to, function in ways that reinforce the 
violence of hate speech.   The chapter ends with an explanation of how the six 
influences explored contribute to the current concept of hate speech. 
Chapter Three, ‘Violence, hate speech and institutional frameworks’, builds on 
the themes explored in chapters one and two to show how the relationship of hate 
speech and institutional frameworks is bound to violence. The argument is made that 
the violence of hate speech is reinforced by state institutional frameworks . The 
chapter gives primacy to legal structures and reveals how these structures can work to 
legitimise hate speech violence. Legal frameworks are argued to function in ways that 
perpetuate the violence of hate speech but without those frameworks managing to 
fully encompass the force of these utterances.  Despite this tension the state is shown 
to possess the ability to control and command the violence of hate speech to some 
extent. 
 The chapter initially considers how hate speech - since it is measured against 
other forms of harmful language - becomes judged against a standard.  The argument 
is progressed to explain how, the judgement and the standard itself, mean hate speech 
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can be thought of as subjected to legal violence. When these standards ensure 
different levels of toleration for forms hate speech, it is shown how the perceived 
authority of a hate speaker can be brought into question. As a result, it is argued that, 
when legal frameworks function to individualise the problem of hate speech they can, 
to some extent, diminish any authority attributed to a speaker.   
An element within legal restrictions of hate speech is made visible that is both 
inclusive and exclusionary. This opposition is argued to be positioned at heart of 
considerations for hate speech and institutional frameworks. When this uncertainty 
meets with the performative violence of hate speech, an opportunity is revealed - 
through the state authorisation or legitimisation of hate speech - for particular social 
and political conditions to be generated. The boundaries of what can be considered 
acceptable speech in the public domain are argued to be produced by legal 
institutional frameworks.  Hate speech that falls within the domain of the ‘sayable’ is 
shown to become legally sanctioned as legitimate. 
This final chapter also identifies the ‘external authority’ that is initially observed 
within chapter one. The law is shown to act as one form of external authority; 
however, an overarching ‘external authority’ is identified as the executive power of the 
state. It is argued, that the executive power is overarching because it has the capability 
to disrupt the territorial integrity of the law.  As a result, the executive power is able to 
exert a force over hate speech that does not depend on the law and exceeds any 
intention of a hate speaker.  Where executive power intervenes, it reveals an 
opportunity for the state to potentially exploit the violence of hate speech for its own 
ends.   
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While it is demonstrated throughout the thesis that state institutional 
frameworks do reinforce the violence of hate speech, the final chapter also presents 
some possible sites of resistance to this injurious language. The arts are presented as 
productive sites of challenge to hate speech because, they are argued to be able to 
reposition the boundaries of discourse and transform how linguistic subjects come to 
be constituted. I argue that it could be possible for the forum of the theatre to reduce 
the power of hate speech to harm. Equally and more directly related to legal 
institutional frameworks, the theory of ‘speaking back’ is considered to understand 
ways victims of hate speech could be empowered through responses that are enabled 
by state institutional frameworks.  
The thesis concludes by drawing together the major themes from each chapter 
and emphasising that hate speech possesses a power to harm in subtle and extreme 
ways.  The themes are used as evidence to show that the violence of hate speech 
becomes authorised by the state and is reinforced through institutional frameworks.  
As a result, the continued survival of these forms of expression is argued to be 
ensured. Through demonstrating the mutually exploitative relationship between hate 
speech and institutional frameworks, the ways in which those state institutional 
frameworks work to reinforce the violence of hate speech is illuminated. 
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Chapter One: Unnamed. 
‘Gloucester @Tesco: 'this is England, foreigners have 48 hours to f**k right off. Who is 
foreign here? Anyone foreign?' #Brexit’1 
How can the term ‘hate speech’ be understood and how do expressions of hate 
come to occupy a place in our modern discourse and culture?  This chapter aims to 
answer these questions by considering some contested definitions and the place of 
hate speech in language. Seven characteristics of hate speech will be considered and 
emphasised using examples from academic, legal and social spheres. I will argue that 
these elements ultimately shape how hate speech can be understood. What will be 
shown is that hate speech has violence as a foundational cornerstone of its identity.  
Later chapters will demonstrate how the violence that characterises these forms of 
expression creates an inevitable tension.  The tension is visible between a need for the 
state to intervene in order to exert some level of control over hate speech, and the 
role that state institutional frameworks play in reinforcing the violence of this 
language.   
Commonplace yet simultaneously elusive, hate speech speaks with a vague 
familiarity.  Commonplace, because the term has found a home in public discourse and 
is now in regular use in many different spheres: academia; legal; the media; online; 
music; the list goes on.  Elusive because although hate speech may appear 
recognisable, a difficulty is faced when attempting to pinpoint exactly what it is that 
makes something ‘hate speech’.  Despite the threat hate speech is assumed to pose, 
the utterances can be somehow hollow and desolate.  When interrogated at the level 
of the linguistic sign, a signifier considered in isolation will not reveal a word as hate 
                                                                 
1 Taken from Twitter on the 24th June 2016 following the UK’s EU Referendum result on the 23 rd June 
2016. At the time social media platforms were documenting a rise in racist incidents following the vote. 
Police confirmed a 57% rise in reported incidents immediately following the Referendum result. 
https://twitter.com/fullofeels/status/746413588177387520  
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speech.  Through the process of signification, a signifier must be combined with the 
signified to be understood.2  Nevertheless, the combination of form and concept is not 
necessarily enough to tether hate speech in the spotlight. At this point hate speech 
may be real and in use but, if there is no context to clearly identify a word or words as 
hate speech, the meanings of those words can remain unclear or incomplete.  Where a 
lack of clarity exists it can lead to an uncertainty in meaning.  Only when context is 
embraced, where a word becomes meaningful, can something reveal itself as hate 
speech.  Although even then hate speech may remain elusive.3   
As we have seen, it can be difficult to identify where and when hate speech 
exists.  This indicates that we must first consider other factors in order to understand 
what hate speech actually is.  Problems begin immediately in terms of how to identify 
common characteristics that may be consistently present within hate speech.  Shared 
characteristics that might clearly identify hate speech are not always made visible 
through context.  However, assuming that such clarity can be found in context may be 
a doubtful proposition in the first place.  In the book ‘Limited Inc.’(Derrida 2000a), 
Jacques Derrida makes the argument that ‘…a context is never absolutely 
determinable, or rather, … its determination can never be entirely certain or saturated’ 
(Derrida 2000a, 3).  He emphasises that the possibility of all signs being citable 
provides the opportunity for them to ‘…break with every given context engendering an 
infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable.’ (Derrida 2000a, 12)  
                                                                 
2 I am describing a basic semiotic analysis based on Ferdinand de Saussure’s ‘Course in General 
Linguistics’ (Saussure et al. 1983) but with the understanding that later developments allow for the 
consideration of the sign itself more as material than only psychological. 
3 For example, ‘economic migrant’ means a person who has moved to find work; however, during 2016 
it was used by some UK media outlets and politicians as a way of categorising people they claimed 
intended to move to the UK to claim state benefits. Within the second context the term is wildly 
inaccurate and exaggerated but nevertheless, it demonstrates how meanings can be manipulated to 
hide hate speech under a more palatable disguise. 
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As a result, considering context as a complete, singular, element that can help to limit 
and define the parameters in which hate speech can be understood is problematic.4  
What this indicates, it seems to me, is that hate speech must combine with something 
else, a force beyond context, which can be shown to be common for all instances of 
hate speech.  If, as Derrida’s argument shows, it is possible for hate speech to break 
with context, this indicates that a particular sort of violence is taking place.  If violence 
is present then it can potentially give hate speech a mechanism through which it can 
inflict harm.5  How might this force and the barbarity it injects into these injurious 
utterances be understood?6  To progress to that point, there must first be an 
understanding of how the term ‘hate speech’ has come to be understood. 
The term ‘hate speech’ appears to encapsulate a type of linguistic horror within 
a unified and singular concept.7 And that concept appears to be taking shape by 
apparently aiming to detain derogatory, discriminatory and dangerous language.  Yet, 
hate speech remains to some extent intangible because neither a word, nor a word 
coupled with context make something identifiable as hate speech.  Understanding the 
threat and danger of injurious language is impossible without first considering what 
‘hate speech’ really is.  On first appearance, the idea of hate speech seems obvious and 
accessible.  One might assume these utterances are simply verbal expressions of 
                                                                 
4 At this point in his text, Derrida is clear that he is not solely considering written words.  His analysis has 
been expanded to include spoken and written words and linguistic and non-linguistic signs (see pages 3 
to 13 for further details).  While hate speech may appear to relate to spoken language, it will  be shown 
later how hate speech actually encompasses all forms of communication. 
5 Instances of hate speech are now generally accepted as performative speech acts.  However, being 
performative does not in itself explain the power of this language to injure or harm its victims. Another 
influence, violence, gives hate speech an injurious force. 
6 Chapter Three explores force and violence in relation to hate speech and state institutional 
frameworks.  Here, force and violence are used in relation to each other in acknowledgement of Walter 
Benjamin’s  work ‘The Critique of Violence’(Benjamin, Bullock, and Jennings 1996) where he uses the 
term ‘Gewalt’ which means both force and violence. 
7 I use the term ‘l inguistic horror’ because expressions of hate can be extreme and in Chapter Two are 
discussed in the context of genocide. However, this should be treated with some caution as hate speech 
is not necessarily horrific to a hate speaker or an intended victim. 
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hatred but this would be inaccurate.  Through analysing four definitions of hate speech 
from Samuel Walker, L. W. Sumner, Bhikhu Parekh, and The Council of Europe, it will 
be shown that there is an underlying threat posed by hate speech: a threat to wound 
or harm.8  However, in order to make the extent of the threat to harm clear, there 
must be a consideration of how hate speech can transcend the confines of language 
before the definitions can be discussed.  At this point Jerome Neu can be considered to 
make an important and relevant intervention stating that hate speech: 
…aside from causing emotional injury and other harm to individuals, [it] can harm 
interests in community: in civil relations, in equality and non-discrimination, and in 
peaceful and nonhostile environments for work, education and other pursuits that 
must take place in an interactive setting. (Neu 2008, 154)  
What is important in Neu’s statement is the identification of the ability of hate speech 
to inflict trauma beyond language, in civil relations. Often hate speech can be assumed 
to be limited to causing harm only to an individual person.  It is not uncommon to hear 
someone advised to ignore hate speech because it is ‘only words’.  The implication 
here is that such utterances inflict no real or lasting damage.  However, if ‘hate 
speech’, as a term, is now commonly used across a range of public spheres (as 
indicated above), then that in itself suggests that such utterances have a reach beyond 
individuals. Although hate speakers carry an individual responsibility for their use of 
this language, a wider threat that reaches beyond individual people is being signalled.  
Neu demonstrates through his argument in the book ‘Sticks and Stones: the philosophy 
of insults’ (Neu 2008), that hate speech can harm the interests in communities, in 
equality, and in non-hostile environments.  In doing so, an agency in hate speech is 
exposed that signals its ability to wound. 
                                                                 
8 The four definitions have been chosen because they are representative of common and accepted 
understandings of hate speech within the literature.  
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The above points can be further illustrated through the following example: 
Nigel Farage was branded 'fundamentally racist' today after he unveiled a Brexit poster 
showing thousands of male refugees flooding into Europe. The poster uses a picture of 
Syrian refugees being escorted along the Slovenian border during the migrant crisis 
last October and tells voters the EU is at 'breaking point’, adding: “The EU has failed us 
all. We must break free of the EU and take control of our borders.”(Dathan 2016)9 
What is initially shown through this example is that the poster being reported is 
breaking from previous contexts of both the poster display and the image it contains. 
This illustrates Derrida’s notion of citation generating possibilities of illimitable 
contexts. Although the quotation states that the picture reproduced in the poster was 
taken in Slovenia and that the migrants were entering mainland Europe, the original 
context is erased or at least obscured in the poster display.10  The image is thrown into 
a new and political context.  Rather than capturing a human crisis, the meaning 
becomes more sinister.  Stating that ‘our’ borders are out of control and that the 
European Union (EU) is at ‘breaking point’ with an image of many, now unidentified 
and displaced individuals, suggests that the people pictured are somehow responsible.  
While the association is not one based on truth, it is nevertheless a powerful one.  
Being displayed in the UK during the EU Referendum campaign in 2016, and against 
the backdrop of the Home Office ‘hostile environment’ policy, it can be argued that the 
intention of the poster is to arouse hostility against people from beyond the borders  of 
the UK.11  Using the image to promote a particular political position is what prompted 
the outrage at Farage with the result that he was labelled institutionally racist. 
                                                                 
9 The poster has been widely reported and condemned across the UK. The poster is particularly relevant 
to definitions of hate speech as it demonstrates the power of images as hate speech and connects to the 
themes of naming and the constituting power of hate speech examined in this section. 
10 To say the context is erased is not accurate in terms of the article the quotation is taken from.  The 
author does state the details of the original image.  However, the poster itself does not mention the 
origin of the photograph, the people pictured within the image, or the circumstances of movement.  In 
that sense, the context is at least missing if not completely erased and replaced with an alternative. 
11 The ‘hostile environment’ policy was introduced by Theresa May as Home Secretary in 2012.  The 
policy ‘refers to a range of measures aimed at identifying and reducing the number of immigrants in the 
UK with no right to remain.’(Taylor 2018).   
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Combining all of these elements to promote a political agenda starts to show how hate 
speech can begin to harm civil relations and communities in the sense that Neu 
articulates.   
Defining a contested term 
One problem when considering definitions of hate speech, as a means of 
understanding how the term might be understood, is that currently ‘no universally 
accepted definition of the term “hate speech” exists…’ (Weber 2009, 3).  That is not to 
say there are no useful or illuminating existing descriptions that can be used to 
advance this investigation of the term. Instead, it serves as a reminder to be cautious 
in assuming that hate speech is always understood in a shared or consistent way. The 
term ‘hate speech’ first appeared in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) as a draft 
addition in 2002.12  Quotations associated with this entry are noted as dating back to 
1981, suggesting that, ‘hate speech’ remained, for over twenty years, a conceptual 
category that could not be confidently tied down.       
Reasons for this apparent uncertainty around defining hate speech can now be 
explored by considering the complex conditions that refuse but also embrace 
identification.  Direction can be taken from definitions offered by; Walker, Sumner, 
Parekh, and The Council of Europe who have already sought to define or at least 
describe hate speech.  A significant proportion of the definitions share the key feature 
of identifying that hate speech is directed at people or groups because they are 
identified as different or ‘Other’.  A problem arises here because there is an indication, 
                                                                 
12 (Oxford EnglishDictionary [accessed 2019/04/13])  The definition is n. orig. U.S. speech expressing 
hatred or intolerance of other social groups, esp. on the basis of race or sexuality; hostile verbal abuse 
(though the term is sometimes understood to encompass written and non-verbal forms of expression).  
However, the concept of hate speech is significantly older than the point at which the term enters this 
dictionary. A first use is noted as taking place in 1938; however, the majority of references are from the 
1980s as that was the decade that began to acknowledge ‘hate speech’ as a term.  
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that hate speech is not an isolated verbal expression of hate towards someone or 
something that becomes exhausted in the moment of the utterance. Hate speech has 
the potential to harm broader community interests because victims can be targeted 
for their perceived status as ‘Other’.   
However, to understand the underlying threat of harm that might be seen 
more generally within hate speech, a moment must be spent considering the impact 
injurious language can have.  For hate speech to acquire the ability to harm an 
individual it is necessary for that person to be constituted as a linguistic subject, in and 
beyond language.  In order for this to take place, a process of interpellation is required 
that situates a victim of hate speech as a member of a specific group subject to a 
particular form of ideology.13  Where a hate speaker identifies a person as ‘Other’ 
through an ideological construction of identity, that person becomes an individual 
victim of hate speech. However, it can also be argued, that the harm is simultaneously 
a personal one that injures an individual, and a civil harm with the potential to injure 
any person perceived as belonging to the same ideologically constructed group.  As a 
result, it seems to me, that hate speech is never only a random expression of hate 
directed towards one person by another.  A wider danger is apparent that reaches past 
individual people and may play a role in reinforcing ideologically constructed social 
divisions.   
An example of this expanded threat of harm, from others beyond individual 
hate speakers and victims, is drawn from the ‘Findings and Conclusions’ report of the 
                                                                 
13 The process through which an individual is positioned as a subject, in relation to a particular ideology.  
See Louis Althusser ‘Lenin and philosophy, and other essays ’ (Althusser, Brewster, and Jameson 2001) For 
detailed theoretical explanation see pages 170-86. 
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Leicester Hate Crime Project. (Chakraborti, Garland, and Hardy 2014) A participant in 
the research identified as a black British gay woman was quoted as saying: 
 …if the police are standing and someone calls me a nigger, they are straight over 
there.  If someone calls me a filthy dyke, like, they just wait for whatever witty retort I 
come back with and stand and have a giggle. (Chakraborti, Garland, and Hardy 2014, 
73) 
In the situation being described above, hate speech in the form of racism is treated as 
unacceptable by the police and the victim receives help. When the hate speech relates 
to her identity as a gay woman, she is forced to experience both the hate speech of the 
speaker and, a lack of protection from the police. Here, the reaction of the police 
appears to legitimise the homophobic form of hate speech she is suffering.14 Through 
the victim’s description of her experiences, it is clear that the hate speech she refers to 
takes aim at specific parts of her overall identity.  The response of the police appears 
conditional upon which part of her identity is being targeted but not upon the initially 
constituting words of the hate speaker. It is helpful here to understand Judith Butler’s 
development of Louis Althusser’s view of interpellation.  Butler states that ‘the subject 
need not always turn around in order to be constituted as a subject, and the discourse 
that inaugurates the subject need not take the form of a voice at all.’(Butler 1997, 31) 
The above example of the gay woman’s experience of hate speech demonstrates 
Butler’s point.  Part of the discourse to which the gay woman becomes vulnerable is 
not only the hate speech itself but also, the failure of the police to provide protection 
from the hate speaker’s homophobia.  Such a failure is not verbal but manifests in the 
form of inaction. Being seen simultaneously is, what Neu identified as, the wider 
                                                                 
14 The hate speech victim’s  identity is spanning a number of ideologically constructed categories that are 
important for hate speech definitions (race, gender, nationality, and sexual preference).  These 
groupings and their importance will  be considered in the paragraphs below. What is important here is 
that the victim identifies herself as a black British gay woman. 
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community harm threatened by hate speech.  This is because it can be argued in this 
example that homophobic speech is being authorised as acceptable. 
While the process of interpellation functions most effectively when it remains 
invisible, definitions of hate speech can function to disrupt some of its constituting 
power. As will be shown below a number of hate speech definitions rely on identifying 
groups which people can belong to or can be assigned to.  Most often the groups are 
based on predetermined categories of race, ethnicity, religion, and nationality.  The 
individuals assigned to, or identifying with those groups, are those most likely to be 
victims of hate speech.15  Additionally, those identified groups include communities 
that may be likely to suffer the greatest collective harm from hate speech.  These 
observations are important because ‘words have effects in the world and sometimes 
their transformative power is peculiarly direct, constructing and constituting the 
world.’(Neu 2008, 153) If a hate speaker directs a derogatory insult toward an 
addressee and the addressee recognises a harm is inflicted upon them, then hate 
speech constitutes the subject in a subordinate position.16  
At the start of this section I quoted Anne Weber to make the point that there is 
no universally agreed definition of hate speech.  But that is not to say there are not 
differing definitions in existence.  Walker provides a place of departure for this 
discussion when describing ‘hate speech’ as having ‘Traditionally…included any form of 
expression deemed offensive to any racial, religious, ethnic, or national group.’(Walker 
1994, 8).  Four specific groups at risk of being subjected to hate are singled out here.  
                                                                 
15 For examples of other definitions see ‘Extreme Speech and Democracy’(Post, Baker, and Parekh in 
Hare and Weinstein 2009), ‘The Hateful and the Obscene: Studies in the Limits of Free Expression’  (Sumner 
2004)  
16 Butler describes the power of hate speech to constitute the subject in this way but she also questions 
if the constitution is always final or effective. (Butler 1997, 18)  
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This is not accidental but a reflection of the major sociocultural, political and academic 
preoccupations of different eras.  Walker goes on to recognise that these groups are 
broadened during the 1980s to include ‘gender, age, sexual preference, marital status, 
physical capacity, and other categories.’ (Walker 1994, 8)  Expanding definitions 
through the inclusion of new categories serves to locate hate speech across a greater 
range of social constructs, and something telling is revealed as a result. The increasing 
fragmentation that the broadened categories bring about also increase the 
opportunities for hate speech to inflict its injuries .  As has been shown, an individual’s 
identity may span a number of these groups.  Greater specificity in definition might 
recognise this complexity but it can also inadvertently generate a hierarchy of harm 
that privileges the risk hate speech poses to some groups over others.  
Hate speech, when defined in a contemporary setting, is not usually considered 
an isolated unmotivated attack upon a random individual.  Victims are targeted 
because they are identified as different or ‘Other’. And so, hate speech fixates upon a 
(perceived) characteristic that has come to be associated with one or more of these 
named groups.  A concern arises within the process of classifying these groups 
targeted by hate speech that unless membership of one or more of those pre-assigned 
groups is embraced in the definition, then it is feasible that an individual might not be 
recognised as a victim of this injurious speech.  It would be at best cumbersome and at 
worst impossible, to create a definition that includes all conceivable groups that are 
threatened by hate speech.  I am not suggesting that this should be an aim when 
attempting to agree a definition.  Instead an acknowledgement is required that there 
must always be an absence that is accepted as part of hate speech.  Absence and 
uncertainty come to the fore prominently in Walker’s definition because exposing hate 
speech partly depends upon an external judgement.  He states that hate speech is 
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traditionally something deemed offensive but does not attempt to explain who or 
what, may actually deem something offensive.17 A judgement appears to be required 
by an, as yet, unknown authority that holds the power to deem an expression 
offensive.  In seeking clarity through definition, an additional problem has been 
created; who or what is the authority that judges an expression to be ‘hate speech’? 
At this point it is useful to introduce a second definition from Sumner. Sharing 
some similarities with Walker, Sumner acknowledges hate speech goes beyond verbal 
utterances and targets specific social groups.  However, Sumner’s definition includes 
some key differences that I will argue have influence upon the understanding of the 
term ‘hate speech’.  For Sumner, hate speech is understood as: 
…any form of expression whose dominant purpose is to insult or denigrate members 
of a social group identified by such characteristics as race, ethnicity, religion, or sexual 
orientation, or to arouse enmity or hostility against them. (Hare and Weinstein 2009, 
207-8) 
The focus is shifting subtly here.  Whereas Walker is content to consider the effect of 
hate speech as being one judged to cause offence, Sumner identifies a dual purpose 
within this language that seems to me to be crucial in understanding hate speech.  
There is a ‘dominant purpose’ of hate speech to insult, as well as, the recognition that 
hate speech can generate hostility against a victim.  Sumner introduces the idea of an 
intention linked to hate speech and designed to generate particular effects. What this 
suggests to me is that hate speech need not be explicitly hateful in content. Instead it 
could take the form of a hate speaker using more moderate language with the 
intention of encouraging others to express hatred towards members of a social 
                                                                 
17 It is possible that a hate speaker may deem their words offensive which is why they choose them.  A 
victim of hate speech may deem something directed at them offensive.  A court may deem something 
offensive or perhaps a reader or viewer.  Walker does not address this problem in his main text, so who 
deems something offensive is unclear. 
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group.18 No requirement for the forms of expression to be factual, appropriate or true 
is demanded. Examples are numerous. They include phrases such as ‘all Blacks are 
lazy’, ‘all Jews are rich’, or ‘paedophiles are gay’.’19   
With Sumner, the definition of hate speech develops from forms of expression 
that are deemed offensive to a particular group, to expressions  that can arouse 
hostility in others against particular groups.  An additional power of hate speech must 
be recognised here.  Arousing hate in others and encouraging them to direct their 
animosity towards particular groups appears to give hate speech an agency.  If hate 
speech has the capability to arouse hostility in others in this way, the possibility arises 
that new victims will be targeted as a result.  What is uncovered here is that the 
original target of hate speech is never the only one put at risk by expressions of hate. 
Both definitions from Walker and Sumner refer to ‘any form of expression’ that 
is judged to be offensive or has the purpose of being denigrating. They involve a 
helpful and generally accepted recognition that hate speech is not limited to speech or 
writing, despite what its name might suggest.  Accepting the notion that any 
expression can be a form of hate speech is essential for understanding the reach and 
impact expressions of hate can have.  Gestures, images, policies, and even silence can 
all be instances of hate speech.  Each mode of expression potentially possesses the 
power to contribute to the constituting of a subject in a particular and political way. 
However, to say hate speech has a dominant purpose, as Sumner does, suggests that 
hate speech is intended to do something and this can be problematic.  On the one 
hand it allows for the intention of a hate speaker to cause harm to be considered.  On 
                                                                 
18 This idea will  be considered further in Chapter Two under the section titled ‘Hiding in plain speech’  
19 No specific references are given as these slurs are based on well documented and much repeated 
stereotypes that can be considered well known. It is important to point out that people do not have to 
belong to any racial or religious group to be a target by hate speakers.  False associations are common 
but inaccuracy does not make the injury that is infl icted by hate speech any less severe.    
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the other hand, if hate speech has an agency that can arouse hostility in others then an 
additional harmful intention, existing beyond the speaker, also appears to be 
indicated. Although intent is essential in understanding how hate speech is conceived, 
it can also be its most elusive element to uncover.  
There are of course others who seek to resist the inadequacies of the ‘hate 
speech’ label.  In light of this, a third description from Parekh becomes important to 
advance this analysis. For Parekh, the term ‘hate speech’ is itself unsatisfactory 
because the phrase: 
…stresses hatred, an extremely strong emotion’ and allows the concept to be easily 
confused if ‘all forms of uncivil and hurtful  speech’ are subsumed within it. (Herz and 
Molnar 2012, 40).  
  
To this point, the other definitions from Walker and Sumner have emphasised the 
negative effects that hate speech produces (to cause offence, to insult or to create 
hostility).  Parekh adds complexity to how hate speech might be understood by 
distinguishing it from other types of speech that might cause injury.  Sumner appears 
content with assigning to hate speech the intention of causing offence. Parekh is less 
convinced because speech that causes offence may be hurtful but that does not 
necessarily make it hateful. A key distinction is being made that begins to differentiate 
the levels of harm different types of expressions might inflict. Offensive speech can 
harm but it can also incorporate distasteful or rude utterances  that do not 
communicate hate.  By introducing categories of speech that might inflict lesser forms 
of harm, Parekh introduces a value judgement to distinguish what is hateful and what 
is merely uncivil.  Just as Walker’s description of hate speech requires an external 
authority to deem something offensive, so too Parekh’s consideration requires a 
similar judgement. Despite the reservations Parekh articulates about the term ‘hate 
speech’, he nevertheless commits to a definition on the basis that the expression ‘is 
25 
 
widely used and there is no obvious alternative’(Herz and Molnar 2012, 40) stating 
that: 
…hate speech expresses, encourages, stirs up, or incites hatred against a group of 
individuals distinguished by a particular feature or set of features such as race, 
ethnicity, gender, religion, nationality, and sexual orientation. (Herz and Molnar 2012, 
40)   
Parekh’s reluctance to accept the term ‘hate speech’ emphasises the difficult nuances 
faced when attempting to accurately define these forms of expression. Such resistance 
in the face of the term’s inadequacies goes some way to explaining the difficulties in 
defining ‘hate speech’.   
What is beginning to become visible is how hate speech is able to create and 
re-enforce social division and difference. I suggest the divisions are made firstly and 
most obviously by identifying, through the definitions, who is vulnerable to this 
language. The definitions identify members of different religions, races, genders, and 
nationalities who may be subjected to expressions of hate.  Secondly, although the 
process of defining the term is necessary, it also unintentionally colludes with hate 
speech and provides a way for a new division to be made.  Since any definition is never 
entirely comprehensive (and will also adapt over time), they must always exclude or at 
least omit, some groups who are vulnerable to hate speech.   
‘Hate speech’, the term that designates the idea, forces another splinter by 
virtue that it exists at all.  In creating a name that claims a coherent, identifiable 
concept, hate speech is granted an authorised space in language where it is 
recognised.  Additionally, hate speech is able to combine with and separate from other 
types of harmful speech (such as racist language or homophobic language), depending 
on the degree of harm that is inflicted.  It is necessary to continually revise definitions 
of hate speech but the process of undertaking these repeated revisions ensures that a 
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shared certainty of meaning remains an impossibility.  Definitions of hate speech are 
always susceptible to continual change, reframing, manipulation and omissions. 
Therefore, absence and uncertainty become a necessary part of the term that is 
understood as ‘hate speech’.   
Maintaining an openness to re-evaluation of the definitions is essential but is 
not without its problems.   Definitions must keep pace with changing conceptions of 
the term itself, the ways in which hate speech is deployed within language, the victims 
who are targeted, and with the methods these utterances employ to injure.  And yet, 
despite the challenges, those who seek to define hate speech also hold power over 
how the term is understood.  Perhaps unintentionally, they are able to influence what 
is omitted or unrecognised as hate speech.  This leads to a site of continual conflict 
where hate speech can thrive because the term must always exist in an uncertain state 
of revision. 
What is consistent in the three definitions from Walker, Sumner, and Parekh, is 
how each privileges the effects of hate speech above any unique or quintessential 
features of the content of expressions.  Each example under discussion asserts that 
hate speech conveys, promotes, or generates hatred in some form or another.  
However, in emphasising only the effects of hate speech, a problem can be seen.  
These indicate but do not address the notion that, in some sense, the impacts and 
harms inflicted by hate speech must occur prior to the utterance itself.  The conditions 
that enable harm to be inflicted by this language must already be in place in advance 
of a communication.  Whether such conditions are known or unknown is unimportant.  
What is significant is that these apparent pre-existing conditions create an 
environment where hate speech can succeed in its aim to inflict harm. 
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With each struggle for precision, these definitions of hate speech expose some 
of the key problems with attempting to understand and locate the harm these 
expressions can inflict.  Two common themes are visible.  Firstly, hate speech is agreed 
to encapsulate all forms of expression and, through these, its power to constitute and 
situate the linguistic subject in specific ways is identified.  Secondly, there is a 
recognition that some groups are considered more vulnerable to, or more frequent 
targets of, hate speech.  At the same time, questions arise over who or what may be 
authorising hate speech and judging the extent of the threatened harms.  The 
centrality given in the definitions to the effects of hate speech suggest that hate 
speech itself is not a random or an accidental explosion of vitriol.  Instead, there is a 
suggestion that hate speech is constructed with purpose, with the intention of 
communicating and sometimes creating hatred.  If this is the case then, it seems to 
me, that hate speech cannot ultimately depend on how one subject or another 
interprets an instance of communication. As has been shown, a different authority, 
one that is as yet unknown, has the power to name something hate speech and judge 
the level of harm that may be inflicted.  Later chapters will go on to uncover that 
authority and reveal it as something beyond both the hate speaker and the victim of 
hate speech.  
A term gathering force 
So less than 20 hrs after Brexit results announced, I have the pleasure of being called 
"a Paki  c*nt in a suit" by a homeless man.20 
At the beginning of the chapter I stated that hate speech is known when it is 
heard but there is a difficulty in pinpointing exactly what makes something hate 
                                                                 
20 https://twitter.com/TheBuddhaSmiled/status/746453286077796356 A personal account of suffering 
verbal abuse published on Twitter.  The incident is important for discussions of hate speech because it 
demonstrates that perceived social status or economic privilege provide no protection from bec oming a 
victim. 
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speech, which makes these forms of expression elusive. The statement now requires 
some clarification. It would seem that hate speech comes to be understood, at least in 
part, through its destructive results.  It is now known that some definitions of hate 
speech consistently focus on the effects of these forms of expression.21  However, they 
avoid giving explanations as to what content or form hate speech may actually have.  
Hate speech is referred to as a presupposed category and the definitions cited here 
persistently restate who is vulnerable to its attacks.  Such a blind spot in how the term 
is understood allows hate speech the opportunity to begin to enforce its power.    
When hate speech incidents are analysed there is a tendency to place a 
reliance upon alternative concepts that seek to quantify the potential harms of these 
forms of expression.  Other approaches construct arguments around the justifications 
for legislative restrictions on hate speech.  Rather than being problematic, this 
frequent diversion within the hate speech literature actually serves to reinforce and 
highlight the contested space of definition.  Ensuring the term is open to continual 
challenge and re-evaluation allows for its adaption to unstable external influences and 
helps the concept of hate speech maintain cultural relevance. 
A moment is needed to remember the complicated themes that have arisen 
from considering definitions of hate speech that have a bearing on the concept itself.  
Because hate speech takes root across diverse and evolving social and political 
categories, no singular, universal definition of hate speech can, nor does, exist.  
However, the following common characteristics have emerged thus far: 
                                                                 
21 Alexander Brown in the thorough and engaging article ‘What is Hate Speech? Part 1: The Myth of 
Hate’ makes the point that ‘…only some characterisations stress that hate speech, properly called, 
typically causes or has a substantial l ikelihood of causing harm of one kind or another.’ (pg. 437) 
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1. Hate speech is not limited to verbal utterances and can occur within all  forms 
of expression. 
2. Definitions tend to treat hate speech as a presupposed concept. 
3. Definitions usually focus on the effects of hate speech not its content. 
4. Hate speech is not random.  It is intended to cause harm, premeditated, and 
authorised by an external authority. 
5. Groups most at risk from hate speech are constituted as ‘Other’. 
6. Absence and uncertainty in meaning are an inextricable part of hate speech. 
7. A divisive and violent force gives hate speech its injurious power. 
As the ultimate aim of the chapter is to show how the term ‘hate speech’ is  
understood and how hate speech occupies a place in discourse, these characteristics 
must be examined in more detail.  Performing as it does  means that hate speech has a 
constituting power that reaches across all forms of expression.  Hate speech 
definitions encourage the idea that forms of expression of hatred can be considered as 
vehicles for asserting, or arousing hatred of, and in, others.  And yet, we seem to lack 
the vocabulary to adequately articulate this thing that is ‘hate speech’.  Recognised as 
stronger and more virulent than offense or insult, explanations are forced to qualify 
hate speech through recourse to inadequate and lesser descriptions.  Each synonym 
(insult, denigration, offense) is simultaneously essential and deficient.   
Hannah Arendt explores a comparable problem in her book ‘On 
Violence’(Arendt 1970) when describing a failing in the terminology used to consider 
violence because it does not sufficiently differentiate between specific key terms.  
Although the problem of sensitivity to specific terms is relevant here, Arendt’s work is 
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additionally important for understanding hate speech because it focuses on violence.22 
Even in the work of having to supplant hate with other descriptors, in the hope of 
exposing the nature or essence of hate speech, the tools  to do so seem to be missing.23  
Where other words are synonymised with hate, opportunities are created for this 
injurious language to go unseen and unnamed.  For example, hate speech might be 
downgraded to an insult or offensive remark. In these circumstances there is a risk of 
failing to acknowledge an utterance as one that specifically expresses hate.  Arendt 
articulates this problem writing that, ‘to use them as synonyms not only indicates a 
deafness to linguistic meanings, which would be serious enough, but it has also 
resulted in a kind of blindness to the realities they correspond to.’(Arendt 1970, 43) 
Whereas hate speech is no doubt offensive, not all offensive utterances can be 
considered hate speech. Some are merely distasteful.  The blindness Arendt articulates 
in terms of violence is relevant here because, when considered in the context of hate 
speech, it can explain how this type of injurious speech exploits an ability to claim 
other terms, using them as a shield to avoid being fully exposed.  When shrouded in 
this way, hate speech can appear less dangerous giving the illusion that it is ‘only 
words’ in the sense of posing no direct threat to an individual.24  By exploiting the 
deafness to meaning hate speech creates a lure, offering a false assurance that 
expressions of hate no longer pose a danger.  Where the masquerade is accepted, a 
                                                                 
22 A continual theme throughout the text, and particularly in Chapter Three, shows how violence is a key 
element of hate speech.   
23 Derrida uses the term ‘suppleer’ meaning both to supplant and supplement.  The translation into 
English uses ‘supplant’ to articulate a ‘concept of absence as the modification of presence’ (Derrida 
2000a, 6) as examined through Derrida’s reading of Condillac in the essay ‘Signature Event Context’. 
24 I am using ‘only words’ as a reference to speech but also to the book ‘Only Words’ (MacKinnon 1993) 
Catharine MacKinnon argues that pornography constitutes women in positions of subjugation and is 
authorised by the state ‘…establishing what women are said to exist as, are seen as, are treated as, 
constructing a social reality of what a woman is and can be in terms of what can be done to her…’ 
(MacKinnon 1993, 25) MacKinnon of course always knows and rejects the problem of the ‘only words’ 
argument. 
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blindness to the discriminatory practices that hate speech requires in order to exist can 
also follow.25  The masquerade can also be argued to have the effect of masking the 
previously identified intention of hate speech to generate particular effects  beyond an 
individual hate speaker.  Absence that is in fact presence, generated through deafness, 
follows hate speech like a spectre.26  What is shown is an ever present and 
unavoidable failing in attempts to uncover the essence of expressions of hate. 
Understanding the weight and importance of linguistic precision, and how 
neglecting particular words or terms may obscure social realities to which they 
correspond, allows for a final definition to be drawn into discussion. The ‘Manual on 
Hate Speech’ (Weber 2009) is a publication designed to ‘guide policy makers, experts 
and society as a whole on the criteria followed by the European Court of Human Rights 
[ECHR] in its case law relating to the right to freedom of expression.’(Weber 2009 
Foreword)  As Weber’s text takes hate speech as its subject and is designed to guide 
society as a whole, it can be argued that it has relevance to the realities of social 
relations.27  The importance here is that ECHR case law informs a specific definition of 
hate speech provided by The Council of Europe. As a result, a direct relationship 
between hate speech and society as a whole is created through legal means.  What is 
evident here is that there has become a need for states to intervene and attempt to 
                                                                 
25 It is important when analysing hate speech not to accept that this type of language resides only within 
abstract l inguistic categories.  Hate speech produces and is a product of, discriminatory practices that 
shape the social world.  Lacking a full  and res ilient vocabulary to articulate hate can mean it is easy to 
fall  back in to less threatening terms and as a result fail  to fully comprehend the savagery and force with 
which this language strikes.  
26 I am referring to Derrida when he writes that ‘One never inherits without coming to terms with 
[s’expliquer avec] some spectre, and therefore with more than one spectre. With the fault but also the 
injunction of more than one.’(Derrida 1994, 21)   
27 Further discussion of the relationship between hate speech and the law will  be pursued through 
chapter three.   
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control hate speech via the law. Weber’s text also introduces a new theme that links 
hate speech directly to freedom of expression.   
The Council of Europe in Recommendation 97(20) states: 
…the term “hate speech” shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which 
spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti -Semitism or other 
forms of hatred based on intolerance, including: intolerance expressed by aggressive 
nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, 
migrants and people of immigrant origin. (Weber 2009, 3)     
This is the most detailed definition considered so far; however, the seven common 
characteristics identified earlier in the chapter remain evident.  Importantly, however, 
the context of this definition, because it is informed by criteria used in freedom of 
expression case law, pits hate speech and free speech in a false opposition.28  
Additionally, the definition introduces a much clearer link between hate speech and 
law indicating a state interest in gaining some sort of control over this type of 
language.  The definitions considered earlier were produced within academic texts. 
Weber’s is designed for policy makers with an understanding that the definition is 
likely to shape real political approaches to hate speech.  The result is that paragraph 2 
of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights becomes relevant, that is to 
say freedom of expression being considered a human right.29  To pursue this thread, it 
is necessary to accept that freedom of expression is applicable to all information and 
ideas including those ‘…that offend, shock, or disturb the State or any sector of the 
population.’(Weber 2009, 20)  
A tension arises here because hate speech definitions referred to earlier in the 
chapter include ‘offence’.  There is a need to remain mindful that hate speech can 
                                                                 
28 Considering this relationship between free speech and hate speech on the basis they are mutually 
exclusive is, it seems to me, a false opposition since hate speech is a part of language in and of itself.  
Free speech is a principle that relates to human rights and so incorporates hate speech but is not in 
opposition to it. 
29 For full  details on the ECHR framework in relation to hate speech see ‘Hate Speech Revisited’ 
(Noorloos 2011, 57-119) 
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‘offend’ and so might also be considered a legitimate statement of free expression. In 
addition, Article 10 introduces a new layer in terms of differential levels of offence by 
recognising expressions that shock and disturb.  At this stage I will focus on the 
influence of rights to freedom of expression and case law on the concept of hate 
speech because they bring to the fore the challenges of linguistic precision, as Arendt 
has emphasised.  I will argue that where a lack of precision or over-reliance on 
synonym are evident they generate a conflict that begins to imbue hate speech with a 
particular power to strike.   
In the moment of aligning hate speech with offense, through a connection with 
freedom of expression, the demolition of the boundaries between the two is 
witnessed.  To uphold ideals of freedom of expression there must be space for 
offensive utterances to be tolerated.30  And yet, hate speech itself, at least on the 
surface, remains intolerable.  Hate speech can be offensive speech but not all offensive 
speech can be hate speech.  By what means can this contradiction be reconciled?  If 
expressions that offend are tolerated on the basis of freedom of expression they are, 
in some respects, especially in a legal sense, no longer hate speech. Part of the 
problem lies in failing to clearly distinguish between offensive speech and hate speech.  
One might argue that this is done through considering the effects, considering the 
impact hate speech has.  Did a form of expression promote, incite or justify hate? 
However, to tackle the problem of hate speech once its effects are known seems too 
late. Constructing a conflict between hate speech and freedom of expression seems to 
suggest that injurious language is now capable of eluding full exposure and, worse still, 
can affect its own sanitisation. While hate speech need not be based in fact, there is 
                                                                 
30 Behind this statement is a question of who authorises hate speech in the sense of judging its severity 
against other forms of speech that may hurt or offend.  Chapter Three will  address this point.  
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now a burden, not to show something is hate speech but, to show why something is 
not just shocking, offensive or disturbing.  In part, this is a result of the inevitable and 
required act of substituting words for others in efforts to reveal hate speech in 
meaningful ways.  When the state intervenes to control hate speech through law and 
policy, an additional force is exerted that gives hate speech further opportunities to 
refuse identification and to demand a level of toleration in public discourse.  
Instances of hate speech are, under these circumstances, too easily relegated 
to the lower levels of offense or insult.  Again the absence and hollowness hate speech 
requires is seen. Expressions of hate are not so much a fleeting burst of hateful energy 
that flares up and swiftly disappears.  Instead, a blindness to the substance of what 
sustains hate speech is generated because, as the expressions are interrogated for 
evidence of their essence, they can evaporate and vanish under the scrutiny.  
Nevertheless, hate speech does not die and disappear.  Instead, these expressions of 
hate transform and reappear; changed, yet the same.  Like a snake shedding its skin, 
hate speech, once in danger of being exposed, moves on leaving its empty casing 
behind to distract us from following.31   
A pause is needed here as a site of conflict and creation is being uncovered.  
Arendt cautions in her text that ‘violence’ should not be substituted for, or used 
interchangeably with, other distinct terms such as power.  This problem is equally true 
of hate speech and yet, achieving a desired differentiation between expressions of 
hate and other insults is also impossible.  As has been seen with offense, hate speech 
can masquerade as less threatening forms of language when in fact it poses a much 
                                                                 
31 Here I am invoking the spectres conjured by Derrida in response to international transformations 
proclaiming the death of Marxism (Derrida 1994).  It is not Marxism that is of significance for hate 
speech but rather the concept of the spectre.  
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greater threat.  A claim is made by hate speech to assert its power over words that 
would seek to unmask it.  In claiming other analogous terms as its own, hate speech 
creates a tension specifically around the levels of brutality expressions of hatred 
expose people to.  Hate speech acts coercively to force the questions of how much 
injury has been caused and if that level of harm is significant enough to be called ‘hate 
speech’.  Finding ways to quantify the trauma and determine the depth of the wound 
inflicted by hate speech begins to take precedence. By causing a distraction in this way, 
hate speech is able to increase its power to harm. Arguably, hate speech is aided in this 
endeavour by state interventions designed to control hate speech because they can 
create a false opposition between hate speech and freedom of expression.  
To accept that hate speech is in conflict with freedom of expression limits how 
much of this language can be kept in view at any one time and as a result, and 
potentially how effective any response to hate speech may be.  This is because too 
little attention would be paid to how hate speech is conceived as a broad collection of 
communications.  Analysing individual hate speech instances or events in the context 
of whether they are legal, discriminatory or harmful, and in terms of the harmful 
effects those instances of hate speech generate, is also limiting.  So too are approaches 
that focus on a presupposed need to balance rights of freedom of expression against 
those of restricting hate speech.  While remaining incredibly valuable as ways of 
locating trends and similarities between hate speech incidents, these approaches can 
fail to illuminate the resilient, dangerous, and chameleon character of hate speech 
itself, which, is why I have taken a different approach here. 
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Violent acts 
By engaging, through The Council of Europe’s  definition of hate speech, with the 
broader influence of state interest in expressions of hate, an opportunity arises to 
explore the divisive and violent force that is a common trait of injurious utterances.  
Divisions in definitions that attempt to provide clarity, inadvertently allow hate speech 
to target victims more directly.  Positioning hate speech as in conflict with principles of 
free expression shows that hate speech is more than only words.32  Identifying the 
targets of hate speech within the definitions by attributing characteristics to them such 
as age, gender, or ethnicity, can be argued to show a political function.  Building 
definitions around constructs that are subject to inclusion or exclusion depending on 
political or social circumstances does two things.33  Firstly, hate speech receives a type 
of authorisation because the named groups are identified as targets for these injurious 
utterances.  Secondly, a risk is generated of failing to recognise the harm hate speech 
inflicts upon people or communities who remain unnamed. The crucial point, I suggest, 
is the act of exclusion that takes place in the naming and identifying of some groups 
and not others within each definition. Hate speech makes an act of violent division 
here.  In fact, a double action occurs in the moment of naming.  The defined groups 
become burdened with a heavy weight; one of difference, of being other, of not being 
‘normal’.  In the moment of classifying difference within a definition and, in particular, 
when that description is forced into opposition with a broader principle that, ‘…is not 
only a consequence of democracy, [but] it also stands as one of its roots and 
continuously fosters it’ (Weber 2009, 19) a moment of rupture is witnessed, a moment 
                                                                 
32 Examples include ‘Trigger Warning’ (Hume 2015).’I find that Offensive’ (Fox 2016), ‘Extreme speech and 
democracy’ (Bodney, Edgar in Hare and Weinstein 2009) 
33 I mean that current groupings included in hate speech definitions can and do change.  If the category 
of age was removed it would be because it may have lost its politi cal relevance and could result in ageist 
hate speech becoming unrecognised by state controls. 
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of violence.34  What does this mean for understanding the concept of hate speech?  Is 
hate speech claiming to emerge from a place of normality; is hate speech claiming to 
be ‘normal’? 
Acting normal 
Initially, stating that hate speech can claim to be normal might seem a ridiculous 
proposition.  Hate speech is not normal in the sense that it is usually considered a 
typical or customary part of public discourse.35  Expressions of hate are terrible, 
abhorrent and unwanted. What I mean here is that the harms that hate speech can 
inflict are recognised and understood to cause damage.  36  An observer, as opposed to 
a victim of hate speech, may consider expressions of hate abhorrent and yet, hate 
speech persists; hate speech may be terrible and yet it persists; hate speech may be 
unwanted and yet it persists.  No matter how repulsive injurious utterances may 
appear, they nonetheless continually demand and receive a place within public 
discourse.  As argued previously through the process of engulfing and over-powering 
its synonyms, hate speech ensures its own sanitization producing the illusion that the 
harm which hate inflicts is lessened.  This question of normality demonstrates how this 
works.  Hate speech may not be considered ‘normal’ within public discourse. However, 
shocking, offensive and contemptible utterances, though distasteful, are accepted as a 
                                                                 
34 The force de rupture that is the ‘very structure of the written text’ allowing it to break with context in 
the moment of inscription (Derrida 2000a, 9). It seems to me that the separation involved allows 
individually innocuous words or signs to be used as hate speech. 
35 What or whose discourse is another question that cannot be answered here but there should be some 
recognition that the category is problematic and not at all  unified. 
36 The presumption in this thesis is that all  hate speech is harmful and dangerous. While this is 
defensible given that hate speech is often destructive, there can be instances where hate speech has no 
effect or where these expressions are authorised in some way. 
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necessity of free expression.37 It seems to me that the points debated above are the 
reason a Presidential candidate in the United States is able to say: 
”[Mexico] are sending people that have lots of problems, and they are bringing those 
problems to us. They are bringing drugs, and bringing crime, and their rap ists,” the 
business mogul said. (Gabbatt 2015)38 
To suggest hate speech might be ‘normal', is not to blithely assert it is acceptable, 
harmless, or even simply, a burden our discourse must bear.  Instead, the issue is really 
whether hate speech can be considered usual or acceptable in public discourse.  Who 
is accustomed to hate speech?  But, a glimpse of the real problem is seen here.  When 
a Brexit campaigner boldly and publicly claims, that sex attacks perpetrated by 
immigrants will increase if Britain votes to remain in the European Union, surely it 
becomes clear that hate speech is more commonplace than one may care to admit.39  
Here it is important to return to my indicated, but not yet explored, suggestion that 
an external force authorises hate speech to harm.  During the earlier discussion of 
Walker’s description of hate speech, I raised the point that if something is deemed to 
be hate speech, then some external authority beyond the addressor and addressee 
must authorise it as such.  Such an external validator appears in the Brexit campaigner 
example.  Publicly linking responsibility for sex attacks to immigrants surely promotes, 
or at least aims to promote, ‘hostility against migrants and people of immigrant 
origin.’(Weber 2009, 3) It seems to me that the comments meet the definition of ‘hate 
speech’ proffered by the Council of Europe.  Given that this particular definition is 
informed by European case law (but with the proviso that this scenario plays out under 
                                                                 
37 Examples of this point are available in ‘A Duty to Offend’ (O'Neill  2015) and ‘Free expression is no 
offence’ (Appignanesi 2005) and ‘I find that Offensive!’(Fox 2016) 
38 This is a quote taken from a speech made by the Republican Presidential Nominee, Donald Trump on 
16 June 2015 and reported widely by the UK press.  Trump was later elected President. 
39 Nigel Farage made the sex attack comments in an interview with The Telegraph newspaper.  The 
article text was ‘Women could be at risk of mass sex attacks carried out by gangs of migrant men if 
Britain stays in the EU’ (Ross 2016) 
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somewhat different national laws across the EU), it seems to me that comments 
meeting its criteria could potentially be unlawful.40  Nevertheless, no calls for an 
investigation were made.  Perhaps more alarmingly, especially given the public context 
of the statement, is that few demands for an apology were made.  Some form of 
authorisation is taking place here that allows the speaker to make these comments 
without being tempered by a serious threat of repercussions  (or at least legal 
repercussions).  I suggest that this indicates that a source more powerful than that 
wielded by an individual speaker, has influence over the conditions under which hate 
speech becomes ‘sayable’.41  For the time being, who or what, authorises hate speech 
in this situation remains unclear, but the existence and power of an external authority 
seems evident. 
Both examples, from Donald Trump and the Brexit campaigner, work to create 
division and promote hate.  One seeks to divide Americans and Mexicans, and the 
other seeks division between migrants and non-migrants in the UK.  Hate speech 
makes a violent intervention in both situations. When hate speech is named and when 
it is known as a category of language (however distasteful that might be), expressions 
of hate become, in some senses, normalized.  A different example that also shows how 
hate speech can be normalised can be seen in instances where people understand 
singular epithets, like ‘nigger’ or ‘faggot’, as hate speech.42  At the point of someone 
                                                                 
40 The Donald Trump example given earlier in the section is slightly different as it is situated in the 
context of the US where legal traditions and cultural views of free speech are usually considered to be 
somewhat different to those in the UK. However, there is sti l l an authorisation taking place that allows 
Trump to speak from a position of power and influence. 
41 In the book ‘Excitable Speech’, and the chapter ‘Sovereign Performative’, Butler states ‘the border 
that produces the speakable by excluding certain forms of speech becomes an operation of censorship 
exercised by the very postulation of the universal.’ (Butler 1997, 90) The state is shown to draw the 
boundaries between the speakable and the unspeakable through speech regulations. 
42 At the beginning of the chapter I stated that semiotics alone will  not reveal a word as hate speech 
because the sign is not enough to reveal their meaning.  The single words referred to in this section 
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recognising the words and understanding them to be hateful, the meaning and force of 
these injurious utterances is exposed.  The words appear to conform to a standard that 
is understood as typical of hate speech.43  A recognised shared meaning seems to 
allow the word to be understood in a way that does not depend on the interpretation 
of its context but still identifies it as hate speech.  It does not mean that the use of 
particular words is condoned, or accepted, or inflicts no injury. Instead, the words 
appear to be acknowledged and known to belong to the broad conceptual category 
that has come to be termed ‘hate speech’.  However, a problem arises here, as it has 
previously been argued, that hate speech thrives in a site of continual conflict exactly 
because the term itself must always exist in an uncertain state of revision.  If hate 
speech is, to some extent, always uncertain then how can some words conform to 
what appears to be a broader shared understanding?   
What’s in a word?   
"And then he says to me 'yeah, that goes for you as well'. He starts calling me the N word 
and told me to 'go home'." (News 2016)44 
To respond to the question above, it is helpful to remember an earlier point that 
hate speech possesses an agency that allows it to reach beyond language.  Singular 
words that encapsulate hate may initially appear to contradict the point that hate 
speech must always involve absence and uncertainty but that is not the case.  Instead 
these individual names allow a new strand of investigation to be taken forward that 
                                                                 
move the discussion forwards as they are saturated with political meaning through their histories.  The 
point will  be addressed directly in the following section. 
43 The standard to which I say the words conform may go unexplained or unartic ulated but the standard 
is nevertheless met in the understanding that the words represent hate speech. 
44 Trish Adudu, a BBC reporter, became a victim of hate speech and was interviewed about her 
experience by Nick Owen for BBC Midlands on 30 June 2016.  The quotation is taken from the 
transcribed text of the television interview available through the BBC website.  In the embedded video 
of the interview, the victim conveys what her abuser said repeating the word ‘nigger’ twice.  The 
transcribed text is edited to change those sentences to the quote shown above where the epithet is 
changed to ‘the N word’.  
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can resolve the difficulty.  What of ‘Paki’, ‘Nigger’ or ‘Dyke’ for example?  They all 
scream ‘hate speech’ in a single name.  I could argue that I understand these particular 
words ooze hate because I already know how I should conceive each one.  To know 
these words, I must also know their hateful meanings.  To some extent this is true but 
there is also another factor at play.  Earlier in the chapter I argued that hate speech 
always carries an underlying threat to wound, and that the conditions that allow hate 
speech to harm always precede any communication.  These singular names 
communicate beyond the moment of the utterance because each one has a history 
that can be accessed.  Such a history is not just related to contexts and content but 
what Butler describes as being: 
…the history that has come to be internal to a name, has come to constitute the 
contemporary meaning of a name: the sedimentation of its usages as they have 
become part of the very name, a sedimentation, a repetition that congeals, that gives 
the name its force. (Butler 1997, 36)  
From the slurs cited above it would seem that cultural memory combines with 
iteration, allowing a turbulent and violent history to distil so potently, it can be 
conjured through the invocation of a single name.  Through repetitive use in different 
situations, the negative meanings of the words solidify in their association with hate. 
Hate becomes constitutive of hate speech.  The word alone becomes enough to harm 
because that word always carries the weight of every harm inflicted through its prior 
use.  Each use adds a layer of sediment, an additional history and, by extension, 
increases the potential violence that can be forced upon a future victim.45   
 An example that illustrates this point can be taken from a recent speech made 
by Suella Braverman MP that resulted in her being heavily criticised for using the term 
                                                                 
45 There are a number of instances where people have attempted to reclaim some of these derogatory 
words through the process of resignification.  Although important, I have not included discussion within 
the main text as even where resignification takes place the word as hate speech remains understood 
and often in use. 
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‘cultural Marxism.’46 Often associated with the far right, the term refers to a 
conspiracy theory that is considered to be anti-Semitic.  A phrase like ‘cultural 
Marxism’ can be said to demonstrate the sedimentation that Butler describes  because 
its history has come to constitute its meaning. However, in addition, a comment made 
about the incident by a spokesperson reveals something new: 
Suella Braverman MP may not have been aware of it, but the term ‘cultural Marxist’ 
has a history as an antisemitic trope. We would ask for her to clarify the remarks and 
undertake not to use the phrase in future. (Walker 2019) 
As is indicated in this extract, the history that Butler describes as being ‘internal to the 
name’ has given the term ‘cultural Marxism’ a force that allows it to injure.  However, 
in saying that Braverman ‘may not have been aware of it’, it can be argued that these 
histories cannot be assumed to be equally accessible to everyone.47 If some of the 
sedimentation within a word remains unseen, then the absence and uncertainty I 
argued is a necessary part of hate speech, again becomes visible. However, the words 
still contain a violence that propels the underlying threat of hate speech to harm, 
regardless of whether the history is known or not. I argue that this is a force that 
supplants the violence of each utterance with misdirection.48 In diverting attention to 
what remains a real shared understanding of names like ‘nigger’, the powerful point of 
continuity and shared comprehension (which I argue is violence) can go unseen. 
Violence propels hate speech, ensuring its performative power to inflict harm.  Where 
hate speech is concerned, the misdirection I suggest takes place is not a ‘natural’ 
development miraculously evolving over time.  Rather, it is the use and iterablility of 
                                                                 
46 Braverman was quoted as saying ‘We are engaging in many battles right now. As Conservatives we are 
engaged in a battle against cultural Marxism, where banning things is becoming de rigueur;’(Walker 
2019) 
47 At the time, Braverman was challenged about her use of ‘cultural Marxism.’  From her response it is 
not clear if she was directly aware of the anti -Semitic connotations although she did not di rectly deny 
knowing.  She responded by defending her use of the term.   
48 Again I referring the translation of ‘suppleer’ used by Derrida and explained under footnote 23. 
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hate words, structured and pre-determined by social and political conditions, which 
precede the words and ensure their violence.  As Lynne Tirrell points out ‘People may 
use them casually, participating in practice without being fully aware of the details of 
the practice.’ (Maitra and McGowan 2012, 206)  However, even when a person may be 
ignorant of a name’s internal history, they can still know the word carries a threat to 
harm.49  Such a force is exerted in the process of naming, since the naming both 
constitutes a linguistic subject and makes their vulnerability to language transparent.   
This chapter began by demonstrating that hate speech cannot be fully revealed 
through content and context alone because, as performative speech acts, the 
iterability of these forms of expression allows them to break with context.  Such a 
point of disruption was the first insight into the violence that shapes hate speech and 
its definitions.50  As the end of the chapter draws near, it seems to me appropriate, to 
return to this site of violence and to propose that it may reveal a glimpse into the 
future of the term ‘hate speech’.  A famous passage from the play ‘Romeo and Juliet’ 
can be read in this context to elaborate my point: 
ROMEO    By a name 
I know not how to tell thee who I am: 
My name, dear saint, is hateful to myself 
Because it is an enemy to thee. 
Had I it written, I would tear the word.(Shakespeare et al. 2001, 1015) 
The final line of the poetic quotation presents an intriguing opportunity to consider the 
violence, which I have argued is both internal and external to hate speech, from a 
                                                                 
49 Social conditions can be argued to function to reinforce this point.  For example, when a child is 
warned not to call  someone a name because it is ‘bad’ or ‘nasty’ that child will  not understand the 
lengthy and painful histories that are internal to a particular name.  Nevertheless, they are l ikely to 
understand that it is considered wrong to use the word because it can hurt someone. 
50 During this chapter there has been an underlying presupposition of hate speech as a performative 
speech act that can be argued to be supported by the focus on effects of hate speech in the definitions.  
Hate speech does act. However, chapter two will  look in more detail  at hate speech being positioned as 
a performative speech act. 
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slightly different perspective.  The idea of tearing the word or name, as indicated in the 
quotation, is a physical possibility for a written inscription. In a more modern sense of 
a typeface displayed on a screen, the act of tearing could potentially be replicated with 
a strikethrough.51 Conceiving this action within other types of communication may 
appear more challenging, especially if Roland Barthes’s assertion that ‘Speech is 
irreversible; that is its fatality…In speaking, I  can never erase, annul; all I can do is say 
“I am erasing, annulling, correcting”, in short, speak some more’ (Barthes 1989, 76) is 
considered.  However, to tear the word as Romeo wishes is not to erase, instead it 
implies a violent rejection. A tear must leave behind a residue or a part of the name. 
The apparent contradiction here between speech and writing can be resolved through 
the positioning of hate speech as a performative speech act because, ‘Performative 
utterances operate according to the same logic as written marks…’(Butler 1997, 148)  
Under these circumstances, to ‘tear the word’ can be construed as the force de rupture 
that Derrida explores as a ‘breaking force’ in the ‘very structure of the written 
text,’(Derrida 2000a, 9)52 but it is not limited to the written text.53 Considering the 
tearing of a name in this way, as a force de rupture, might allow hate speech itself, the 
idea that is represented by the name, to break ‘with its context, that is, with the 
collectivity of presences organizing the moment of its inscription’ (Derrida 2000a, 9). In 
the act of existing in a state of continual revision, it seems to me that, ‘hate speech’ as 
a term is never far from the possibility of being torn apart and reimagined. And so, I 
                                                                 
51 Although the supplemented electronic option may lack the physical force of an actual tear, I would 
argue the intention is similar enough for a comparison to be drawn. 
52 A full  explanation of the force de rupture is given in ‘Limited Inc.,’(Derrida 2000a).   
53 Hate speech as a performative speech act will  be considered in chapter two.   
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suggest that there is a possibility that hate speech can shed its name and move into 
the future under a different guise.54   
The original aim of this chapter was to answer the question of how the term 
‘hate speech’ is understood and how expressions of hate come to occupy a place in 
our modern discourse.  A point has been reached where a response to these questions 
can be articulated.  Through examining four definitions of hate speech, and seven 
characteristics I have argued they share, I have made a case for recognising violence as 
the real foundation for understanding the term ‘hate speech’.  Consequently, I 
conclude this chapter by stating that the term ‘hate speech’ can be understood 
through violence, and that it is violence that allows hate speech to claim a place in 
discourse.   
As there is no universally accepted definition of the term ‘hate speech’, it 
cannot be assumed that the term is always understood in a shared or consistent way.  
Having said that, I argued that hate speech is often treated as a presupposed concept 
within definitions that describe these forms of expression.  The term’s generality 
‘…means that is can be used to meaningfully talk about far more protected 
characteristics and far more varieties of speech than any of its predecessors.’ (Brown 
2017, 427) However, the generality Alexander Brown identifies means hate speech 
must always exist in an uncertain state of continual revision, subject to changing social 
and political conditions.  As a result there is always an absence and uncertainty in 
meaning that is internal to these forms of expression.  These absences ensure that 
                                                                 
54 The point here acknowledges that hate speech is a term that has come in to regular use over th e last 
thirty years.  However, expressions currently termed hate speech have been uttered prior to the 
collective name being applied.  It is not inconceivable that the term ‘hate speech’ will  change its name 
over time in response to different conditions so I argue the ‘force de rupture’ provides the opportunity 
for that to happen. 
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hate speech always encapsulates the possibility of redefinition, allowing hate speech 
to adapt to unstable external influences, and ensure its own continuation.   
Despite being labelled with the name ‘hate speech’, hate speech is not limited 
to verbal utterances and can be found within all forms of expression. Because hate 
speech can break with context and, in that rupture, generate new and alternative 
contexts, a type of linguistic violence takes place from the outset.  The propensity of 
the definitions of hate speech to focus on the effects of these forms of expression is 
useful in identifying their violent impacts.  However, giving primacy to effects obscures 
a different violence that is identifiable within hate speech.  Through being named, 
‘hate speech’, becomes formally recognised.  Becoming visible in this way allows hate 
speech to forcefully demand, and receive, a place in discourse which subsequently 
increases and, in some instances, authorises its ability to harm.     
Violence appears again when definitions of hate speech work to identify the 
groups considered most at risk from these forms of expression. Initially, a violent act of 
division takes place exposing the groups, or individuals within those groups, as 
particularly vulnerable to hate speech. They are designated as different, or ‘Other’ in 
some way.  Simultaneously, an act of exclusion takes place ensuring any unnamed 
person or group, who may be targeted by hate speech, risks going unrecognised as a 
victim. Additionally, the role of hate speech itself, in constituting and reconstituting 
the linguistic subject, forcibly ensures a single individual is never the only one placed at 
risk from expressions of hate.  As a result, violence is seen in both the harms hate 
speech inflicts upon its victims and, within the agency it possesses to constitute social 
identities and incite hatred towards different groups.  Positioning and recognising hate 
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speech as a performative speech act allows these violent pre-conditions to become 
visible.55   
Other significant ways through which the violence of hate speech becomes 
visible, are emphasised throughout the chapter.  The definition offered by The Council 
of Europe is used to demonstrate an initial, direct, connection between hate speech 
and the state.56 Such a connection is forged through law and politics in the context of 
what can be considered ‘freedom of expression’ and where the limits to ‘freedom of 
expression’ may be drawn.  State interventions to control hate speech acknowledge 
the danger this language poses to individuals and civil relations.  At the same time, 
these interventions generate requirements for some levels of toleration of offensive 
utterances as part of commitments to ‘freedom of expression.’ Hate speech goes 
beyond individual injuries, which are damaging enough, because this injurious 
language both produces and is a product of discriminatory social practices.    
By aligning hate speech with similar words, in efforts to describe and isolate it, 
a confusion is generated in relation to what actually defines hate speech.  While hate 
speech can saturate alternative names used to describe it (offensive speech, degrading 
speech), those synonyms are not always in themselves forms of hate speech. Although 
the use of synonyms may be necessary, the process of invoking alternative 
descriptions is also deficient.  Hate speech gains a power to masquerade as a less 
threatening substitute, and by extension, to prevent the violence it inflicts being fully 
                                                                 
55 Chapter two will  consider hate speech as a performative speech act. 
56 Connections between hate speech and state institutional frameworks will be explicitly considered in 
chapter three. 
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exposed.  As a result hate speech creates opportunities to sanitise its own appearance 
and falsely reduce the appearance of its harm.   
A hierarchy is reinforced by creating a requirement for some form of value 
judgement to be applied in order to assess the amount of harm hate speech inflicts. 
Where the harm is judged to fall within one of the ‘lesser’ realms of offence, then the 
violence of hate speech can be obscured or even tolerated. Having claimed a place in 
discourse through being named and distinguished from other types of offensive 
utterances, hate speech becomes, in a very direct way, authorised by the state.  A 
space is forcefully created within discourse which demands hate speech is , to varying 
extents, tolerated.  I argue that through this process, hate speech becomes to some 
extent normalised within discourse. Combined, all of the divisive and violent forces 
explored within this chapter function to give hate speech its injurious power.  As a 
result, hate speech is always able to carry an underlying and sustaining, threat to 
wound or harm.  Hate speech is always, in some sense, violent. 
 
  
Chapter Two: Constructing a concept of hate speech 
Chapter one demonstrated that definitions of ‘hate speech’ are contested and, 
although they share a number of similar characteristics, the definitions undergo a 
necessary and continual revision.  I argued that a consistency can be brought to 
understanding ‘hate speech’ through violence, and that violence allows hate speech to 
claim a place in discourse.  Following from this, it seems possible that violence may 
also help to shape the concept of hate speech itself.  Brown has written that: 
…it makes a material difference that people use the term ‘hate speech’ rather than 
these older terms, and it makes a difference because the term is referring to a much 
broader and more capacious concept; and this is not necessarily a bad thing. (Brown 
2017, 428)  
It seems to me, that if Brown’s statement is accurate, then there is potential within the 
concept of hate speech (because it can be general and expansive) to incorporate both 
the state of continual revision and the violence revealed during discussion of the 
definitions.1 Additionally, because hate speech can transcend the confines of language 
to inject harm into civil relations, the need to understand the broader concept of hate 
speech becomes more urgent.  As a result, some of the historical conditions connected 
to how the concept of hate speech has come to be understood must be explored.   
However, I have previously shown that hate speech can be problematic 
because histories associated with particular words or phrases cannot be assumed to be 
equally accessible to everyone. The different groups identified as most vulnerable to 
hate speech change over time, and hate speech possesses the ability to break with 
context and obscure any points of origin. As a result, I suggest that tracing a linear 
history of events in the hope of describing how the concept of hate speech has 
                                                                 
1 Brown proposes a general concept of hate speech because he recognises an imbalance in academia 
that has focused heavily on legal concepts of hate speech.   
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developed, may not be productive. The main focus here is to understand the concept 
and its relationship with violence, force and institutional frameworks.  And so, as an 
alternative, I propose to approach the concept of hate speech by emphasising six 
particular points of influence that, I will argue, have shaped the modern 
conceptualization of hate speech.  The six points of influence are the relationship of 
hate speech to: freedom of expression, hate crime, the concept of ‘fighting words’, the 
importance of being a performative speech act, everyday situations, and genocide. To 
understand the concept of hate speech through this approach means to seek out, the 
spaces of disruption that allow conflicting perceptions, to become part of the concept 
of hate speech itself. Using academic work alongside a range of examples drawn from 
law, social movements, publications, the internet, theatre, politics, and everyday 
situations, I will show how the relationship between the concept of hate speech and 
violence is shaped.2 The six themes will act as a prism and refract to illuminate the 
concept of hate speech in terms of, how the concept is shaped by violence and comes 
to absorb conflicting ideas and ideals. 
Freedom of expression  
Strictly speaking, there is no definitive point of origin that can be isolated to 
show the birth of ‘hate speech’ as a conceptual construct. Such a statement should not 
be unexpected.  Origins are multiple and mendacious and, as chapter one has shown, 
hate speech targets origins and fights being limited to a singular original, injury.  
Constituting subjects beyond speech, across a variety of points of origin, ensures 
expressions of hate always exceed an original speaker.  Perhaps it is more appropriate 
                                                                 
2 It is important to remember that this thesis focuses upon hate speech from the perspecti ve of 
violence, force and institutional frameworks.  The emphasis of the chapter is placed upon considering 
the concept of hate speech in this context.  
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to refer to a point of departure instead.  To find this uncertain site, I will look toward 
societies that embrace the value of freedom of expression since:3  
Free speech and democracy have had a long and ambivalent relationship.  From the 
dawn of modern democracy, it was recognised that the right of the people to criticise 
government, laws, and social conditions was inherent in the very concept of the rule of 
the people. (Hare and Weinstein 2009, 1) 
Chapter one made the argument that hate speech can infiltrate all forms of 
expression.  Most often, hate speech is debated in terms of how these utterances or 
expressions should be conceived in relation to rights to freedom of expression.4 A 
societal commitment to freedom of expression while crucial and valuable, seems to 
me, to create the conditions that allow a particular type of concept of hate speech to 
develop.  In order to explore this further, I will look back to some of the beginnings of 
the modern idea of freedom of expression and demonstrate their relevance for 
discussions of hate speech today. 
In ‘The Harm in Hate Speech’ (Waldron 2012), Jeremy Waldron explores ‘the 
issue of hateful defamation in Enlightenment theories of toleration.’(Waldron 2012, 
207) He approaches this through the specific lens of religious toleration.  While 
religious toleration may seem an unusual point of departure the words of Kevin Boyle 
can be used to help defend this choice as follows: 
The struggle to achieve religious liberty has been a fundamental aspect of the 
emergence of the modern world.  Freedom of expression is the child of freedom of 
religion and the two remain intimately connected.  Both rights remain precarious and 
are far from achieving universal acceptance. (Boyle in Coliver, D'Souza, and Boyle 
1992, 61) 
                                                                 
3 By taking this approach, the emphasis in this thesis  is placed mainly (but not exclusively) upon Western 
liberal democracies where legal frameworks include provisions covering freedom of expression. 
However hate speech is a global threat so as the thesis develops, the points of influence I identify as 
shaping the modern concept of hate speech will  be indicated, to be potentially, universally applicable. 
4 There are numerous academic texts that analyse hate speech within the context of freedom of 
expression and so I consider this relationship both important and not in need of further elaboration. 
Examples include: ‘Extreme Speech and Democracy’(Hare and Weinstein 2009), ‘Striking a Balance: Hate 
speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-discrimination’(Coliver, D'Souza, and Boyle 1992), ‘The Content 
and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Responses’(Herz and Molnar 2012), ‘Hate speech 
revisited’ (Noorloos 2011), and ‘Freedom of expression v. hate speech ’(Bacquet 2011) amongst others. 
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As was shown in chapter one through discussion of definitions of hate speech, religion 
is often one of the characteristics cited when identifying those most at risk from hate 
speech.5 In addition, Ivan Hare has observed that ‘religion has been central to 
discussion of freedom of expression since the first sustained writings in English about 
the extent of free speech.’(Hare in Hare and Weinstein 2009, 289) And so, Waldron’s 
link between religion and toleration has a clear connection with freedom of 
expression. Through his reading of John Locke, whom he considers as having created 
the ‘most sustained piece of writing on [toleration] in the early modern period’ 
(Waldron 2012, 210), Waldron traces these links back to the Enlightenment period.6 
Using Locke as a starting position, Waldron draws upon the work of Voltaire, Pierre 
Bayle, Montesquieu and Denis Diderot within his analysis.  His argument culminates in 
the summation that current approaches that defend the position of no or minimal 
restrictions on free speech are deficient where they claim to deal with hate speech ‘by 
making concessions under the headings of “public disorder”, “incitement”, “or fighting 
words.”(Waldron 2012, 232)7   
Waldron argues that where public order is considered in the context of 
toleration, it does not just convey the absence of violence, but also ‘…a principle of 
inclusion and a rejection of the calumnies that tend to isolate and exclude vulnerable 
religious minorities.’ (Waldron 2012, 232).  As a result, he suggests that amendments 
to non-speech related regulations are inadequate in terms of dealing with injurious 
                                                                 
5 This would seem to indicate that the links between religious toleration, freedom of expression and 
hate speech currently remain relevant. 
6 Definitive dates for the Enlightenment period or ‘Age of Reason’ are debated. Generally speaking they 
are accepted as covering the majority of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.  The defining 
characteristic of this age was the primacy of rational  thought and scientific thinking.  Major thinkers 
associated with this period include Immanuel Kant, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Voltaire, Denis Diderot and 
John Locke. 
7 Fighting words is a reference to a specific point in US case law that will  be discussed in  a later section. 
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speech. Instead he argues that specific restrictions enacted against hate speech have 
now become a requirement.  Although I agree with Waldron’s conclusion that specific 
restrictions against hate speech are now required, it is not for the same reasons. It 
seems to me that given public order is maintained by legal, social, and political means, 
then it cannot convey an absence of violence.8 Additionally, as shown in chapter one, 
hate speech demands a level of toleration in discourse. Specific restrictions against its 
use can be argued to be necessary because of the violence hate speech threatens to 
individuals and civil relations.  Mary Kate McGowan makes a counterpoint to Waldron 
stating that: 
Since a commitment to free speech is deeply incompatible with allowing the 
government to regulate the expression of political opinions, it seems that one cost of 
valuing free speech is the mandatory toleration of hateful speech. (Maitra and 
McGowan 2012, 122) 
Where Waldron is able to break from the idea that the cost of freedom of expression 
means accepting vilification as a dark side of discourse, McGowan takes the opposite 
stance.  The two positions appear incompatible with one another; however, I would 
argue that their main difference is really located in different levels of toleration for 
hate speech they are willing to accept.  I suggest that from the perspective of the 
concept of hate speech, both views are essential to its construction.  A direct 
connection to the state is created through the idea of the right to free expression and 
the regulatory frameworks surrounding it (i.e. law or politics).  Simultaneously, a site of 
conflict is uncovered through opposing the needs to limit hate speech through 
regulation against those required to support freedoms to criticise government, laws 
                                                                 
8 Chapter one concluded that hate speech is always violent. Due to the violent threat of this language, it 
is necessary for states to attempt to exert a level of control over hate speech. However, as I will  argue in 
the last chapter, where legal, political or social force are used to l imit the harm of hate speech (through 
attempts to control this language) the institutional frameworks through which those controls are 
enacted, inevitably and simultaneously work to reinforce the violence of hate speech. 
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and social conditions. And so, seeds for the development of the concept of hate 
speech can be seen germinating during the Enlightenment period. 
Sumner also sees a need to return to the Enlightenment period when he 
considers freedom of expression and its connection to the principle of equality in his 
book ‘The Hateful and the Obscene: Studies in the Limits of Free Expression’ (Sumner 
2004). His aim is to ‘articulate a framework for determining limits to the right of free 
expression and to apply it to the particular cases of hate propaganda and 
pornography.’(Sumner 2004, 203) In order to achieve this, Sumner draws upon John 
Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle on the basis that ‘where harm to others is involved, 
individuals may rightfully be subject to coercion and control.’ (Sumner 2004, 20)9  
Despite the different approaches taken by Waldron and Sumner they both agree that 
hate speech is damaging enough to warrant being restricted through law. The 
difference lies, in Waldron, on the one hand, arguing that the restrictions ensure the 
participation of vulnerable minorities in public life, while Sumner, on the other hand, 
focuses more on where the limits on freedom of expression ought to be placed in 
order to prevent harm to others.  Alon Harel and Sumner share a position that harms 
from hate speech can be quantified and ordered in terms of their ability to injure. 
Harel supports Sumner’s view that hate speech harms when saying: 
Hate speech constitutes one of the most damaging forms of “bad speech.”  The most 
serious harms from hate speech are expressive and psychological injuries….Other 
harms…include the risk of violence and the contribution of such speech to creating or 
sustaining and reinforcing a discriminatory or oppressive social environment. (Harel in 
Herz and Molnar 2012, 308) 
However, Harel also recognises directly the contribution hate speech makes to 
sustaining oppressive social environments. Sumner’s solution is to produce a 
                                                                 
9 Sumner’s conclusion presents four policy recommendations for modern Canadian courts generated 
from ‘consistent application of a principled normative framework – one which is both harm-centred and 
evidence-based.’(Sumner 2004, 202) 
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framework to legitimately limit freedom of expression in particular cases where the 
harm can be evidenced. 
Mick Hume challenges the position Sumner takes by suggesting that Mill’s 
concept of the harm principle has been ‘expanded beyond all recognition’ (Hume 
2015, 189) and is wrongly used to argue for restrictions on hate speech.  Rather than 
considering the potentially varying levels of harm hate speech can inflict, Hume argues 
that de-normalising offensive speech through legislative measures serves to restrict 
public debate.10  While Waldron and Sumner advocate hate speech restrictions, Hume 
considers this problematic because: 
The biggest victim is not the one taking offence; it is the rest of us, robbed of the 
opportunity for open-minded discussion and free debate that offers our best hope of 
getting at the truth and deciding a way forward on controversial issues.  (Hume 2015, 
189)   
Such an argument is not unusual when hate speech is considered, however, I would 
argue that the position is flawed, not least, because it appears to conflate hate speech 
and offense. As I have argued in chapter one there is a need to clearly distinguish 
between the two terms to ensure hate speech is recognised. Hume appears to dilute 
the harm threatened by hate speech through equating hate speech with offence. 
Under such conditions, the wider threat to civil relations hate speech poses is 
overshadowed with the suggestion from Hume that a victim who suffers at the hands 
of hate may somehow be choosing to take offence.  Hume appears to reject the notion 
supported by Waldron, Sumner and Harel that hate speech can reinforce 
discriminatory social practices. Others too resist the idea of placing legal limitations on 
hate speech. Theodore Shaw, for example, follows Hume in suggesting that restricting 
                                                                 
10 I argued in chapter one that hate speech can be normalised in discourse and it would seem here that 
Hume is providing additional evidence for that position. 
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free speech removes opportunity for free debate. However, Shaw is different in taking 
the view that greater freedom of speech provides ways of challenging systems of 
discrimination, stating that:  
Free speech is essential for minority group members who are challenging systems of 
subordination, segregation, discrimination, particularly if they are attacking the 
complicity of government in creating and maintaining those systems of subordination. 
(Shaw in Herz and Molnar 2012, 411)   
Though the writers quoted above differ in their positions, what seems to be clear is 
that freedom of expression and its limits are not universally agreed or without 
restriction. As Marloes Van Noorloos has recently observed ‘An individualistic, one 
sided “right to say whatever I think” mentality…’(Noorloos 2011, 328) has become 
worryingly prevalent and serves to distort the idea of the right to freedom of 
expression.  Such a distortion is generated by privileging individual interests over and 
above the rights of all people.  In reaching back to Mill, Sumner provides a reminder 
that ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of 
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.’(Mill and 
Himmelfarb 1982, 68)  To deny the personal and civil harm hate speech causes as 
Hume appears to do, facilitates the argument that freedom of expression should be 
absolute, in the distorted individualistic sense Noorloos has observed.  But an 
individualistic view neglects to acknowledge the historical conditions and social 
contexts that have already tied freedom of expression, and by extension hate speech 
itself, to limitations and measures of state control through civil, political and legal 
means. 
Focusing on these texts makes it possible to argue that the influence of early 
debates about the right to freedom of expression set conditions for the modern 
concept of hate speech to take shape.  While ‘hate speech’ as a term may be relatively 
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new, the long lineage of the right to free expression ensures that hate speech must 
always be aligned with the state, law, and civil relations.  Therefore, hate speech as a 
concept becomes tied to models of Western liberal democracies through the concept 
of freedom of expression.11 Additionally, those ties involve understanding that the 
right to freedom of expression has always been limited. As is demonstrated by the 
work of Waldron, Sumner, and the other writers quoted, rights to freedom of 
expression play a fundamental role in debates about hate speech today.  A central 
point of debate continues to exist in relation to whether it is right to restrict freedom 
of expression in order to limit the harms hate speech can inflict. These debates are 
fuelled by the contradictory requirements that hate speech must be tolerated and 
restricted simultaneously.  At the heart of the concept of hate speech sits this conflict. 
Hate speech or hate crime? 
Police are investigating reports that signs reading "No more Polish vermin" have been 
distributed in Huntingdon - including outside primary schools - just hours after the 
result of the EU referendum was announced.12 
What is becoming clear, through the influencing history of freedom of 
expression and the arguments to place restrictions upon hate speech as a result, is that 
the law has a significant role to play in shaping the concept of hate speech.  However, 
caution should be used in making any assumptions that would lead to always thinking 
of hate speech as illegal.  If that were the case there would be no distinction between 
hate speech and hate crime.  However, it is known that hate speech exists and harms 
                                                                 
11Identifying the concept of hate speech, as tied to freedom of expression and models of Western li beral 
democracies in this way, raises a question of if the concept of hate speech being presented here can 
resonate in societies constructed under different social and political conditions. It seems to me, that 
where any political conditions and social contexts tie rights to freedom of expression to any state 
l imitations or controls on injurious language, then the concept of hate speech explored here could 
potentially be more universally applicable.  
12 http://www.cambridge-news.co.uk/reports-of-no-more-polish-vermin-signs-distributed-in-
huntingdon/story-29443411-detail/story.html, [accessed 26 June 2016]  The story has also been 
reported by national media in The Guardian, Independent, The Express and The Mirror all  of which 
included photographs of the signs written in both English and Polish . 
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when it is not considered to transgress legal boundaries.  It seems to me that hate 
speech laws actually have more resonance with maintaining public order and the limits 
of free expression, than they do with directly protecting people from the harms of hate 
speech.   
Paul Iganski has written that ‘the term ‘hate crime’ has no legal status in the UK. 
No law uses the term. Yet the police and other criminal justice agents have 
enthusiastically embraced it.’(Iganski 2008, 1) This is equally true of the term ‘hate 
speech’ in that in itself, ‘hate speech’ is not named in the legal provisions that relate to 
these forms of expression. I argue that this formal absence, despite a more general 
presence in discourse, has a wider influence on the concept of hate speech, in terms of 
generating a shared social understanding of what hate speech means. Despite 
numerous connections to the law, it would seem that ‘hate speech’ as a term has no 
legal status.  Hate speech must exist beyond the law whilst also being subject to the 
law. The reluctance or inability of the law to directly confront hate speech is critical to 
the conceptualisation of hate speech.  However, if the elusiveness of hate speech is 
recalled from chapter one, then this should not seem too surprising. 
Nevertheless, many nations have adopted what can be considered some direct 
‘hate speech’ legal restrictions. The UK, US, Germany, France, The Netherlands, 
Australia, Canada, Hungary, all enacted legislation that relate to hate speech in some 
way. European law and international law have also addressed hate speech through 
legal means. Given the amount of academic work that analyses and cites ‘hate speech’ 
law, it can be argued that legal traditions influence the concept of hate speech over 
and above the history based in democracy and freedom of expression.  Having said 
that, this is not a thesis in law and I do not intend to revisit the mass of work already 
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carried out in this area of study. Nevertheless, I will argue that the next major point of 
influence for the concept of hate speech is to be found in the conflict through which 
hate speech is differentiated from hate crime.    
Like ‘hate crime’, ‘hate speech’ is not a term that can be found in the wording 
of specific legislation that seeks to tackle these forms of offences.  One of the 
difficulties in attempting to uncover a traditional history of hate speech, and a reason I 
am taking a different approach in this chapter, is articulated by Sir David Williams QC 
who writes:  
There is no accepted generic term for the battles of the past, and the restrictions 
which have arisen emerged from many statutes as well as from the common law itself.  
(Williams in Hare and Weinstein 2009, 92)   
Lines of legal heritage that are relatable to ‘hate speech’ can be traced through a range 
of other restrictions from sedition, libel, and other legislation focused on offences of 
incitement or disturbances to public order.  These vary considerably between different 
countries and periods of history.13  A result of this historical journey in the UK has been 
to closely align ‘hate speech’ with protections for religion, race and public order.14  
Although hate speech is clearly bound to the law, there is no certainty that 
these forms of expression are always marked by illegality.  The relationship between 
hate speech and law is more complex and results in having a significant influence upon 
the concept of hate speech.15  Brown provides a basis from which to explore this 
                                                                 
13 To explore the mass of variation in legal developments is beyond the scope of this thesis and would 
also unnecessarily l imit the discussion of the broad concept of hate speech.   
14 A brief summary of UK developments is provided by Will iams (Williams in Hare and Weinstein 2009, 
92-95) A much more detailed history is given by Noorloos. (Noorloos 2011) Chapter one identified other 
groups that have been closely aligned with hate speech in this way through consideration of the 
definitions of the term ‘hate speech.’ 
15 For the purposes of this thesis, UK law is given primacy and the arguments and conclusions drawn as a 
result are UK-centric in that respect. Different legal traditions and areas of the world may access and 
understand the concept of hate speech very differently in their own contexts. However, international 
law does include provisions for combatting hate speech that are l inked to rights to freedom of 
expression, and the term ‘hate speech’ is now wi dely used across many nations.  Consequently there are 
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tension in the article ‘What is Hate Speech? Part 1: The Myth of Hate.’ (Brown 2017) 
Here he distinguishes between a legal concept of hate speech and a more general 
concept of hate speech.  He notes that ‘numerous legal scholars have put forward 
putative definitions of the term ‘hate speech’(Brown 2017, 421) but suggests that an 
increasingly general view is more apt where ‘hate speech is best conceived as a family 
resemblances concept that does not admit definition.’(Brown 2017, 419) Brown argues 
that legal definitions of hate speech have heavily influenced academic considerations 
of the subject in other disciplines.  As a result, an imbalance has been created in 
theoretical work that he views as obscuring the illimitable contexts in which the term 
‘hate speech’ is used. As I emphasised in chapter one if hate speech can appear 
normalized, and force debate as to if it should be tolerated as a result of a 
commitment to free expression, then an understanding of the concept cannot be one 
purely formed through law. This more general type of hate speech concept is being 
indicated when Claire Fox expresses concern that: 
This escalating offence-spotting is unnerving, especially when you realise that the 
target list for people likely to be hauled over the coals for being offensive is growing.  
Anyone can be accused, and the most liberal organisations can crumble under fire. 
(Fox 2016, 9)   
Usually, it might be expected that legal frameworks would require a certain evidence 
threshold to be met to determine if a defendant is guilty of a crime or not.  Here Fox’s 
comments serve as a reminder that where hate speech is concerned, accusations and 
judgements take place through other forums as well.  Recognising this shows a break 
or at least a difference between hate speech and hate crime.  It can be argued here 
                                                                 
some indications that the concept of hate speech incorporates elements that are potentially more 
universal ly shared. For an overview of relevant international law, see ‘Hate Speech Revisited’. (Noorloos 
2011, 141-179) 
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that one of the reasons for this, as R. L. Tsai points out when considering the politics of 
hate, is that: 
…the rule of law, which does not trickle down to most of the human interactions in 
society, relies on other media and social organisations to reinforce norms of equality 
and participation. (Tsai 2012, 13) 
These other mechanisms that Tsai is emphasising can be argued to be the major 
influences that lead Fox to express her concerns about what she views as a decreasing 
ability of society to tolerate offense.  Legal restrictions upon hate speech exist.  They 
are important for formally denouncing and punishing hate speech as well as marking 
boundaries for what is considered legally ‘sayable’. At the same time, there must also 
be a resistance to viewing hate speech only, or primarily, through the legal readings.  
Hate speech always occurs prior to any legal intervention and it is clear that a number 
of hate speech utterances, although recognised as hate speech, are not considered to 
contravene any particular law.  As demonstrated in chapter one, state controls that 
rely on determining varying levels of toleration for injurious language can also serve to 
legitimize some forms of hate speech. Recognising the wider generality of the concept 
of hate speech is significant for distinguishing between hate speech and hate crime.  
With this in mind, I will consider these challenges not via specific legislation but 
instead, through different community influences and experiences.16 
During an investigation of the normality of everyday hate crime, Iganski argues 
that ’the label ‘hate crime’ wrongly individualises the problem as the abnormal, 
irrational and pathological behaviour of severely bigoted individuals.’(Iganski 2008, 
40)17  While Iganski is specifically referring to racist hate crime, I argue that the 
                                                                 
16 Specific pieces of legislation will be discussed during chapter three as they are relevant to the 
discussion of the relationship between hate speech, law, and state institutional frameworks. 
17 The notion of ‘perpetrator communities’ is addressed by Iganski in the context of ‘low-level hate 
crime’ that is described as ‘banal and unorganised’.  Examples given include: broken windows, banging 
on doors, pushes, kicks or a blow to a passer-by.  
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problem is also relevant to conceptualising hate speech.  Instances of hate speech are 
often perceived as individual exchanges. Brown draws a parallel with Iganski arguing 
that conceptualising hate speech as ‘the expressing of hate or hatred may have the 
unwelcome effect of pathologising hate speech.’ (Brown 2017, 454) Where this 
happens Brown argues that hate speech becomes individualised in the same way 
Iganski observes for hate crimes.  I suggest here that often, such moves to individualise 
hate speech result in the wider influences shaping behaviour, including the influence 
of institutional frameworks, receiving less attention than might be deserved.  One can 
argue as a result, that the law can actually distract from identifying hate speech in a 
broader sense and lead to a narrower conception of hate speech than is actually 
needed. Individuals who engage in hate speech carry a responsibility for the harm their 
speech inflicts, but at the same time, frameworks that shape and authorise particular 
behaviours in communities or society also contribute to the damage hate speech can 
cause.  
Iganski continues by asserting that perpetrators of hate crimes are likely to be 
quite ordinary. He explains this by saying that offenders are influenced by the wider 
community which ‘shapes and legitimises the perpetrator’s racism, the offender in 
turn serves the community’ (Iganski 2008, 40) through committing the hate crime. In 
doing so, offenders are ‘not only acting out these notions of difference, they are 
simultaneously reconstructing the prevailing structures of oppression and reinforcing 
the boundaries of difference.’ (Iganski 2008, 40)  This point is significant for 
understanding the concept of hate speech and how it relates to violence and 
institutional frameworks.  Here, Iganski’s work suggests that civil relations, and what 
he terms structures of oppression, can also shape the environment to produce hate 
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crime.  Chapter one showed that hate speech exceeds any individual hate speaker 
because it has the potential to harm wider civil relations and can become normalised 
in public discourse. Iganski’s work shows how those wider threats posed by hate 
speech become so damaging. It seems to me to serve as one way to differentiate hate 
crime from hate speech.  Both function in similar ways, to reinforce boundaries of 
difference, but hate speech retains an ability to avoid being criminalised because, in 
some circumstances, it demands a legitimacy in public discourse.18  While hate crime is 
argued by Iganski to be produced by the structures of oppression that it reinforces, 
hate speech, because it can avoid criminalisation through being legitimized, can also 
function to produce discriminatory social practices. 
Research conducted by the Leicester Hate Crime Project appears to at least partly 
support these claims. Findings following interviews conducted with victims of hate 
crime showed that:  
… there is ‘no one size fits all’ type of offender…participants referred to a sense of 
unfamiliarity and intolerance towards ‘difference’ as being key motivating factors beh ind 
acts of targeted hostility.  Perceived vulnerability was also identified by participants as 
being central to why they thought they had been victimised. (Chakraborti, Garland, and 
Hardy 2014, 62) 
The main difference between the research outcomes of the Hate Crime Project and 
Iganski’s position is the reference the research participants made to their perceived 
vulnerability.  While it cannot be clear how the vulnerability they refer to was 
conceptualised, there is a link here to the definitions of hate speech discussed in 
chapter one.  I argued that labelling or naming particular groups in definitions aims to 
identify and protect those most vulnerable to hate speech. However, through the 
process of being named, those groups and people who identify as members of them, 
                                                                 
18 This argument only applies to instances of hate speech that do not directly conflict with legal 
provisions to restrict hate speech.   
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are also designated as ‘Other’ and inadvertently made more vulnerable as a result.  
The participants in the Hate Crime Project appear to indicate here that they became 
constituted as victims of hate because of an intolerance towards difference on the part 
of the perpetrators. 
And so, a point is reached where it is becoming clear that considering hate 
speech through its relationship with hate crime is limiting.  Law is restricting the 
concept of hate speech and distracting from the broader social and political influences 
that are shaping the construction of the concept.  As a result, it seems productive to 
explore an alternative example in order to understand how hate speech and the law 
interact.  The example I will use relates to the introduction of the Racial and Religious 
Hatred Act (2006) in the UK. (2006a)19 Prior to the introduction of the Act, the 
dominant Christian religions were privileged under the law.20   However, it is not the 
legislation itself that is important here.  What can lead to understanding a point of 
influence for the construction of the concept of hate speech is a response to the 
introduction of the Act from arts practitioners.   
During 2005 English PEN published ‘Free Expression is No Offence’ (Appignanesi 
2005) containing contributions from across the arts sector objecting to the proposed 
law.  The book includes contributions from actors, writers, directors, film makers, 
academics, journalists, a comedian, a QC and a radio presenter.  The objections were 
based on the view that the Act was considered ‘a modification to the UK’s justice 
system which puts all writers, artists and performers at risk, and limits all of our 
                                                                 
19 Primarily the Act was designed to create equality in law between religions by granting equal status to 
non-majority religions.  An offence was created making it i l lega l to ‘stir up’ hatred on religious grounds. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/1/contents  [accessed 28 January 2016] 
20 It seems pertinent at this point to remember Waldron’s consideration of religious tolerance in relation 
to his support for hate speech regulation. The Act demonstrates how these issues maintain a continuing 
relevance. 
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fundamental rights to free expression.’ (Appignanesi 2005, Publisher's Note)21 While 
the Home Secretary of the time gave reassurances that the arts would have no reason 
to fear the legislation, some contributions to the book contextualise the concerns of 
the artists and cultural practitioners, by articulating a set of events that led to the 
cancellation of the play Behtzi in 2004.22 After running for two weeks, the play was 
cancelled when protests against its performance turned violent. The protests against 
the play came mainly from the Sikh community in the city of Birmingham who raised 
objections to the staging on the basis that the play insulted the Sikh religion. Here it is 
helpful to provide some context about the play itself. Madhav Sharma, one of the lead 
actors, gives a synopsis of the content of the play as follows: 
And so it was that I agreed to take on the challenge of trying to portray the head of a 
gurdwara (Sikh temple) renovation committee who abuses the psychological hold he has 
by raping, within the confines of his office, the devout daughter of his former homosexual 
lover.  He is murdered, and our heroine ultimately finds some salvation thanks to her 
abiding faith in God and the love of a younger Afro-Caribbean man. (Sharma in 
Appignanesi 2005, 32) 
The point here is not to argue whether the play did or did not amount to hate 
speech.23  Instead, I aim to show the influence of law upon on the concept of hate 
speech by considering what took place. The relevance of this point is articulated by the 
executive director of the Birmingham Repertory Theatre who was quoted as saying 
that ‘it remains a matter of great concern to us that illegal acts of violence can cause 
the cancellation of a lawful artistic work.’ (Left 2004)  
                                                                 
21 English PEN is described in the book as ‘a vital part of an international organization that champio ns 
freedom of expression everywhere and the right of writers, artists and indeed anyone to say whatever 
they feel without fear of persecution or penalty.’ (Appignanesi 2005, Publisher's Note) 
22 The cancellation of the play, written by Gurpreet Kaur Bhatti and performed at the Birmingham 
Repertory Theatre, took place in 2004.  The Racial and Religious Hatred Act became law in 2006. 
23 I do not hold the view that the play contains or represents hate speech. The point of interest are the 
reasons presented for why artists might object to a proposed piece of legislation that would outlaw the 
‘stirring up’ of racial or religious hatred. I argue that these reasons are really related to who controls 
what can be said and who is authorised to set l imits on freedom of expression. 
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Nicholas Hynter has said that ‘…it’s the business of theatre and always has 
been, to disturb and provoke.’(Hynter in Appignanesi 2005, 40) If that is the case then 
arguably, the play resides within the acceptable boundaries of freedom of expression. 
As a result, any response to the people who protested violently, might be expected to 
be a legal one.  And yet, the events were not quite so simply resolved.  The police 
made three arrests but no prosecutions followed.  In addition, the theatre was not 
‘…given the guarantee that it was entitled to: namely that audience, workforce and 
premises would be protected.’(Hynter in Appignanesi 2005, 39)  And so, the violent 
protests can be argued to have received a form of authorisation that resulted, in the 
curtailment of the right to freedom of expression of those involved with the 
production. This leads to the question of what might have prevented the police, and 
legal structures, from acting to protect those under attack, and failing to prosecute 
those who protested violently.  
As has been discussed in chapter one the definitions given to hate speech are 
continually revised.  Often these changes will reflect the social and political 
preoccupations of different time periods.  Hate speech remains officially unnamed in a 
legal sense with legislation instead emphasising rights to freedom of expression and 
the limitations of those rights.  Hynter’s criticism of the police force and the apparent 
legal failure to protect those involved with the production becomes more complex 
when the political conditions are considered in more detail.  Hynter suggests that the 
‘theatre and play seem to have been victims of political jostling between a local Labour 
minority and a Tory-Lib Dem coalition’ (Hynter in Appignanesi 2005, 39) that each 
required votes from the Sikh community. He goes on to suggest that the ‘political 
jostling’ and desire for votes meant there was a failure by politicians to condemn the 
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violent protests. He implies that a lack of open political support for the staging of the 
production was a contributing factor to the situation that forced the play’s 
cancellation.  To my mind, it seems that the cancellation of the play is not explained by 
a simple and seemingly obvious inaction on the part of the police force.  Nor is it 
explained by a lack of public support from politicians who failed to champion the right 
of the play to be performed.  If it is true that the theatre is seen as the site of 
controversy that ‘…the authorities fear above others,’ (Hynter in Appignanesi 2005, 42) 
then a deeper understanding is required that reaches beyond a localised electoral 
contest or the response of the local police.  
Jacques Rancière’s consideration of ‘politics’ allows for a more nuanced and 
revealing exploration of the situation. In the book ‘The Politics of Aesthetics’ (Rancière 
2009) Rancière discusses how forms of art: 
…define the way in which works of art or performances are ‘involved in politics’, whatever 
may otherwise be the guiding intentions, artists’ social modes of integration or the manner 
in which artistic forms reflect social structure or movements. (Rancière 2009, 14)  
The argument can be made here that the play itself challenged established social and 
political hierarchies prompting the allegation that it insulted the Sikh community. The 
violent protests served not only to disrupt the performance but also to reinforce the 
same hierarchies that the play exposed and challenged.  And so, the play becomes 
‘involved in politics’ through what can be argued to be a contest over equality. 
However, I argue that this is not a contest over which group (those involved in the 
production or those involved in the protests) assumes greater authorisation to ‘speak’ 
or to be ‘heard.’ Instead, a specific form of disagreement arises which is  defined by 
Rancière as ‘…a conflict over what is meant by ‘to speak’ and ‘to understand’ as well as 
over the horizons of perception that distinguish the audible from the inaudible, the 
comprehensible from the incomprehensible…’ (Rancière 2009, 84)  Because the play is 
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‘involved in politics’, the contest must be elevated beyond a matter of whether either 
group has more or less authorisation to speak.  
For Rancière ‘politics is an anarchical process of emancipation that opposes the 
logic of disagreement to the logic of the police.’24 (Rancière 2009, 90)  Furthermore, 
the ‘police,’ must be understood as distinct from a police force, referring instead to ‘a 
system of coordiantes defining modes of being, doing, making, and communicating 
that establishes the borders between…the sayable and the unsayable.’ (Rancière 2009, 
89) The competing views of the two opposing communities that clashed over the 
performance of Behtzi are not actually the central concern when considering the 
circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the play.  The play is ‘involved in 
politics’ because its performance presents a challenge to what it means to speak, what 
is understood as sayable, and where the boundaries are drawn around what is sayable 
and unsayable. It can be argued that the contest over equality is not taking place 
between the theatre and the protestors.  Instead, the fight takes place between those 
who control the boundaries that limit free expression and those who would challenge 
them.  
As a result the state finds itself in a precarious position because: 
The arts only ever lend to projects of domination or emancipation what they are able to 
lend to them, that is to say, quite simply, what they have in common with them: bodily 
positions and movements, functions of speech, the parcelling out of the visible and the 
invisible.  Furthermore, the autonomy they can enjoy or the subversion they can claim 
credit for rest on the same foundation. (Rancière 2009, 19)  
                                                                 
24 Rancière assigns some particularly specific meanings to these terms and provides his definitions in 
‘The Politics of Aesthetics’(Rancière 2009, 80-93) ‘Disagreement’ ‘…arises when the perennial 
persistence of a wrong enters into conflict with the established police order and resists the forms of 
juridical l itigation that are imposed on it.’ (Rancière 2009, 84) This should be considered in the context 
of Rancière’s concept of the ‘distribution of the sensible’ that ‘refers to the implicit law governing the 
sensible order that parcels out places and forms of pa rticipation in a common world by first establishing 
the modes of perception within which these are inscribed.’ (Ranci ère 2009, 85) 
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I argue that the cancellation of Behtzi’s performances exemplifies the potential threat 
the theatre poses to the ‘system of coordiantes’ Rancière’s police uses, to create the 
borders for what is considered sayable in a public forums. Where the theatre threatens 
to influence civil relations, it does so through a challenge to the boundaries of what is 
‘sayable’ and who is given authority to speak.  As a result, the theatre potentially 
posesses a power to make audible the inaudible and expose the inequality that is 
revealed when hate speech is wrongly opposed to freedom of expression. 
Foundational ‘fighting words’  
This strange relationship between law and other areas of society and state, that 
appear to be influencing the concept of hate speech, are seen again through my next 
point of influence.  I will argue that one event in US legal history makes a fundamental 
impact upon how the concept of hate speech has come to be understood, particularly 
in academic fields.  The much cited Chaplinksy v New Hampshire decision resulted in a 
new concept of ‘fighting words’ being defined in US law.25  Justice Murphy articulated 
‘fighting words’ as ‘…words that “by their very utterance inflict injury” and words that 
“tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”’(Walker 1994, 71).  ‘Fighting words’ 
are clearly described as more than a heated argument and more than a threat of 
violence.  Justice Murphy’s description is clear that these words are different; they 
inflict injury through being uttered and that they have an ability to incite public 
disorder.    
                                                                 
25 Walker provides a detailed and il luminating history of hate speech in the United States that includes 
consideration of the fighting words doctrine first introduced in 1942.  The ruling is considered especially 
significant because it was ‘the major exception to the expansion of freedom of expression under the 
Roosevelt Court’ at a time when American law on this issue was in its  infancy. (Walker 1994) ‘Fighting 
words’ was specific to the US and ultimately had only minor legal impact. 
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‘Fighting words’, as a legal category, had only a minor influence and 
‘constitutional scholars have argued that this doctrine should no longer be considered 
good law, for reasons that are particularly weighty in the context of racial 
slurs.’(Strossen in Coliver, D'Souza, and Boyle 1992, 300)  However, these reasons are 
not because fighting words are viewed as problematic in terms of restricting freedom 
of expression in the US. James Weinstein has addressed why the Chaplinksy decision 
does not contradict the First Amendment saying it is because ‘…the Court was trying to 
distinguish a ‘private fracas’ from a ‘public debate’ and more specifically a public 
debate linked to political participation.’ (Weinstein in Hare and Weinstein 2009, 53).  
The collection of critical race theorists, who came together in order to theorise an 
approach to hate speech that is compatible with the First Amendment in the US, also 
considered fighting words. The book ‘Words that Wound’(Matsuda 1993) sees both 
Mari J. Matsuda and Charles R. Lawrence III address ‘fighting words’, and although 
they differ in their interpretations, neither argues that the concept is necessarily 
problematic.  The real issue as Matsuda sees it is that ‘…racist speech is so common 
that it is seen as part of the ordinary jostling and conflict people are expected to 
tolerate, rather than as fighting words.’(Matsuda 1993, 35)  Despite its impoverished 
legal weight, the Chaplinsky decision is conceptually important for hate speech 
because it acknowledges two important issues that I will discuss below.26 
Firstly, the court created a term, ‘fighting words’, which categorizes a very 
specific type of speech that has the capacity to inflict injury.  Accepting that speech 
causes injury has become essential to the modern understanding of hate speech. 
                                                                 
26 Fighting words, as will  be shown, are not the same thing as hate speech.  The relevance of this 
moment for hate speech is l inked to the recognition that speech can infl ict injury and that the law has a 
specific aim; to maintain public order. 
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Legally recognising the ability of words to injure puts into question the artificial 
division between language and actions that had been traditionally presupposed.  
When this occurred, space became available to question the position of privilege, 
speech, or rather the democratic notion of freedom of speech, had historically 
occupied.  Most importantly, in my view, ‘fighting words’ laid the foundations for what 
would later become understood as performative speech acts.27  Without the 
performative speech act, the modern concept of hate speech would be very different.   
Secondly, ‘fighting words’, directly assigns language the ability to incite 
disturbances in public order.  Words are assigned an agency that goes beyond that of 
causing injury to an intended individual victim. Potentially, all citizens are threatened 
by these words if public order is threatened.  Recognising ‘fighting words’ meant that 
an understanding that words could do something destructive both in the moment of 
the utterance and beyond it, was legally acknowledged.  More importantly, words 
were deemed to hold the potential power to threaten the state through civil 
disturbance.28  The Chaplinsky case legitimises a way to legally restrict a type of speech 
by both creating ‘fighting words’ as a legal category and linking them to public disorder 
and injury.  However, ‘fighting words’ are not strictly speaking ‘hate speech’.  Although 
‘fighting words’ were considered in the same vein as obscenity, profanity and insults, 
there is nothing specific in the definition to implicate hate in these crimes.  The focus 
was instead placed on provocation and it created an interesting complexity that has 
                                                                 
27 Here, the injury in the moment of the utterance is specifically related to instances of hate speech.  
Performative speech acts are generally understood to act but their action is not necessarily injurious.  
Their action is instead linked to authorisation. These ideas will  be developed further in the next section. 
28 What I mean here is that in breaching the peace there is a risk of the words generating civil  unrest.  
The point of how hate speech can further threaten the state will  be elaborated upon in chapter three.  
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been termed the ‘heckler’s veto.’29 The veto describes a situation whereby a speaker 
might find themselves subject to arrest or prosecution, not because of what they say 
but because of how an audience reacts.  If an audience with extreme views reacts to a 
moderate speaker in a way that disturbs the peace, that speaker may be at risk of 
finding themselves arrested for inciting public disorder, even though what they say 
may be reasonable.  I have previously argued through considering definitions of the 
term ‘hate speech’ that injurious language possess an agency that allows it to arouse 
hostility in others. This intention to generate a reaction need not be that of an 
individual speaker because hate speech can exceed the speaker, transforming its 
contexts and constituting subjects in social and political ways.  Making speakers 
vulnerable to the ‘heckler’s veto’ is one of the broader criticisms of the fighting words 
doctrine.   
Here an interesting development for the concept of hate speech emerges.  Neu 
articulates a conflict when arguing that the Chaplinsky verdict is an ‘odd way to 
prevent violence’ (Neu 2008, 144) since it can be viewed as punishing the speaker and 
not necessarily those engaged in violence. Neu reasons that, although the speaker is 
responsible for their words, they technically incite violent acts rather than carry out 
those acts.  His view is that it would be more appropriate to punish ‘those who actually 
become violent’(Neu 2008, 144) as a result of the language that incites them.  Of 
course, this assumes that individuals enacting physical violence would not be punished 
but it is easy to imagine a range of other laws that those individuals could be charged 
with.  Additionally, it takes a narrow view of what may be being said. Violence could be 
incited if a crowd objected to a view the speaker expressed, as well as, in cases where 
                                                                 
29 A full  explanation of the heckler’s veto is given in ‘Hate Speech: A history of an American 
Controversy’’(Walker 1994, 71) and ‘Sticks and Stones: the philosophy of insults’ (Neu 2008) 
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the speaker may actively encourage an audience to support their view. However, I 
would argue that the major influence of this situation is to illuminate the state interest 
in maintaining public order, over and above, any consideration of the actual words or 
views that may have been expressed.  A supporting argument for this view is provided 
by Nadine Strossen when she writes: 
Even more disturbing is that the reported cases indicate that blacks are often 
prosecuted and convicted for the use of fighting words.  Thus, the record of the actual 
implementation of fighting words doctrines demonstrates that – as in the case with all 
speech restrictions – it endangers the principles of equality as well as free speech. 
(Strossen in Coliver, D'Souza, and Boyle 1992, 301) 
However, the influence of fighting words for the concept of hate speech does 
not end here. Whilst there may ultimately have been little legal gravity to the ‘fighting 
words’ doctrine, the concept has carried currency into much later decades and 
different spheres of public life.  During the 1980s the Campus Speech Codes 
controversies in the US invoked the principles of ‘fighting words’ and firmly established 
them as central to the idea of hate speech.  The Campus Speech Codes involved 
‘colleges and universities adopt[ing] codes of student conduct restricting offensive 
speech’(Walker 1994, 128)  Although initially successful, the codes were challenged 
and quickly defeated in the courts.  Arguably, what is seen here is an instance of, 
‘fighting words’ breaking from its legal context and, acting to re-inform a greatly 
developed area of debate around hate speech. The idea of fighting words recognises a 
specific violence of a certain type of speech that is different to that of a personal 
affront or an insult. Meaning, that fighting words inflict an injury. Although the key 
element of ‘fighting words’ for the concept of hate speech is to acknowledge that 
words can injure, it also emphasises a significant state tie that is not based in a 
motivation to protect a victim but instead is focused on preserving public order.  As 
Strossen observes, ‘…the fighting words doctrine does not address and will not prevent 
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the injuries caused by [campus] racist speech.’(Strossen in Coliver, D'Souza, and Boyle 
1992, 300) Although based in law, the concept of ‘fighting words’ is shown here to also 
be heavily influenced by state politics.   
Performing hate speech 
Chapter one outlined how the definitions of hate speech often place emphasis 
upon the harms hate speech can inflict.  If hate speech can injure then there seems to 
be the presumption that these forms of expression must be performative in nature. 
Additionally, if the political influence, noted at the end of the ‘fighting words’ section, 
is constructing an influential part of how the concept of hate speech is understood, 
then there are additional grounds for considering hate speech as performative.30  As a 
result, a brief account of performative speech acts is needed.  
The first theorisation of performative speech acts is attributed to J. L. Austin who 
gave the William James Lectures in 1955.31  Austin describes these speech acts as 
indicating ‘that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action – it is not 
normally thought of as just saying something.’ (Austin, Urmson, and Sbisa 1975, 6) 
There is no direct association in Austin’s work with violence or indeed any injury 
inflicted by performative speech acts.  Instead, he considers the ability of speech to act 
through a form of authorisation.  A famous example of how the performative functions 
for Austin is the description of a judge saying ‘I sentence you.’ In the moment of the 
utterance, the words act to sentence a defendant.  A certain authorisation is required 
for the act to be successful and, in Austin’s conceptualisation, the scenario privileges 
                                                                 
30 This is because Butler’s theorisation of the performative speech act adds a distinctly political character 
which will  be discussed within this section. 
31 The lectures resulted in the publication of ‘How to Do Things with Words’ (Austin, Urmson, and Sbisa 
1975) which sets out Austin’s theory of performative speech acts. 
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the position of the speaker over the addressee.  For Austin, these performatives are 
restricted to verbal utterances.  His conceptualisation of the performative speech act 
appears to align consistently with the foundation provided through the ‘fighting words’ 
doctrine in the previous section. 
Later work by Derrida and Butler develops this notion of the performative beyond 
Austin’s essential but arguably restrictive concept.  Derrida increases the reach of 
these types of utterance to other forms of ‘communication’ and emphasises the 
violence in these speech acts.32 By identifying the ability of the speech act to break 
with context through the force de rupture, as was outlined in chapter one, Derrida 
introduces violence into the performative.  In addition, he also problematizes Austin’s 
idea of the ‘total speech act in the total speech situation’(Austin, Urmson, and Sbisa 
1975, 148) which Derrida argues must be an impossibility asking ‘…would a 
performative utterance be possible if a citational doubling [doublure] did not come to 
split and dissociate from itself the pure singularity of the event?’(Derrida 2000a, 17) 
Building on these previous works, Butler develops the performative speech act further 
to make it distinctly political.33 She argues that the ‘efforts of performative discourse 
exceed and confound the authorizing contexts from which they emerge.’(Butler 1997, 
159) For Butler, this is because subjects are interpellated into social being in a variety 
of different ways, not in a singular way.  Through those processes, she explains how 
the performative is not only something used by an ‘already established subject’ but 
                                                                 
32 Derrida undertakes a specific reading of Austin’s performative in the essay ‘Signature, Event, Context’ 
in the book ‘Limited Inc.’(Derrida 2000a, 1-23) 
33 Butler devotes a complete book to the performative speech act in ‘Excitable Speech: a Politics of the 
Performative’ (Butler 1997) She responds directly to the work of Austin and Derrida throughout the text. 
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also shows an ability to ‘transform the contexts by which they are or are not 
authorised.’34 
In this sense the social performative is a crucial part not only of subject formation, but of 
the ongoing political contestation and reformulation of the subject as well.  The 
performative is not only a ritual practice: it is one of the influential rituals  by which 
subjects are formed and reformulated. (Butler 1997, 160) 
This developed form of the performative is the version that I argue is an 
essential feature of both hate speech, and the understanding of the concept of hate 
speech.  The stages of theoretical development outlined above are heavily influential 
for the concept of hate speech.  This is because they explain how hate speech can 
injure but, also, how hate speech functions to constitute linguistic subjects in social 
and political ways.  The authorisation that Austin assumes for the performative speech 
act is not always granted to hate speech.35  However, once that performative is made 
violent by Derrida, and politicised through Butler’s analysis, the performative hate 
speech act can transform its contexts whether it is authorised or not.  Butler describes 
this as ‘that moment in which a speech act without prior authorization nevertheless 
assumes authorisation in the course of its performance…’ (Butler 1997, 160)36   
An alternative view of the performative is contributed by Cami Rowe who 
approaches the concept of performativity through theories of performance.  She 
makes a clear point that her conception of the performative refers ‘…to the broad 
performance-like characteristics of particular actions and modes of being, and this is, 
                                                                 
34 I am making reference to Butler’s argument through chapter four, ‘Implicit Agency and Discursive 
Agency’ in ‘Excitable Speech’(Butler 1997, 127-163) 
35 For Austin the speaker is authorised and so the performative can act.  However, with hate speech, and 
particularly where hate speech laws are in place, the speaker cannot be assumed to be in a positon of 
authority. They may be unauthorised, excluded by law. 
36 Through this idea, an explanation can be given for how a hate speaker can oc cupy a position of 
authority over a victim even if they appear to be in position of subordination.  For example the tweet 
describing verbal abuse received from a homeless person at the beginning of the section ‘a term 
gathering force.’  
77 
 
except where noted, distinct from linguistic notions of performativity.’ (Rowe in 
Sylvester 2015, 23)  Nevertheless, Rowe acknowledges that because she is undertaking 
a performative political analysis, there is overlap with the work on performatives by 
Austin, Derrida, and Butler. As a result of the overlap, I am able to pursue an argument 
that the hate speech performative may also be considered as a masquerade.  This is 
not without a connection to a lesser quoted section of Austin’s writing. During the 
opening passages of ‘How to do things with words’ in the section ‘Preliminary Isolation 
of the Performative,’ Austin states that performative speech acts will not be found in 
nonsense but as ‘masqueraders.’ (Austin, Urmson, and Sbisa 1975, 4)37 To masquerade 
is of course to wear a mask, to be disguised, perhaps to alter one’s appearance , or 
temporarily take on an alternative role.   
Rowe traces the historical roots of ‘masquerade’, discovering that the term 
brings together notions of masquerade performances with the objects used to create 
them (Rowe in Sylvester 2015, 23). Initially, this involves Rowe identifying theatre as a 
site for political masquerade and subsequently as a place where participants are able 
‘to take on social identities normally prohibited by their class or gender, or to disguise 
themselves while committing socially inappropriate acts.’(Rowe in Sylvester 2015, 24) 
Disguised behind only a few words, that perhaps were never intended to be dwelt 
upon, the essence of hate speech is made starkly visible. It seems to me, that the idea 
of masquerade can allow hate speech to function performatively at the point where it 
acts to claim synonymous terms and to mask the harm hate speech can inflict.38     
                                                                 
37 It seems to me that the idea of masquerade can allow hate speech to function performatively and 
engulf its synonyms as is described in chapter one.  
38 I described the way hate speech can achieve this masquerade in chapter one under the heading ‘A 
term gathering force.’ 
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Hiding in plain speech: the face of ‘reasonable racism’ 
Both Labour and the Conservatives are calling for a ‘transition period’ when we leave the 
European Union, which would mean unlimited EU immigration until 202139 
 As has been shown earlier in the chapter the concept of hate speech 
incorporates a confusion that disturbs distinctions between hate speech and hate 
crime.  I argued that the reason for this is due to the social and cultural factors 
functioning to maintain frameworks of oppression and discrimination.  If this is 
combined with earlier points that mean hate speech is not always in conflict with the 
law - it can be tolerated - then it seems to me that more ‘ordinary’ forms of hate 
speech may also influence the construction of the concept of hate speech. 
Whereas in many circumstances hate speech is obviously harmful and dangerous, 
there are others where expressions of hate contrive to serve a less visible, insidious, 
social or political purpose. Iganksi pointed toward the possibility of these less visible 
forms of harm when he considered the normality of many hate crime perpetrators and 
the influence their community could have upon their behaviour. However Iganski was 
clearly considering perpetrators of formally and legally recognised ‘hate crimes’. As has 
been discussed, hate speech is not always a hate crime and is able to produce as well 
as reinforce discriminatory social practices . Nevertheless, there is a parallel in terms of 
the ‘normality’ of many perpetrators of hate speech since, in some cases, ‘hate speech 
can also be subtle, moderate, nonemotive, even bland.’(Parekh in Herz and Molnar 
2012, 41) Consequently, it can be counterproductive to think of hate speech only as 
extreme and unusual.40  However, unlike the earlier discussion where state controls on 
                                                                 
39 The quotation is taken from a jointly created leaflet distributed by Europe for Freedom and 
Democracy (EEDF) and United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in 2018.  No publication details are 
provided with the leaflet. 
40 Examples of extreme instances include events such as cross -burning (in the US specifically) or ‘queer-
bashing.’ 
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hate speech were shown to normalise injurious language by requiring its toleration in 
discourse, this next influencing point allows a further argument to be made that hate 
speech can masquerade as something apparently ‘reasonable.’ Following from this, the 
concept of hate speech could conceivably be influenced by more moderate 
expressions of ‘reasonable’ hate speech.  Such expressions would seek to disrupt the 
idea that hate speech is continually in conflict with notions of freedom of expression or 
legal regulations.  Take for example, the following statement: 
Perhaps you're bothered by how someone like Obama, with such a mysterious and 
shadowy background who hasn't even provided college transcripts, can seemingly come 
out of nowhere as a media darling and go on to become the president of the United States 
(and for those in Europe, the strange and harmful leadership of the European Union). 
Maybe you have become one of the millions of White victims of "multicultural 
enrichment."41 
While the essence of the extract may imply that the statement is a form of hate 
speech, there is nothing within the content of the paragraph that is overtly hateful.42 
Even once that context becomes available, there is no indication that the statement 
may warrant any sort of legal intervention or censorship. A much broader context 
needs to be understood in order to be able to decipher the hate speech message. 
Instances such as these require the concept of hate speech to be much broader than a 
concept constructed solely through law.   
Priscilla Marie Meddaugh and Jack Kay explore this, as they claim, ‘new’, type of 
hate speech and suggest that it has the capacity to elude current hate speech 
regulations.  Analysing characterisations of the ‘Other’ within articles published on the 
                                                                 
41 Taken from an introductory section of the Stormfront website attributed to Dr Ford 
https://www.stormfront.org/forum/t968576/ [accessed 26 June 2016].  This quotation is used as it 
provides an example of how so called ‘reasonable racism’, discussed in this section, functions.  
Additionally its source, the StormFront website, is also the focus of one of the c ritical essays considered 
later in this section. 
42 I claim here that the essence of the content implies it is hate speech. However, this is because I am 
familiar with the source and the various theories surrounding this type of hate speech. Without that 
context I may not recognise the statement as hate speech which is why this form of hate speech is so 
dangerous. 
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Stormfront website they conclude that the site has created ‘a “cyber transition” 
between traditional hate speech and “reasonable racism,” a tempered discourse that 
emphasizes pseudo-rational discussions of race and subsequently may cast a wider net 
in attracting audiences.43 (Meddaugh and Kay 2009, 251) Such a transition is argued by 
Meddaugh and Kay to obscure the extreme nature of the articles published through 
the website because the racist rhetoric has been made more ‘palatable’. Meddaugh 
and Kay find: 
…the approach of “reasonable racism” appropriated by Stormfront authors as particularly 
disturbing’ because ‘messages benefit from the “in-tertextuality” of Web authorship, the 
porosity of contemporary texts, and their relative reading in the political organization of 
hate discourse. (Meddaugh and Kay 2009, 264)  
Or, in other words, publications are appropriated to make it appear as though the 
racist articles are well researched with a legitimate evidence base.  The result is argued 
to be that such a pseudo-legitimacy makes the content (expressed in less obviously 
extreme wording) more likely to appeal to a wider audience satisfying and reinforcing 
the prejudices of a more diverse white supremacist group.44  Meddaugh and Kay 
consider the audience here as ‘active participants’ in the creation of meaning but also 
ill-prepared for the pitfalls of the forum.45 There are a number of points that could be 
raised here in relation to the positioning of the audience in creating meaning and the 
assumption that all those individuals are somehow manipulated by the forum of the 
internet.  If Iganski’s point is remembered here, then it is feasible that the audience 
are actively seeking reinforcement regardless of where it comes from.  Perhaps a more 
                                                                 
43 Stormfront has been widely labelled as the first hate website to become established. 
44 The article considers the white supremacist movement and notes that increasingly, members are 
economically successful, socially heterogeneous and well educated (Meddaugh and Kay 2009, 252) 
45 Meddaugh and Kay state they are hesitant to support legal restrictions on hate speech because of the 
implications it has for freedom of expression. Instead they advocate a different response suggestin g 
‘new pedagogical approaches in critical ways of reading, seeing and thinking for students of all  
ages’(Meddaugh and Kay 2009, 264) to equip them with the tools to expose and reject hate speech on 
the internet. 
81 
 
significant counterpoint is the type of performative speech act hate speech has been 
shown to be.  Since the hate speech performative can constitute linguistic subjects in 
particular ways and transform its contexts, it is not necessarily the forum of 
communication that is important nor the intention behind the words.  Nevertheless, 
the example that questions Barak Obama’s claim to the Presidency, the EU, and 
multiculturalism remains powerful for understanding this element of the concept of 
hate speech. 
A second point to consider raised by Meddaugh and Kay is the obscurity of the 
authors or originators of hate speech on the internet.  This is also a theme presented 
in ‘Hate speech in Cyberspace’(Delgado and Stefancic 2014). The definitions discussed 
in chapter one demonstrated that hate speech can break with context, does not 
require a direct originator, and exceeds the speaker.  The points become pertinent 
again here.  In contrast to the Stormfront article, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic 
propose that most internet speech is ‘anonymous or voiced amongst like-minded 
people, and so can give the false impression that a viewpoint is widely shared when in 
reality, it is not.’ (Delgado and Stefancic 2014, 339) Explaining how this occurs, they 
offer the argument that normal social restrictions placed upon behaviour during other 
types of communicative interactions do not apply in cyberspace. Delgado and Stefancic 
reason that in the absence of these boundaries (such as social contact or 
confrontation), individuals become more likely to engage in the use of hate speech 
than they would be in a normal social setting.  However, if the challenges of 
distinguishing between hate speech and hate crime are remembered, perpetrators of 
hate crimes are likely to reflect the views of their community.  Hence, it is not easily 
proven that these individuals are not engaging in hate speech in their ‘normal’ social 
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setting.  The internet after all is as much a part of everyday communication as a smart 
phone, television, radio or podcasts.46  What is important for the concept of hate 
speech I argue is the break from the original speaker and the perceived absence of 
boundaries that might place a limit on someone’s behaviour.  Forms of deterrent that 
may be effective in combatting internet hate speech are suggested as  ‘unmasking; 
group condemnation and economic sanctions’ (Delgado and Stefancic 2014, 341-342) 
What both Meddaugh and Kay, and Delgado and Stefancic, each point to is that a 
wider social view needs to be taken to understand and respond to hate speech.  
Particularly in terms of hate speech that is not in contravention of a legal restriction, a 
concept of hate speech understood through law is not sufficient. Where hate speech 
can infiltrate everyday discourse it can serve to almost anonymously support or 
construct structures of discrimination and suppression.  In order to change those 
structures then a dominant viewpoint may need to be disrupted and changed.  One 
way to attempt such a change could be through the deterrents Delgado and Stefancic 
suggest.  An alternative is provided by participants from the Hate Crime Project:  
When interviewees were asked what they thought would prevent people from committing 
a hate crime in the future, the majority were in favour of adopting an educational 
approach, as opposed to a criminal justice or punitive one. (Chakraborti, Garland, and 
Hardy 2014, 64) 
These issues aside, Delgado and Stefancic are correct in suggesting that normal 
social conventions that might ordinarily temper an individual’s effluence of hate 
speech change when the web is used.  Delgado and Stefancic present this behavioural 
change as one whereby the offender is released from the binds of oppressive social 
forces that prevent them from expressing their real hate.   
                                                                 
46 It is also important to acknowledge that a large proportion of the population has no access to the 
internet. 
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Equally, Delgado and Stefancic’s perpetrator would not actually be breaking their 
behavioural shackles but would instead be enacting the pre-constructed desires of 
their community.  In addition, the ‘reasonable racism’ identified as in use by 
Meddaugh and Kay is not limited to the internet.  Robert Lanning notes a range of 
different researchers who have considered the propaganda of hate groups in the 
‘Irrationalism: The Foundation of Hate Propaganda.’(Lanning 2012, 50) What seems to 
be consistently found is that communication mechanisms considered include the 
internet but also music, linguistics, radio speeches, written literature, and analysis of 
communication strategies. The means by which different hate groups draw people in is 
attributed to a range of different ‘techniques employed as persuasive or deceitful, a 
soft-sell approach or one that is guilt inducing, to prod the listener or reader to accept 
a group’s message and purpose.’(Lanning 2012)  The internet itself does not appear to 
me to stand out in any significantly different way here.  For example, the rhetoric used 
during the EU Referendum campaign in the UK during 2016 can demonstrate the 
appearance of ‘reasonable racism’ within other modes of communication that have a 
considerable audience reach:   
If we vote to remain in the EU, we’ll be stuck with an out-of-control immigration system 
which is bad for our security.  The European Courts will be in charge of who we let in, and 
who we can remove.  Imagine if Turkey joins this broken system. (Vote Leave Campaign 
Leaflet, 2016)47 
Specifying the internet as a special place of concern for abuse or hate seems to me 
to be misleading.  It may or may not be true that fewer barriers to accessing or 
expressing hate speech exist in this forum.  Equally it may or may not be true that 
sanctions (social, political, legal or any other kind), are more difficult to enforce and 
that tailored responses could be helpful.  Nevertheless, maintaining anonymity as a 
                                                                 
47 The Vote Leave campaign leaflet does not receive a full  reference a s there is a lack of information but 
it does refer to the website voteleavetakecontrol.org  
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hate speaker or, the expressing of extreme viewpoints amongst like-minded groups, 
are not isolated to the ether of cyberspace.  The internet may make anonymity appear 
easier but it is not an essentially unique characteristic of this technology.  Telephone 
numbers can be withheld by callers, graffiti does not include a name and address 
(although the artist may leave a tag - much like an IP address), the Ku Klux Klan 
famously wore hoods to disguise their identities; it is not unusual for extreme political 
parties (such as the British National Party (BNP)) to hold closed meetings.  All of these 
can be argued to provide the type of anonymity described in these texts.  What is 
crucial for the concept of hate speech is  the point that is made about hate speech 
taking a form that allows it to exist through apparently reasonable contexts.  As Robert 
Post has written: 
Much hate speech regulation follows an analogous logic.  It permits statements about 
race, nationality, and religion, so long as such speech maintains a ‘decent and moderate’ 
manner. (Post in Hare and Weinstein 2009, 128)  
Nevertheless, and despite my own objections outlined above, the internet is 
increasingly represented through media and general reporting - in line with the views 
of Meddaugh and Kay, and Delgado and Stefancic - as a place of special concern for 
hate speech.  It is an interesting viewpoint given the seemingly limitless reach and lack 
of accountability the web provides. Initiatives such as the recent ‘Recl@im the 
Internet’ campaign (launched in the UK and designed to tackle on-line abuse) do 
appear add weight to the claim.48  I only suggest here that caution should be used to 
avoid elevating the problems of hate speech on the internet over and above those of 
any other form of communication.   
                                                                 
48 The campaign is designed to promote action that challenges on-line abuse.  It follows in the footsteps 
of the ‘reclaim the night’ campaigns begun in the late 1970s .http://www.reclaimtheinternet.com/ 
[accessed 13 June 2016]. 
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It seems to me that the internet does not create a new form of hate speech. 
Instead, it provides another mode of communication for hate speech to invade.  In 
itself, that is not a reason to begin to treat hate speech on the internet differently from 
where it occurs in other media.  Especially as Lanning has observed through examining 
other forms of propaganda, that: 
what is promoted as a rational assessment of a social problem is a means of making a 
perspective acceptable to the consumer of hate propaganda where the more volatile or 
violent message might be rejected as too extreme. (Lanning 2012, 50)  
 The concept of ‘reasonable racism’ is one of importance for the concept of hate 
speech.  It often becomes easy to think of hate speech as always devastatingly 
extreme.  These ‘reasonable’ forms of hate speech are all caught up in the concept of 
hate speech itself. To say the concept of hate speech is limited to encompassing only 
extreme forms of these utterances that conflict with rights to freedom of expression or 
law is limiting.  The site of conflict for these ‘reasonable’ hate speech incidents is based 
more in a performative masquerade that constitutes subjects in social and political 
ways and disrupts assumptions that hate speech is something that is always extreme. 
Extreme dangers of hate speech 
Before concluding this chapter, there is a final influence that I will propose 
contributes to the construction of the concept of hate speech.  Sadly, though 
necessarily, this particular influence returns us to the eye of the storm.  Turning from 
the vile and terrifying dangers of extreme hate speech for too long risks allowing its 
devastating force to evade capture or as in the next example, to unleash its full 
violence.  The worst harm hate speech threatens for its victims is death.  And yet, 
where theoretical arguments about freedom of expression redirect attention to 
offence, and ‘reasonable racism’ stalks everyday activities and debate, this can be too 
easily forgotten.   
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Hate speech received its name and gained its force in the twentieth century, which 
has been described by Arendt as ‘…a century of wars and revolutions, hence a century 
of that violence which is currently believed to be their common denominator.’(Arendt 
1970, 3) If, as Arendt suggests, violence defines the century where hate speech found 
its name, then perhaps it is not surprising to find violence can be shown to be a 
significant factor in constructing the concept of hate speech.  The wars and revolutions 
that Arendt emphasises are military and political ones.  Many other social and cultural 
struggles were taking place across this period.  Arguably, each of these is in essence 
violent in some form or another and they are not restricted to any singular political or 
legal model.49     
For this section, I will focus on the 1994 Rwandan genocide.  Earlier in this chapter 
under the heading ‘Freedom of Expression’, I argued that the construction of the 
concept of hate speech is tied to models of Western liberal democracies through the 
concept of freedom of expression. Although this historical connection heavily 
influences the current concept of hate speech, it is important to acknowledge that 
freedom of expression is not a right exclusively associated with Western liberal 
democracies. Consequently, a more direct argument can be made to consider ‘hate 
speech’ in more universal or generalizable terms  through consideration of events 
taking place in other parts of the world. Noorloos provides some support for this 
position by devoting a chapter to international laws relating to hate speech in ‘Hate 
Speech Revisited’ (Noorloos 2011).  She notes that ‘in 1948, the right to freedom of 
expression was adopted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (Noorloos 2011, 
                                                                 
49 This is not to say violence, war and political struggle are not features of other centuries, of course they 
are.  I am aiming to demonstrate that the role hate speech played during genocide is relevant, for 
shaping the conditions that have constructed the current concept of hate speech, as it relates to 
violence, force and institutional frameworks.  
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141) and that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ‘includes several 
provisions relevant to hate speech and extreme speech (particularly articles 19 and 
20).’50 (Noorloos 2011, 142) Rwanda is a member of the United Nations and has 
ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which means, the 
genocide that took place there can be considered to place hate speech, through links 
to freedom of expression, within an international context.  The destructive horror of 
hate speech can as a result, be argued to pose risks to all nations and citizens across 
the globe, far beyond its initial ties to Western liberal democracies.   
Parekh’s words resonate when considering the appalling violence of genocide as he 
provides a reminder that hate speech: 
…strikes at the root of the shared communal life and represents a gross misuse of the 
right to free speech.  It breathes the spirit of aggression and violence, lowers the tone of 
public discourse, expresses and promotes hostility…(Parekh in Herz and Molnar 2012, 54) 
Hate speech is not imprisoned by national borders or local state laws but instead 
threatens our ‘shared communal life,’ our civil relations, and ultimately our lives.  The 
Rwandan genocide is not the first atrocity of this kind to take place during the 
twentieth century. The Holocaust is an alternative example that could be discussed; 
however, space limits the analysis.  I argue here that the Rwandan genocide has 
greater significance for understanding hate speech because it allows the current 
concept of hate speech to be viewed through a broader lens.  The genocide took place 
during the years that the concept of hate speech became seriously established.51  
More importantly, as Yared Legesse Mengistu has explained: 
                                                                 
50 A detailed analysis of international laws on hate speech can be found in Chapter V of ‘Hate Speech 
Revisited’ (Noorloos 2011, 141-179). This international expansion allows for the earlier arguments 
relating to freedom of expression and hate speech to be positioned in a more global context. 
51 In addition, David Fraser has argued that ‘the concept of “genocide” did not exist until  Raphael 
Lemkin’s study popularized the term in 1944.’ (Hare and Weinstein 2009, 515)  By focusing on Rwanda I 
hope to avoid any confusion in relation to the term ‘genocide’ and its meaning.  
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in the “radio based culture” of Rwanda, where people tune in for the entire day, the 
role of RTLM in instigating and fanning the genocide was immense. (Mengistu in Herz 
and Molnar 2012, 372)52 
 Language is acknowledged as being an instrumental feature of the atrocities. The 
significant role hate speech can play in violence and death becomes undeniably 
exposed. Previously discussed points of influence on the concept of hate speech see 
hate speech masquerade as less dangerous forms of language that hide the 
discriminatory practices it requires to harm. The example of genocide unmasks the 
performative violence of hate speech and the discriminatory practices that sustain it.  
Demonstrating how genocide influences the concept of hate speech through the 
Rwandan example allows a claim to be made that, the understanding of hate speech 
presented in this thesis, may have a more general applicability beyond a context 
limited to western liberal democracies. 
Tirrell has authored an arresting essay ‘Genocidal Language Games’(Tirrell in 
Maitra and McGowan 2012, 174-221) that analyses the power of derogatory terms 
through their effects upon the ‘social being’ during the massacres.  The relationship 
between state and hate speech is laid bare through the text showing how linguistic 
practices, preceding and during the Rwandan genocide, inflicted the ultimate injury.  
Although I raised the levels of harm inflicted by hate speech earlier in relation to 
freedom of expression, Tirrell draws a different linguistic distinction between deeply 
derogatory terms, casual derogations, and slurs.  She makes the first category the 
focus of her text distinguishing ‘deeply derogatory terms’ from the two other 
categories by asserting their ties to ‘systems of oppression.’(Tirrell in Maitra and 
McGowan 2012, 190)  Tirrell identifies five key features of deeply derogatory terms 
                                                                 
52 Radio Tele Libre Mille Collines (RTLM) was a private radio station that broadcast a mass of anti-Tutsi 
propaganda, including the names and locations of people to be kil led. 
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and positions these alongside features of language games.  In doing so, she gives an 
explanation for how these deeply derogatory terms contributed to the genocide.53   
The crux of Tirrell’s argument is that ‘the use of derogatory terms played a 
significant role in laying the social groundwork for the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi in 
Rwanda.’(Tirrell in Maitra and McGowan 2012, 175). She draws parallels between 
physical and linguistic violence to demonstrate how linguistic violence ‘created 
permissions for the very acts of physical violence’(Tirrell in Maitra and McGowan 2012, 
176) that resulted in genocide.  Tirrell sees linguistic violence as ‘constituting 
psychological and cultural harm’ and as distinctly different to physical violence.  Her 
analysis states that the impact of linguistic violence was disregarded because of the 
more immediate need to avoid physical violence. Within this thesis I am maintaining a 
broader conceptualisation of violence in order to understand how the violence of hate 
speech is reinforced by state institutional frameworks.54 This broader concept of 
violence encapsulates the distinctions between the physical and linguistic violence 
Tirrell distinguishes.   
Although Tirrell writes that avoiding physical violence was a priority, disregarding 
what she terms linguistic violence was also dangerous. Applying extreme derogatory 
terms to Tutsi, such as ‘inyenzi’ and ‘inzoka’, took the form of an organised and 
unrelenting process.55 During the genocide pre-existing practices of social and 
                                                                 
53 A full  explanation of Tirrell’s five defining features of deeply derogatory terms and the key features of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s  language games used in her analysis are provided in the essay.  She identifies the 
major influence as being that these terms are ‘action-engendering within a context’ claiming this is how 
they contributed to the ‘preparation for an execution of a genocide’ (Tirrell  in Maitra and McGowan 
2012, 193). 
54 I use a broader concept of violence so as to encapsulate violence within language itself, violence that 
is present and enforced though institutional frameworks, and violence that infl icts injur y. Further 
consideration will be given to violence in chapter three.     
55 ‘Inyenzi’ meaning cockroach and ‘inzoka’ meaning snake.  Tirrell  provides an account of the position of 
the snake in Rwandan culture observing a cultural tradition where boys are tr usted to kil l  snakes in a 
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institutional discrimination were exploited and exacerbated in order to divide and 
dehumanise. These acts were state sponsored, premeditated and targeted: ‘because 
of the action-engendering force of derogatory terms, actions hitherto unthinkable (i.e. 
the extermination of a people) came to be regarded as socially appropriate and even 
required.’ (Tirrell in Maitra and McGowan 2012, 176).56 Through this horror and in a 
particularly extreme way, each element that comes to influence the concept of hate 
speech can be seen.  Hate speech avoids conflict with freedom of expression in this 
circumstance by violently invading everyday discourse and receiving authorisation 
from the state. Social and institutional discriminatory practices were reinforced 
through the use of hate speech, and the performative character of this injurious 
language not only harmed, but even dictated methods of killing. 
The warning that Tirrell provides about these deeply derogatory terms and how 
they came to result in the extermination of people should not be forgotten when 
reading the statement below: 
And I really feel the word cockroach … it may be slightly crude, but again, really, is it any 
harsher than words used in the media … in papers like The Sun, The Mail, The Express at 
the time, they used words like “pests”, “vermin”, “scroungers” … it’s not really – I feel – 
any harsher than those terms. (Collett,2006b)57 
When these types of terms become commonplace in news media and hate speakers 
evade the reaches of the law, concerns should be raised.58 It seems to me that for this 
                                                                 
very particular way. It is later stated that the use of the word ‘inzoka’ resulted in the same method of 
kil l ing being used on people.  The argument is that the power of the linguistic violence not only resulted 
in death but in a specific method of kil l ing. 
56 ‘Action-engendering’ is the fifth and final key feature of ‘deeply derogatory terms’ that Tirrell  
identifies.  It is described as enacting an inferential role that authorises particular kinds of treatment 
towards those classified as belonging to the term.    
57 This quote is taken from the court transcripts of Regina v Nicholas John Griffin & Mark Adrian Collett, 
[23 January 2006, Evidence of Mark Collett (part), pg 14].  Collett was charged with inciting racial hatred 
and the quote forms part of his response when asked why he had said ‘I don’t hate asylum seekers.  
These people are cockroaches and they’re doing what cockroaches do.’ 
58 Collett was acquitted of all  charges against him and so strictly speaking he is not legally a hate 
speaker. From a more general hate speech position it is l ikely he would be considered a hate speaker by 
a majority of the general public. 
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to happen, hate speech must either, be supported by institutional frameworks, or at 
least able to exploit them. Although the Rwandan genocide was clearly much more 
serious than the court case example above, both raise an important point about the 
role of the media since, …’the role of  RTLM in instigating and fanning the genocide 
was immense.’ (Mengistu, in Herz and Molnar 2012, 372)59  Where hate speech can 
disturb the boundaries between extreme speech and ‘everyday’ or ‘moderate’ speech 
then its power to injure can increase exponentially.  The social norms that might 
otherwise arrest the spread of hate speech where it is not in conflict with the law 
cease to function because hate speech becomes the normal state.  In part, through the 
use of radio, it can be argued that the tool for broadcasting because it was such an 
important part of Rwandan culture, created a space to authorise extreme hate in 
public discourse. As Tirrell points out, hate speech was even responsible for directing 
particular forms of killing that people adopted.  Perhaps it should not be too much of a 
surprise then to learn that: 
…the role of RTLM has become indelibly imprinted on the nation’s psyche; it has 
informed the substance and spirit of hate speech regulation and discourse in Rwanda 
and serves as an impetus to set narrow parameters for freedom of expression.  (Tirrell, 
in Herz and Molnar 2012, 373) 
And so, in this site of extreme violence a return to the beginning is signalled with a 
return to the parameters of freedom of expression.  Again, it is clear that freedom of 
expression is not unfettered, and the boundaries which define it are set by the state 
and through law.   
Evaluating a concept 
 A point is now reached where these six sites of influence upon the concept of 
hate speech must be drawn together.  The concept of hate speech is clearly expansive 
                                                                 
59 See footnote 52 for a description of RTLM. 
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and although it is not possible to do so here, each of the themes I have identified 
through the chapter could be developed further.  Brown has suggest that: 
There is always the chance, of course, that as society as a whole co-opts the term ‘hate 
speech’ and puts it to myriad purposes, the term itself will be emptied of its original, legal-
technocractic meaning to such an extent that it becomes merely an empty vessel…But 
even if we are on the path toward emptying the term ‘hate speech’ of substantive 
meaning, I do not think we are there yet. (Brown 2017, 427) 
The term ‘hate speech’ being emptied of meaningful substance is a possibility. 
However, it has also been shown that hate speech is adaptable and able to create the 
conditions to sustain its own existence.  What Brown neglects to mention is that the 
emptying of the term ‘hate speech’ could also present an opportunity for hate speech 
to adapt and reinvent itself in a new form and under a new name.   
Throughout this chapter, the focus I have given to the sites of conflict that allow 
the concept of hate speech to absorb opposing perceptions has proved beneficial. 
Initially, considering current work that finds roots in theories of tolerance and freedom 
of expression generates a link back to the Enlightenment period.  Through this, a very 
specific concept of hate speech emerges tied to the state and the relationship with 
freedom of expression.  Initially this connects the concept of hate speech with values 
and ideologies associated with Western liberal democracies.  However, rights to 
freedom of expression have expanded across the world and, co-exist with a number of 
different political and social models.  These models may vary by nation but they can be 
argued to find a common connection through international law, thereby opening up 
the possibility that the influencing points for the current concept of hate speech, share 
some potentially universal qualities. 
Hate speech has been shown to be bound to public order, toleration, law, and civil 
relations.  Because of the conflict between tolerating hate speech as a part of free 
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expression and restricting hate speech on the basis of the harm it causes, the concept 
has absorbed all levels of possible harms across a range of contexts.  In doing so, the 
concept comes to incorporate a site of debate that focuses upon which harms are 
significant enough to warrant restriction and which are not.  This leads to the 
understanding that the concept of hate speech includes the ability of hate speech to 
sustain and fuel oppressive or discriminatory structures.   
A second site of conflict was identified when attempting to distinguish between 
hate crime and hate speech.  The boundaries between the two are indistinct and the 
concept of hate speech must house the uncertainty that that brings.  The term, ‘hate 
speech’, is never used in a legislation despite the law heavily influencing how hate 
speech is conceived and regulating forms of expression that amount to hate speech.  
Though the law serves an important function in placing limits on freedom of 
expression and therefore hate speech, it can also ignore, sanction, and authorise these 
forms of expression. Hate speech is both legal and illegal simultaneously and the habit 
of individualising hate speech to a single speaker detracts from understanding how 
institutional frameworks both produce and sustain hate speech. 
A third moment I argued heavily contributes to the construction of the concept 
of hate speech, arises through the ‘fighting words’ doctrine. ‘Fighting words’ creates 
the foundations from which hate speech can become considered as a performative 
speech act.  This is done when the court recognises the ability of words to inflict injury 
in the moment of the utterance.  The concept of hate speech is again directly tied to 
the law but this time specifically through public order.  Here it begins to become 
evident that the motivation of the state in regulating hate speech is not based in the 
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desire to uphold freedom of expression. Instead the law places a focus on the ability of  
words to incite a breach of the peace and acts to maintain order.  
Considering hate speech as a performative speech act becomes the next site of 
interest for the concept of hate speech.  Situating hate speech as a performative 
speech act demonstrates that these forms of expression have the capacity to act and 
therefore inflict injury.  The hate speech performative is shown to be violent and 
political with an ability to constitute subjects in social and political contexts.  
Connecting the performative hate speech act to the idea of masquerade illuminates 
how hate speech can claim its synonymous terms and through them, mask the harm it 
can inflict. 
 Following from this, the concept of hate speech was shown to be heavily 
influenced by ‘everyday’ hate speech.  What this demonstrated was that hate speech is 
not always in conflict with the law and disrupts notions that it is always to be found in 
extreme situations.  Hate speech is not always on the limits of what is considered 
publicly sayable.  Because hate speech can masquerade as moderate, these forms of 
expression can become authorised as part of public discourse. Hate speech gains an 
ability to almost anonymously reinforce social and political structures of discrimination 
and subjugation.  However, it was important to end the discussion of the concept of 
hate speech with a reminder that hate speech at its most extreme can and does kill.  
Focusing too heavily on the everyday appearances of hate speech in more ‘moderate’ 
forms can be misleading when considering its danger. Hate speech is able to saturate 
institutional frameworks and play a direct role in mass murder.   
 What each of the key influences creates is a porous concept of hate speech 
that can expand to absorb a wide and varied set of conflicting ideas.  Hate speech 
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becomes more difficult to define as a result, but breadth of the concept ens ures that it 
can become meaningful to for a wide variety range of people and circumstances.  As I 
have shown, the concept of hate speech has foundations tied to democracy and 
freedom of expression.  The conflict between politics, law, and free expression, injects 
a violence into the heart of the concept of hate speech from the very beginning.  As 
the concept adapts to new conditions it becomes able to reach beyond academic and 
legal spheres and ‘enter the field of politics, popular culture, the arts, sport, media, 
education, science, and may more besides.’(Brown 2017, 429). Understanding the 
concept of hate speech in this way means recognising that wherever a form of hate 
speech can be tolerated, hate speech can also inflict harm. 
 
  
 Chapter Three: Violence, hate speech and institutional frameworks 
The two earlier chapters have established how the definitions and concept of 
hate speech are influenced and have developed.  A position has been reached where it 
is possible to directly engage with the relationship between hate speech, violence and 
the institutional frameworks.  I will argue throughout this chapter that the violence 
associated with hate speech, identified through the definitions and concept explored 
in chapters one and two, can be reinforced by institutional frameworks.1  This chapter 
will give primacy to legal and legislative frameworks in order to demonstrate how the 
violence of hate speech can be, legitimized and ultimately reinforced by them.   
Earlier chapters have shown that the relationship between law and hate speech 
is complex yet significant for, understanding the definitions and concept of hate 
speech. This is the case despite ‘hate speech’ as a term having no direct legal status. 
Previous arguments have demonstrated that laws relating to hate speech are actually, 
more closely aligned, with maintaining the limits of free expression and public order, 
than with directly protecting people from hate speech. Legal interventions to control 
hate speech can create requirements for injurious language to be tolerated in public 
discourse. From this point of departure, I will argue that, although there is a need for 
the state to attempt to control the violence of hate speech, legal state institutional 
frameworks also function to perpetuate the violence of hate speech.   
                                                                 
1 The violence I refer to here is meant to incorporate the violence that has been shown to be inherent 
within hate speech itself, within the concept of the term, and within the contexts through which hate 
speech harms. 
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Institutional frameworks are understood here as formal and informal systems that 
shape activity or behaviour.  Within this chapter I refer to institutional frameworks as 
those systems that are controlled and operated by the state.2  
In the last decade or so, we have seen record levels of net migration in Britain, and that 
sheer volume has put pressure on public services, like schools, stretched our 
infrastructure, especially housing, and put a downward pressure on wages for working 
class people. (The Rt Hon Theresa May MP, 2017).3 
However as the quotation from May shows, other institutional frameworks that are in 
place concern areas such as public services, schools, and infrastructure.  The 
frameworks through which the state institutions function serve to provide security, 
maintain order and to fulfil a range of other responsibilities that can be political, 
educational, social or cultural.  It is worth considering the quotation for a few 
moments to identify some of the themes that have been arising through the earlier 
chapters.  Positioning this chapter within the context of those themes can help provide 
ways to consider how the violence of hate speech can become legally legitimized.  At 
the same time, the themes emphasise the need to maintain an awareness of the 
broader social and political influences that also shape the concept of hate speech. 
May is making a political statement and seems to be attributing the increasing 
pressure on services directly to net migration levels.  She also states that the migration 
levels are the cause of decreasing income for ‘working class people’.  If the 
immigration poster discussed during chapter one is recalled, a comparison can be 
                                                                 
2 There may be some important connecti ons between hate speech and other forms of institutional 
frameworks not l inked specifically to the State.  Types of institutional frameworks such as those 
operated by private companies, for example through recruitment policies or practices, fall outside th e 
scope of this chapter. 
3 A quotation taken from ‘The government's negotiating objectives for exiting the EU: PM speech ’.  
Published by Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, Department for Exiting the European Union, on 
17 January 2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-governments-negotiating-objectives-
for-exiting-the-eu-pm-speech [accessed 28/01/2018].  Used here to demonstrate how a political speech 
that directly l inks pressures on education, housing, wages and public services directly with immigration, 
can be used to direct blame towards a particular group of people and deflect it from policy decisions 
that directly impacted each area.  
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drawn.4  Initially this would seem to place May’s words within a political framework 
and within the context of the ‘hostile environment policy.’5 I argue that this is an 
example of hate speech being ‘normalised’ through May’s words because they 
demand a level of toleration in discourse.  A case could also be made that her words 
are actually a form of ‘reasonable’ hate speech.6  The words appear moderate and 
tempered, designed to appeal to a particular audience. They can be argued to show 
the masquerade hate speech performs, concealing its threat, and constituting its 
victims in a particular way. Individuals are being assigned to a specific group through 
being considered a ‘migrant’ or a ‘working class person.’  If a person is not attributed 
to either of those groups they are still being positioned to access the meaning of the 
statement in a particular way.  Migrants are targeted here as the cause for a number 
of social ills. An argument could be made that the message is designed to incite others 
to think about migrants in a particularly negative way.  Directly identifying the 
institutions and other people that are being affected (housing, schools, etc.,) is 
reminiscent to me of the way in which hate speech can harm civil relations.  May 
attributes the harm being done to those civil relations as the fault of migrants (they 
are overburdening services and making people poorer).  I attribute the harm being 
done to civil relations as occurring due to May’s negative constitution of the migrant 
subject.  Additionally, the quotation also points to the theme of this chapter.  By 
making the claim that schools, housing, and even jobs are being affected, May 
highlights the kinds of institutional frameworks that I will propose can function to 
reinforce the violence of hate speech.  Although I will focus on legal frameworks and 
                                                                 
4 The discussion of the poster can be found in the ‘Acting normal’ section of chapter one.  
5 See chapter one footnote 11 for an explanation of the policy. 
6 See the section ‘Hiding in plain speech’ for an explanation of ‘reasonable’ hate speech. 
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the law more broadly, it is important to remain mindful that these other frameworks 
are equally important when considering hate speech. 
As has already been indicated in the earlier chapters, the institutional 
framework of the law is highly significant for understanding the definitions, concept 
and functioning of hate speech.  Academic work features state regulation of hate 
speech frequently, particularly in the context of its relationship to freedom of 
expression. A number of countries across the world have adopted ‘hate speech’ laws.  I 
will argue that when legislative attempts are made to control hate speech, the violence 
of this injurious language can actually be reinforced through established institutional 
frameworks.7 However, this does not necessarily mean that hate speech legislation is 
undesirable. Laws restricting hate speech are important for determining the limits of 
what is acceptable in public discourse and for responding to extreme forms of these 
dangerous utterances. I have argued that definitions, including legal definitions, 
identify and expose vulnerable groups considered most at risk from hate speech.  
These categories are argued to be shaped by social and political influences that are 
equally important when considering harms inflicted by hate speech. Nevertheless, it is 
important to be mindful of Matsuda’s observation that ‘ours is a law bound culture. If 
law is where racism is, then law is where we must confront it.’(Matsuda 1993, 51) This 
is a particularly important point as Matsuda suggests that law, and presumably its 
institutions and frameworks, can itself reaffirm structures of racism.  If this is the case 
then law, through hate speech legislation may have the potential to reinforce the 
violence and injury of hate speech because hate speech could be a part of that 
                                                                 
7 Benjamin’s notion of where a cause becomes violent relies on the notion that the concepts of law and 
justice influence the sphere of social relations.  The institutional frameworks I raise here include both 
formal systems of regulations and informal conventions that serve to give material reality to the 
concepts. 
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institutional framework.  By recalling an example from chapter one Matsuda’s point 
can be demonstrated.8  The victim being interviewed in the example suggested that 
the police would act to prevent racist hate speech but not homophobic hate speech.  
As the police represent a legal institution, then it can be said that in this case, the law 
confronted hate speech when that language was recognised as racism. At the same 
time, structures of homophobia were authorised and reinforced by the failure of the 
law to confront homophobic hate speech. 
It seems to me that extreme examples of hate speech, those most visible to the 
legal system, are only the most easily identifiable versions of these expressions.  As I 
have previously argued hate speech often vilifies in much more ordinary, everyday 
situations that never register in a formal legal context or courtroom.  This concealment 
‘in statements which at first glance may seem to be rational and normal’ (Weber 2009, 
5) makes it essential to maintain awareness of the other frameworks that may 
reinforce the violence of hate speech.  However, I would argue that in the context of 
Matsuda’s view all other institutional frameworks are ultimately bound to and by law.  
In this sense it seems to me that all institutional frameworks can be said to be shaped 
by law.9 
Violence as a foundational cornerstone 
 
Violence was established as a foundational cornerstone of the identity of hate 
speech through the definitions of hate speech considered in chapter one.  Equally, 
violence was found at the centre of the concept of hate speech during chapter two.  
                                                                 
8 See the section on ‘Defining a contested term’.  The example is where a victim of hate speech 
describes how the police provide support for her in one circumstance but do not support her in another. 
9 Although I am considering less obvious forms of hate speech at stages during the chapters, the other 
frameworks that may reinforce their violence will  not come under direct scrutiny here. 
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However, the purpose of those analyses was to gain an understanding of the term 
‘hate speech’ and subsequently, how the concept of hate speech can be understood.  
A different perspective must now be taken in order to focus upon the relationship of 
violence, hate speech and institutional frameworks. Initially, it is necessary to accept 
that ‘meanings of violence are multiple, complex and contradictory.’(Stanko 2003, 4)10 
Refusing a more limited sense of violence is necessary in order to trace the force of 
violence, and the forms violence takes, which can result in state institutional 
frameworks functioning to reinforce the violence of hate speech even through 
attempts to control hate speech. 
In the book ‘Violence: six sideways reflections’ (Žižek 2008), Slavoj Žižek writes 
that:  
When we perceive something as an act of violence, we measure it by a presupposed 
standard of what the ‘normal’ non-violent situation is – and the highest form of 
violence is the imposition of this standard with reference to which some events appear 
as ‘violent’. (Žižek 2008, 55)   
In many respects Žižek’s words can be argued to be echoed in the forums where hate 
speech can be heard. When violence is understood as at the heart of hate speech then 
it seems to me that other forms of language that are not hate speech might be 
considered ‘non-violent’. Where this is the case, hate speech could be considered as in 
conflict with those ‘non-violent’ forms of language. These other forms of ‘non violent’ 
language would then be used to form the standard against which hate speech was 
judged.11  However, Žižek makes an important point that ‘the highest form of violence’ 
is actually to be found in the ‘imposition of this standard’ against which the situation is 
measured. Recalling the definitions of hate speech from chapter one, it can be argued 
                                                                 
10 As I have done throughout this thesis , I am us ing the term ‘violence’ in its broadest sense 
encompassing physical and abstract forms, including force.   
11 However, caution should be used as it is not certain that forms of language that are not hate speech 
are always non-violent. To complicate matters further I have already shown that hate speech, is  not 
always guaranteed to be called, or recognised as, hate speech. 
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that such a standard would be applied to instances of hate speech through a variety of 
different value judgements.  To deem an utterance offensive one must judge that 
utterance against those that do not cause offence.  To distinguish the level of harm 
hate speech inflicts one must judge hate speech against statements that do not harm.  
To show hate speech amounts to a hate crime one must provide evidence that meets a 
legal standard.12  However when considering hate speech the situation is more 
complicated.  Where hate speech is judged against utterances that may be considered 
only offensive or insulting, then it can be argued, that hate speech is not being 
measured against a form of non-violent language.  In this case, the imposition of the 
standard and the standard itself, could both be argued to be a form of violence. An 
indicator appears here that hate speech may not only be saturated in violence, but 
may also be subject to violence through the way in which the boundaries of what is 
considered ‘sayable’ are drawn.  The implication is that a framework, through which an 
injury inflicted by hate speech can be judged, is imposed by an external power. That 
external power can force a form of violence upon hate speech itself by, imposing a 
value judgement upon language linked to the perceived levels of harm it threatens.13  
The point serves as a reminder of the question of the external authority that arose in 
chapter one and has haunted proceedings since its first appearance.  
This leads to the question of what the external power might be and what the 
framework in which it operates is?  An answer to these questions can be sought in 
Walter Benjamin’s essay ‘Critique of Violence.’(Benjamin, Bullock, and Jennings 1996) 
                                                                 
12 Chapter one demonstrated the points being reiterated; however, the implied external authority 
remained unknown. That authority will  be uncovered during this chapter.  
13 The scenario being proposed is complicated further by the fact that hate speech is not always 
identified or may be tolerated as was demonstrated in chapter two. Where hate speech appears 
‘moderate’ there is potential for the ‘standard measure’ to be corrupted.  Hate speech could function to 
generate a false standard or even elude a measure completely. 
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Benjamin makes the claim that ‘a cause only becomes violent once it enters into moral 
relations’ because those relations are ‘defined by concepts of law and justice.’ 
(Benjamin, Bullock, and Jennings 1996, 236)  Moral relations are concerned with the 
principles of right and wrong behaviours. I argue that the standard that Žižek observes 
exists because it is within the sphere of moral relations. If these relations are defined 
by law and justice, then it seems to me, that legal institutional frameworks may be 
dictating the standards Žižek argues are used to measure violence. Should that be the 
case, it can be argued, that where legal restrictions aim to control hate speech they 
can also be argued to reinforce the violence of injurious language.    
However, there is another influence to consider when thinking about violence 
in the context of the ‘Critique of Violence’. In the original German language of his text, 
Benjamin uses the word ‘Gewalt’ which is translated into English as ‘violence’.  In 
German though, gewalt can mean violence or force. The word is not irreducible to 
either force or violence and carries both meanings simultaneously.14 Derrida 
understands gewalt differently and refers to it as ‘violence and legitimate power, 
justified authority.’(Derrida 1990, 927)   
It cannot be assumed that the ‘violence’ in question is the same homogenous 
concept for both Derrida and Benjamin.  Initially, they appear similar since Derrida is 
situating his translation within the context of Benjamin’s essay.  However, Benjamin’s 
‘task of a critique of violence can be summarised as that of expounding its relation to 
law and justice.’(Benjamin, Bullock, and Jennings 1996, 236) Derrida is exploring ‘the 
force of law of a legitimate power and the supposedly originary violence that must 
have established this authority.’ (Derrida 1990, 927)  Therefore, Benjamin considers 
                                                                 
14 The difficulty presented by translation is one of the reasons a broad conception of violence must be 
retained. 
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violence in terms of its relation to law and justice but Derrida looks beyond the law, for 
the ‘justified authority’ that established the force of law.  In contrast, Arendt considers 
all of these terms (power, authority, violence, force) as distinct from one another.  She 
goes so far as to state ‘in a head-on clash between violence and power, the outcome is 
hardly in doubt; violence would prevail and power would be destroyed.’ (Arendt 1970, 
53)   
The conceptual language of discussions of violence is undergoing a subtle but 
distinctive change between the texts. In some ways, this can be argued to be 
reminiscent of the earlier discussion relating to the concept and definitions of hate 
speech.  What became clear was that no single unified meaning of hate speech can 
exist. This was because hate speech can cover all forms of expression and act through 
all modes of communication.  Both the concept and definitions of hate speech have 
been argued to be instilled with violence.  Perhaps it should not be too surprising that 
the conceptual language of violence is also difficult and elusive. 
The challenge of the terminology here is also a reminder that there is a 
continuing violent struggle between controlling hate speech and being a victim of hate 
speech.  It can often be presumed that a hate speaker must hold a position of power 
and authority over their victim in order to inflict an injury upon them. Given this 
licence, the speaker’s words would be able to wound and hurt because the speaker 
would be considered to be, in control of the speech situation.  A speaker may be 
assumed to be in control of the violence of hate speech:  
To the extent that the speaker of hate speech is understood to effect the 
subordinating message that he or she relays, that speaker is figured as wielding the 
sovereign power to do what he or she says…(Butler 1997, 80-81)  
However, the earlier chapters have demonstrated how hate speech can exceed the 
speaker because of its performative agency. A hate speaker should not be thought of 
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here as being absolved of their responsibility for inflicting harm upon a victim. Instead 
an additional layer of complexity is added because the hate speech performative can 
politically constitute both the speaker and the addressee. During chapter two, the 
‘fighting words’ doctrine exposed the vulnerability of a speaker to the ‘heckler’s veto.’ 
What this showed was that words have a capacity to threaten the state by provoking 
civil disobedience. Speakers could be held to legal account as a result of the way an 
audience might react to their words.  Over and above the speech content or the intent 
of a speaker, a need was uncovered for the state to control language in an effort to 
maintain public order. In addition to this, understanding the tension between hate 
speech and hate crime as an influencing point for the concept of hate speech is also 
significant here.  As has been previously argued, the process of seeking to individualize 
hate crime and hate speech, can allow institutional frameworks to function in ways 
that reinforce discriminatory practices and structures and to obscure those effects 
from view.   
To resolve this apparent conflict it is necessary to return to an earlier theme 
where I argued, hate speech can be normalised in so far as it can be authorised to 
occupy a place in discourse.  Again it is necessary to consider what form that 
authorisation may take.  Because of the relationship between hate speech and 
freedom of expression, hate speech forms part of public discourse and should not be 
considered as separate from public discourse.  Conditions are imposed upon a hate 
speaker when unconditional hospitality is removed from language, when freedom of 
expression is qualified with other conditions.15  There are a range of conditions that 
                                                                 
15 In reality freedom of expression always has l imits and responsibilities attached (see chapters one and 
two) but the extent to which these are transparent and clear varies. The concept of hospitality is 
important for hate speech since hospitality can never be unconditional yet, at the same time, it must 
also seek to be unconditional.  To be hospitable requires a certain element of power, of authority.  
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could be considered here; however, I argue that it could be suggested these all fall 
within the realm of ‘moral relations’ and that all of the conditions are in fact subject to 
law and justice. As a result, I propose here that it is the law that creates those 
conditions and, therefore, the law (in addition to the performative agency of hate 
speech) that can potentially wield a power to remove authority or control over hate 
speech from the hate speaker.   
There are situations where conditions might demand a language of hate be 
imposed as the dominant one, for example at a meeting of a white supremacist group.  
However, these conditions change when hate speech laws are enforced through the 
legal system.  A form of regulation is introduced through law that functions to 
determine if the limits of what is legally sayable have been breached.  Earlier in the 
chapter the standard by which violence was judged was discussed. Here it can be seen 
that the law is determining how that standard is constructed. Consequently, where a 
hate speaker becomes formally disempowered through being legally convicted, the 
limits of what is acceptable in public discourse become redrawn or reinforced.  Where 
a defendant is found not guilty of hate speech offences, their words can be argued to 
become confirmed as acceptable within the boundaries of the law.  As it is already 
known that hate speech is saturated in violence, this structure ensures the law 
provides a mechanism through which hate speech violence can be subjected to legal 
control.16  And so, it can now be suggested that the law inflicts a type of violence upon 
the hate speaker through its judgement that serves to remove their authority. 
                                                                 
However, should that hospitality be overtaken by the ‘guest’, the ‘foreigner’, then there is no longer 
control and the choice to be hospitable is removed.  I am making reference here to Derrida’s theory of 
hospitality in ‘Of Hospitality’ (Derrida 2000b)   
16 I am maintaining a focus on legal influences for this chapter.  It is equally feasible that other 
institutions could work in a similar way.  For example, a school can introduce behaviour codes that could 
set levels of tolerance around hate speech in the same way. 
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Individualising the problem of hate speech to the hate speaker ensures the broader 
social and political influences that shape hate speech remain masked. But, if violence 
can disempower in this sense then perhaps it can also act to empower.  
Arendt writes that: 
Violence does not promote causes, neither history nor revolution, neither progress nor 
reaction; but it can serve to dramatize grievances and bring them to public attention 
(Arendt 1970, 79) 
Arendt explains through giving examples of student riots in France that in the short-
term, violence can be a way to achieve certain goals and to empower minority groups. 
If this is the case, then it may be possible for the legal violence, that has been argued 
to disempower the hate speaker, to function in a way that could result in a form of 
empowerment for minority groups targeted by hate speech.  By recognising the 
danger of hate speech through law an option is presented to victims to seek redress 
for their injuries. Where guilty verdicts are reached the boundaries of acceptable 
speech become redrawn. It seems to me, that a form of indirect empowerment for 
victims of hate speech may be realised through, the process of legally redefining what 
becomes judged as acceptable speech.  Such a relationship between violence and hate 
speech can perhaps be thought of in terms of authorised and unauthorised forms of 
violence.  Authorised violence would be the violence hate speech inflicts when the 
state, via the law, enforces a standard against which hate speech can be judged 
regardless of what that judgement turns out to be. Unauthorised violence would relate 
to instances of hate speech that avoid the legal structure altogether. I argue that this is 
one reason legislation, definitions, and social practice, often emphasise the effects of 
hate speech. Where the violence of hate speech is being contained and managed 
within an ‘authorised’ framework, then its effects can be quantified, measured and 
controlled.  In the act of legitimizing the violence of hate speech within the legal 
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structure, the institutional frameworks serve to reinforce the violence of hate speech.  
Although the law may enforce penalties, it also ensures hate speech is publicly 
recognised and to some extent, tolerated in public discourse. The boundaries of law, 
having encompassed the violence of hate speech, become threatened with decay 
through exposure to that same violence.17 As a performative speech act, hate speech 
possesses an ability to transform its contexts.  As a result, hate speech, can never be 
fully restrained by law and can therefore threaten, the civil relations law seeks to 
maintain. Nevertheless, and regardless of whether or not hate speech is sanctioned, 
the laws enacted to restrict hate speech also expose those forms of expression to the 
violence of the legal system.    
Elizabeth A. Stanko has expressed a concern that ‘…we prefer to pass laws than 
to look carefully at how violence is so much welded to (often unequal) social 
relations.’(Stanko 2003, 4)  She goes on to write that ‘more often than not, people find 
a way of coming to terms with ‘what happened’ outside of the law’(Stanko 2003, 5) 
when they suffer violence. But it seems to me, this view limits ‘law’ only to the sphere 
of pre-existing legislative restrictions and as somehow separate from social relations.  
When Benjamin’s view is taken in to account - that a cause becomes violent when 
entering moral relations - the relationship changes.  The influence of the law can be 
argued to, be expanded to encompass all relations governing behaviours . This is 
important, because hate speech, has been argued to harm civil relations because it can 
both produce and be a product of social discriminatory practices.   
                                                                 
17 For Benjamin, language was originally inaccessible to violence.  However, he argues that the creation 
of laws against fraud allowed violence to infi ltrate language because they attached a legal punishment 
to using deception for specific ends. 
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Using the term, ‘gewalt’, Benjamin incorporates the concept of force as well as 
violence within the word he uses.  From this, a broader understanding of violence can 
be explored than might otherwise be attempted.  Violence is diminished by the 
translation of ‘gewalt’ into English as there is no comparable word that encapsulates 
the full meaning of the original term.  A violent and inaccurate intervention is made 
and yet, it is simultaneously an essential necessity.  Whilst something might not seem 
overtly violent, violence can still be demonstrated through alternative shows of force.   
Legitimising violence. 
To begin this section it is important to recall Benjamin’s statement from the earlier 
part of the chapter. He asserted that moral relations are governed by law and justice 
and therefore are necessarily violent.  Violence has been shown previously to be at the 
centre of the concept and definitions of hate speech. When legal controls are imposed 
on hate speech, I will argue that this results in the violence of hate speech being given 
a legitimacy.  As the aim of this section is to address the idea that hate speech violence 
can be legitimised through institutional frameworks, it is helpful to consider the 
following extract from ‘The Force of Law.’(Derrida 1990) Derrida writes that: 
….in many countries, in the past and in the present, one founding violence of the law or 
the imposition of state law has consisted in imposing a language on national or ethnic 
minorities regrouped by the state. (Derrida 1990, 957)  
Two areas of discussion that I will pursue are prompted by Derrida’s words. These 
relate to the imposition of a language on minorities regrouped by the state, and to 
how that imposition can contribute to the legal legitimacy given to hate speech 
violence. As this thesis is concerned with hate speech, it seems to me necessary to 
consider the imposition of a language that Derrida emphasises.  This consideration 
must precede any discussion of how the violence of hate speech may be legitimized by 
110 
 
state institutional frameworks.  A point of departure is provided by Derrida when he 
considers the language in which he is to address a colloquium: 
Je dois speak English (how does one translate this “dois”,  this devoir?  I must? I should, 
I ought to, I have to?) because it has been imposed on me as a sort of obligation or 
condition by a sort of symbolic force or law in a situation I do not control.  (Derrida 
1990, 923)     
Derrida remarks that a language, that is not his language, is imposed upon him and it is 
through those conditions that he is asked to communicate.  Although Derrida is the 
speaker he does not control the situation. An immediate violence is revealed through 
this example that determines the language that must be spoken, forcing its use.  
Derrida states that, at this moment, ‘it is more just to speak the language of the 
majority especially when, through hospitality, it grants a foreigner the right to speak’ 
(Derrida 1990, 925)18  
A comparison can be made here with the moments when states enact 
legislation to restrict hate speech. It can be argued that a particular language becomes 
forced upon all those who encounter the law in relation to hate speech.  This could 
include a victim of hate speech, a hate speaker, and all communities that make up a 
society. This is a legal language: a language of the state that conveys that hate speech 
carries a legal penalty.  Where this takes place the legal language becomes the 
language that must be spoken in relation to hate speech, and it articulates the limits 
and boundaries those forms of expression become subject to.  However, chapter two 
revealed that hate speech is not named in law.  Provisions to restrict hate speech 
become subsumed within other measures relating to race, religion, and public order 
(amongst others), that were outlined through the discussion of hate speech 
                                                                 
18 The concept of hospitality is important for hate speech since hospitality can never be unconditional 
yet, at the same time, it must also seek to be unconditional.  See footnote 14 for an explanation in ‘Of 
Hospitality’ (Derrida 2000b)   
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definitions.  Although the legal institutional frameworks provide authorisation for a 
legal language relating to hate speech to be imposed, those same frameworks also 
strangely withhold their authorisation.  Hate speech is not directly named in law; it has 
no ‘legal’ name.  This prompts a second consideration.  Where groups are named in 
law as vulnerable to hate speech but hate speech itself is not named through law, it 
seems to me, the violence of hate speech can be argued to be reinforced upon those 
groups because hate speech masquerades as something else (for example offensive 
speech).  
Derrida continues by relating the process of imposing a language to some 
contemporary scenarios ‘precisely in this place where questions of politics, education 
and law (droit) are inseparable….’(Derrida 1990, 957)  Here it is appropriate to recall 
the discussion from chapter one, where definitions of hate speech create and reinforce 
divisions between groups identified as most vulnerable to hate speech.  The state acts, 
through the law, to expose minorities thereby reinforcing their vulnerability to hate 
speech.19  The first move of law then, it seems to me, is not to limit violence but to 
inflict violence. A legal language is effectively forced upon those who are vulnerable to 
hate speech that potentially rejects their injury if, hate speech is considered to remain 
within the legal boundaries that apply limits to free expression. The language is not a 
choice between English and French as Derrida’s was . Instead, I argue it is a legal 
language linked to situating and constituting subjects in terms of their vulnerability to 
hate speech. This language determines who is protected through legislation and who is 
                                                                 
19 I am using ‘law’ to encapsulate a full  range of social and legal rules and regulations. The primary 
suggestion of this argument is that where hate speech restrictions are in place the legal language takes 
precedent.  However, where there are no or minimal legal restrictions placed upon hate speech then 
social conventions and behavioural practices are also implied. 
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not.20  In turn, in the act of regulating hate speech through legislation, the legal 
institutional framework functions to ‘actively produc[e] the domain of publically 
acceptable speech.’(Butler 1997, 77).  I argue here that two acts are taking place that 
show how state institutional frameworks can function to legitimise forms of violence.  
Firstly the law forces a type of violence upon those vulnerable to hate speech.  In doing 
so, the law makes the claim that its violence is legitimate by presenting hate speech 
regulation in relation to freedom of expression.  Secondly, the legal framework 
functions to determine what can be considered publically sayable.  Hate speech that 
falls within the domain of the ‘sayable’ becomes legally sanctioned as legitimate. 
And so, it would seem that legitimacy is being given to the violence of hate 
speech through the legal institutional framework. In many countries hate speech 
regulation forms part of a state’s formal laws.21  Regulations and legal procedures fall 
within this structure as do informal conventions and standards.  The frameworks both 
precede and follow the concept of law that defines them. They shape laws and are 
shaped by the law thereby engaging in a continual struggle for dominance. I have 
suggested in the earlier chapters that the legal approaches to hate speech can often 
focus on maintaining public order as opposed to placing direct limitations upon hate 
speech. If state institutional frameworks are accepted as acting to control or even 
produce hate speech, then potentially those frameworks may also have the power to 
manoeuvre and manipulate the violence of hate speech.   
                                                                 
20 These groups are identified in the definitions of hate speech and cover groups such as age, gender and 
religion. 
21 Hate speech itself may not be named in these laws explicitly but they are designed to address extreme 
speech of this nature. 
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Legislation that relates to hate speech cannot necessarily be presumed to 
prevent the violence these utterances inflict upon a victim.  There are no laws that 
directly name hate speech as an object of illegality.  In some senses, this could be 
argued to mean that no specific hate speech laws actually exist.  Butler’s theorisation 
must be followed here for a moment as she proposes a full and decisive legal 
intervention against hate speech is not yet a possibility.  She claims that ‘‘...there is no 
hate speech in the full sense of that term until and unless there is a court that decides 
that there is...’(Butler 1997, 96) However, the earlier chapters have shown that hate 
speech exists before any court might name it as such and hate speech is not 
guaranteed to come into conflict with the law.  What is important here is the legal 
institutional frameworks that have the power to intervene and legally label something 
as hate speech.  The result is that there becomes a need for the state to respond 
because through the law, the state can exert a level of control over hate speech.  It can 
be argued that the state must control, restrict and punish expressions of hatred in 
order to control the violence that hate speech threatens to civil relations.  It is 
important to note here that controlling the violence is not the same as eliminating the 
violence.  It seems to me that the elimination or even reduction of the violence of hate 
speech is neither the intention nor the outcome of state interventions in hate speech.   
To explain the point it is worthwhile dwelling on a lengthy quote: 
Q. You are before this jury in respect of two speeches.  I do not want to look at 
them at the moment, but first, on the 19th January 2004, I just want to ask you 
straight-forward questions about that speech.  In making that speech did you intend to 
use threatening words? – A. I did not. 
Q. Did you intend to use abusive words? – A. No. 
Q. Did you intend to use insulting words? – A. No. 
Q. Did you intend by your speech to stir up racial hatred? – A. No, I did not. 
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Q. Were you of the view in making that speech that racial hatred was like ly to be 
stirred up? – A. No.     (Regina v Griffin & Collett, 2006b)22 
 
What can be immediately seen from the words above is the application of the 
standards and judgements raised through Žižek at the start of the chapter.  The 
language being used in the courtroom appears to be functioning to disguise hate 
speech to some extent by substituting other descriptions for it.  By individualising hate 
speech to the speaker, the court fails to consider the wider community to which he 
belongs and the influences that may shape and legitimise his words within that 
community.  It can be argued that in this example, the courtroom in which hate speech 
should be visible, appears to work in a way that fails to expose hate speech.  The 
institutional framework can be said to be reinforcing the violence of hate speech 
through the failure to reveal it.  The eventual verdict of this trial was a ‘not guilty’ one 
that served to ensure the words that were used by the defendant were not legally 
deemed hate speech.  This refers back to Butler’s earlier quotation because again, the 
institutional framework is acting to create the parameters of what becomes ‘sayable’ 
in public discourse. 
Since 1965, the UK has seen new regulations come into being that have 
informed, shaped or dictated, the relationship between hate speech and the law.  A 
high proportion of these developments are evident from 1998 onwards.  These include 
The Human Rights Act (1988), Terrorism Act (2000), Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act (2001), Communications Act (2003), the Racial and Religious Hatred Act (2006a), 
Equality Act (2010) and most recently The Counter Terrorism and Security Act 
                                                                 
22 This extract is taken from a court transcript of evidence given by Nicholas John Griffin (at that time the 
leader of the far-right British National Party) on 25 th January 2006.  He was charged under the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act with inciting racial hatred in relation to two speeches he had given in 2004. 
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(2015b).23 The Public Order Act (1986) includes provisions designed ‘to control the 
stirring up of racial hatred.’(1986, 3) The Racial and Religious Hatred Act (2006) 
(2006a) amended the Public Order Act provisions to include ‘stirring up hatred against 
persons on religious grounds.’ Overarching legislation, for the UK and other European 
Union states, exists under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.  This 
takes the form of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (1950). Even this very brief summary of some of the relevant legislation 
currently in force in the UK serves to demonstrate the validity of Butler’s theory.  Each 
piece of legislation includes elements that can be applied to hate speech. However, in 
one sense, hate speech is only fully exposed when the court recognises it as such.  The 
courts decide what legally counts as hate speech and they simultaneously exclude 
forms of hate speech that do not transgress the parameters of the law. Legal 
judgements that might formally identify hate speech, are always and necessarily, made 
after a harm has been inflicted.  As a result, I argue that each piece of legislation 
imbues hate speech with a certain power. They either, reaffirm the hateful violence of 
this language by recognising it or, they authorise the harm inflicted upon a victim 
through non-recognition. The judgement can only ever take place after these of 
expression have wreaked their violence upon their victim(s). 
Although this chapter is considering how state institutional frameworks can 
reinforce the violence of hate speech, it should not be forgotten that the dangers of 
hate speech are real not theoretical. Hate speech exists beyond the boundaries of 
normal, civilized behaviours even where it masquerades as moderate or makes claims 
                                                                 
23 The Acts named here are not a comprehensive l ist of laws created addressing hate speech or 
elements of hate speech.  They are given to provide an indication of the variety of legislation enacted 
between 1998 and 2016 that can apply to hate speech which can focus on a range of content such as 
communications, equality, tolerance, security, crime, terrorism and human rights. 
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to be tolerated.  The threat hate speech poses has become so powerful that the law 
must and does respond.  Chapters one and two have shown that there is frequent 
conflict and confusion as to whether legal efforts to restrict hate speech are justified 
because of the way in which hate speech has become positioned in relation to 
freedom of expression.  Legislative approaches pursued in the United States and in 
Europe do differ but, it seems to me, those differences can be over-emphasised. 
Where the differences between legal approaches are over-emphasised, the result can 
be to detract from a clear consideration of the relationship between law and hate 
speech that can unhelpfully polarise positons. Roni Cohen has articulated the 
difference between the traditions as: 
Whereas the United States, or at least its Supreme Court, views freedom of expression 
in nearly absolute terms, European nations, and the international community more 
generally, seek to promote values such as dignity and equality above other rights. 
(Cohen 2014, 238)   
It seems to me there are three issues arising here that help to develop an 
understanding of what the act of legislating against hate speech can do.  Firstly, it can 
provide a public condemnation that positions this language as unacceptable in public 
discourse.  Hate speech can harm both individuals and civil relations and so specific 
restrictions that acknowledge and attempt to deal with its danger can be argued to be 
necessary. Secondly, legislating creates a space that focuses debates on questions of 
equality and tolerance in terms of where the limits of what is ‘sayable’ are drawn. A 
distraction is generated here through a false binary between free speech as a 
democratic principle, and hate speech as its undesirable but necessary part.24.   
Thirdly, and most importantly, it legitimizes the violence of hate speech.  Responding 
to hate speech through legislation provides a recognition that hate speech poses a 
                                                                 
24 This point has been elaborated within chapters one and two and will  not be repeated here. 
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threat so great it must be contained within law.  And yet, one result of this means that 
hate speech that is normalised or might appear ‘reasonable,’ can be accepted as 
‘sayable’ despite the violence it may inflict.   
It could be suggested that through the act of legislating the state promises a 
certain protection from violence or harm to its citizens.  Individuals are asked to 
relinquish their own personal violence (their right to retaliate against something) to 
the state because the state provides them with legal protections.  When hate speech is 
considered, it can initially appear that protection from this language is delivered 
through law.  However, I argue that universal protection is actually impossible, in part, 
because not all hate speech is illegal.  If Butler’s view is recalled then the intervention 
of legislation serves to produce (and continually redraw) what is considered acceptable 
speech in public discourse.  The process cannot encompass all forms of hate speech 
and could therefore, be argued to deceive us into relinquishing rights to challenge hate 
speech through non-legal means.  This can be outlined by a recent example from the 
UK. The creation of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015b)25 prompted the 
human rights and civil liberties organisation Liberty to publish a briefing paper for the 
bill’s second reading in the House of Lords.26 Amongst many issues the paper raised 
was that the Bill would: 
… for the first time, allow the State to require British communications service 
providers to retain communications information on the British population that they 
don’t already retain for billing purposes, just in case that information is in future useful 
for law enforcement. This is a major step change in relationship between the individual 
and the State. (Robinson, Ogilvie, and Sankey 2015, 20)  
                                                                 
25 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/enacted [accessed 25 May 2015] 
26 The briefing paper was published in January 2015 and the bil l  received its Royal Assent in February 
2015. 
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Here, a number of problems arise that the state, through legislative frameworks, gains 
the ability to exploit.  A change is taking place that shakes the foundations of the 
relationship between the citizen and the State which are explored below.   
An address by David Cameron, the then Prime Minister, to the National 
Security Council in May 2015 explains this point further.  A number of social media 
platforms, picked up and widely publicised, his comments because he said:  ‘for too 
long, we have been a passively tolerant society, saying to our citizens: as long as you 
obey the law, we will leave you alone.’(2015a)27 The implication that upholding a duty 
as a citizen to obey the law is no longer enough signifies the step-change Liberty 
signalled.  The statement challenges the integrity of the concepts of both the individual 
citizen and the private sphere. Cameron’s words suggest that attempts are being made 
to increase the power and force of the government, through the police, on the basis of 
an imagined crisis. ‘Obey the law, we will leave you alone.’ ‘Passively tolerant.’ These 
phrases can be argued to directly challenge, established ideas and practices 
surrounding presumptions of innocence and proven guilt, changing the territorial 
conditions under which they exist.  This seems to me to be emphasised by Étienne 
Balibar when he writes that: 
…traditionally, and in conformity with both their juridicial definition and 
“cartographical” representation as incorporated in national memory, [borders] should 
be at the edge of the territory, marking the point where it ends, it seems that borders 
and the institutional practices corresponding to them have been transported into the 
middle of political space. (Balibar 2004, 109) 
 
Previous boundaries marking the edge of the legal territory can be argued to be being 
politically redrawn in the statement Cameron makes.  There is no explanation or 
reference for why that is happening.  What I mean by this is that it could be assumed 
                                                                 
27 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/counter-extremism-bill-national-security-council-meeting 
May 2015 [accessed 26 May 2015]. 
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that a border would be positioned between where law is obeyed and the law is 
broken. However, Cameron’s statement indicates such a border is being transported 
so that the point at which the territory of the police might be thought to end becomes 
changed.  As a result, I would argue that the act of legislating can be viewed as an 
institutional practice that works to enforce and redraw those borders .  In legislating 
against hate speech it is made possible for violence to recur repeatedly in a range of 
forms.  As Benjamin writes, ‘law sees violence in the hands of individuals as a danger 
undermining the legal system.’(Benjamin, Bullock, and Jennings 1996, 238)  
Introducing hate speech legislation protects the legal system by removing the ability of 
the individual to retaliate through the use of their own individual violence.  Perhaps 
this is a reason that ‘at the level of policy, the dominant response to current problems 
[of racist violence] has been to advocate increasingly restrictive immigration policies.’ 
(Gordon in Coliver, D'Souza, and Boyle 1992, 17)  
A second example is also relevant here. Commander Mak Chishty has been 
quoted in an interview with The Telegraph newspaper as saying: 
We need to now be less precious about the private space. This is not about us invading 
private thoughts, but acknowledging that it is in these private spaces where this 
[extremism] first germinates. The purpose of private-space intervention is to engage, 
explore, explain, educate or eradicate. (Riley-Smith 2015)  
He made the comments as a way to justify ‘more intrusion into Muslims’s “private 
space” to counter extremism.’ (Riley-Smith 2015)  The argument here is the authorities 
would be justified in invading individuals’ private space because, private space has 
become a dangerous threat in itself and needs to be controlled.  What this could 
suggest is that attempts are being made to eradicate the boundaries between public 
and private spaces in order to expand state power and influence over some minority 
groups, in this case Muslims.  
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Consideration should be given here to the narratives of the state and the risk of 
violence these pose to minority groups and individuals as a result.  If the language of 
such minorities is at odds with the language of the state, they run the risk of becoming 
victims of state violence. The proposal is not to invade everyone’s private space in 
order to counter extremism, only that of Muslims.  This is problematic and shows how 
the state narrative around extremism serves to condemn all Muslims as extremists. 
Chishty is a police commander and his comments show how the state via the police is 
able to tolerate some forms of violence in order to retain or extend its own power. It 
can be argued here that hate speech that labels Muslims as extremists becomes 
sanctioned by the state, through the institution of the police, and is able to inflict 
violence upon individuals and civil relations as a result.  However, the situation is 
tolerated because it allows the state to expand its power over the private space of 
individuals. While the state may condemn hate speech, its institutions can 
simultaneously work to control hate speech and exploit its violence to achieve 
different ends (such as private-space intervention). Such a situation means opposition 
to state constructions of acceptable language can be tolerated as long as the status-
quo is ultimately unchanged.  The legal system remains intact and the law remains 
unchanged.  Simultaneously this type of legal force brings together the elements of the 
discussion relating to the balance of power between individuals and the state.  People 
can become additionally vulnerable to hate speech because they can be constituted in 
ways that subject them to the violence embedded in hate speech, and the 
reinforcement of that violence through an institutional framework.   
A different example is provided through the European approach to placing legal 
restrictions on hate speech as it is based around striking a balance between 
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fundamental rights afforded to citizens.  Article 10 of the ‘Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’(1950) exposes one of the 
common sites of conflict in hate speech debates.28 It states that ‘everyone has the 
right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to 
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers…’(1950, Article 10, pg 6)  Such freedoms of opinion are one of 
the founding principles of democratic societies.  However, Article 10 continues with 
the qualification that enforcement of state restrictions is necessary within a 
democratic society.  Freedom of expression is thus granted to people on the basis of 
the conditions outlined within the following passage: 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or 
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or 
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. (1950, Article 10, pg 12) 
The importance of this passage lies within the constraints it articulates to the exercise 
of freedom of expression.  In the extract above, the reach of the law is clearly 
expanding beyond the prevention and punishment of crime or disorder.  Boundaries 
are reaching as far as territorial integrity, and health or morals. Considering this 
expansion can make clear how a state can reinforce the violence of hate speech and 
also how violence of this sort can be legitimized.   
Developing the lines of enquiry outlined above can be aided by considering the 
wider context to Article 10: the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, 
                                                                 
28 Now known as the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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Recommendation 1805 (2007).29 The Recommendation explicitly states that 
expressions ‘that may shock, offend or disturb the state or any sector of the 
population’ are protected language within the limits of Article 10 of the Convention.  
Immediately, the vocabulary of the Recommendation separates expressions that may 
shock, offend or disturb, from those that are considered hateful.  A certain degree of 
tolerance for offence is acknowledged, not only for individuals who are granted the 
right to freedom of expression but crucially, for the protection of the wider democratic 
society and its associated moral standards.  Shocking, disturbing and offensive 
expressions that do not breach the limits of the Convention are acceptable in a public 
domain.  By separating and categorising some types of distasteful language from hate 
speech, the wording of the Recommendation suggests that hate speech is somehow 
different and more threatening. As explored in the earlier chapters the wording also 
ensures that the Recommendation cannot fully encompass all forms of hate speech 
and especially those that performatively masquerade as offensive or shocking. 
When discussions of hate speech are linked to freedom of expression, they are 
frequently framed in terms of judging the levels harms that hate speech can inflict. 
However, the violence of hate speech remains inescapable and destructive because it 
is ingrained in the language itself and always present.  But, violence can also be argued 
to fulfil the function of providing a means of protection or entertainment. For example, 
violence may be required in self-defence, or upheld as a spectacle though film or sport.  
The use of violence or the presence of violence is not always unjust, illegal or 
undesired in terms of moral relations.  To always approach violence as an enemy to 
                                                                 
29  Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1805 (2007) 
http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta07/erec1805.htm [accessed 
27/02/2011] 
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subdue or eliminate, is to remain blind to the totality of its influence. It is also to 
overlook the point that in order to suppress violence, the use of violence is usually 
required.  I would argue that state institutions that seek to control hate speech must 
inevitably perpetuate the violence of this language since their intervention in itself, 
ensures that hate speech must break with and transform its context. 
Statements of Exception 
 This goes some way to explaining why every single wing of the Irish state supported 
gay marriage, from the police, who proudly waved the rainbow flag, to all the political 
parties, the public sector, the health establishment and the cultural establishment.  It’s 
because they recognise, at a gut level, that unlike pretty much every other demand for 
liberty or equality in modern times, the campaign does nothing to threaten their 
authority – on the contrary, it expands it, in a way that the most authoritarian among 
them could only have dreamt of. (O'Neill 2015, 35-36) 
Benjamin states that ‘law making and law preserving violence ensure the territorial 
integrity of the law.30  They define and determine its reach and ensure its power or 
force.  However, the state of exception creates a territorial void that lacks definition 
(that could be described as lacking integrity) and generates a confused space between 
acts of executive power and acts of legislative power.31 And so, the power and force 
that hate speech exerts through violence and institutional frameworks can be further 
explored through ‘State of Exception.’ (Agamben 2005)  I will argue that Giorgio 
Agamben’s work comes to play an important role for understanding the relationship 
between violence, hate speech and state institutional frameworks because he 
develops ideas relating to power and state structures.  
Agamben traces the first use of the term ‘state of exception’ back to 1922.  He 
follows Carl Schmitt’s construction of a theory of the state of exception through two 
                                                                 
30 Benjamin considers the concepts of law-making and law-preserving violence within the Critique of 
violence (Benjamin, Bullock, and Jennings 1996, 236-52) 
31 The sentence paraphrases a page from ‘State of Exception’ (Agamben 2005, 38) 
124 
 
books.  Agamben proposes that Schmitt’s work be read as a response to the ideas 
presented by Benjamin in the ‘Critique of Violence’.  He states that, Benjamin’s essay 
aims to ‘ensure the possibility of a violence…that lies absolutely “outside” and 
“beyond” the law.’(Agamben 2005, 53) Agamben views Schmitt’s work as attempting 
to capture this pure violence in the state of exception.  Agamben writes that the 
theory of the state of exception really began to become significant between 1934-48, 
specifically in debates surrounding ‘constitutional dictatorship’(Agamben 2005, 6).32 
He argues that during those years, ‘democratic regimes were transformed by the 
gradual expansion of the executive’s powers during and after the two world wars.’ 
(Agamben 2005, 6)33 Agamben suggests that examples of the existence of a state of 
exception are still evident today, within state efforts to increase surveillance or erode 
protections that grant privacy rights to citizens.  In his book Agamben uses the Patriot 
Act in the United States as an example of the ‘state of exception.’ He explains that the 
Act erases an individual’s legal and political identity ‘thus producing a legally 
unnameable and unclassifiable being.’(Agamben 2005, 3) .  It seems to me that the 
state of exception is important for hate speech because the law has been shown, to 
attempt to control hate speech while simultaneously failing to encompass all forms of 
this injurious language. Because hate speech cannot be wholly contained within the 
parameters the law sets, then hate speech must also be positioned outside and 
beyond the law. Through the institutional framework of the law, the state positions 
hate speech as both legal and illegal, tolerated and ostracised, nameable and 
unnameable.  Combining this contradictory positioning with the performative violence 
of hate speech, arguably shows how, the state could potentially use hate speech as a 
                                                                 
32 The idea of the state of exception is attributed by Agamben to Schmitt in 1922. 
33 Agamben also adds that a state of exception was experienced during and after the two world wars. 
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tool to create particular social and political conditions, and constitute subjects in 
specific ways. 
Agamben distinguishes between pure violence and individual rights in order to 
highlight the ways in which states will attempt to increase their power in times of 
crisis.  He argues the distinction is ‘particularly significant to our political selves as it is 
the structure through which law encompasses living beings through suspension of 
itself.’(Agamben 2005, 3) Here we should be reminded of Benjamin’s decision to 
consider violence in relation to law and justice because they define the sphere of 
moral relations where causes become violent. Where law could be suspended in a time 
of crisis then there is a possibility that hate speech could exploit those circumstances 
and unleash its full force and violence.  The examples used from Cameron and Chishty 
are suggestive of how this could take shape.  Although the law is not suspended in the 
examples, Cameron is indicating that the state could function to erode the individual 
liberties of law-abiding citizens through disrupting the territorial integrity of the law as 
it is currently constructed.  Cameron suggests that even if someone obeys the law the 
state may still exert additional force over them if the executive power deems it 
appropriate. Chishty also suggests something similar through ‘private-space 
intervention’ that could be used to eradicate what the state considers to be 
extremism.  This is not a response to an act of extremism that would fall under legal 
jurisdiction.  He is suggesting an earlier intervention at a point where no crime has 
taken place.  While these are not strictly speaking suspensions of the law in the sense 
Agamben is suggesting, they are nevertheless examples of where the state attempts to 
expand the boundaries of executive power over the individual. 
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Since hate speech can be legal, normalised, or presented as ‘reasonable,’ some 
responses to these forms of expression can reveal a refusal to publicly or legally 
challenge injurious language. Comments such as, ‘just ignore it’ or ‘sticks and stones’ 
serve to illustrate this. The suggestion is that we are able to refuse injury and choose 
to remain unaffected by hate speech.  The force of hate speech in this sense becomes 
obscured because the implication is that responses or the lack of a response, at an 
individual level can negate the harm posed by these utterances. Dangers threatened 
by hate speech seem to me to be increased if the burden is placed upon an individual 
victim to respond in this type of scenario. One would not ask a victim of assault to 
ignore the injuries inflicted upon them.  And yet, I have also argued, that when the 
obligation to respond to hate speech resides with the state, the violence of hate 
speech becomes reinforced through the legal structures. Even where a hate speaker 
may be convicted, the state does not and cannot reverse the injury inflicted upon a 
victim. The harm has already been exacted upon a victim prior to any legal judgement. 
An indication that the law alone is not an effective response to responding to the harm 
hate speech inflicts arises here. As has been argued earlier hate speech can create or 
reinforce social hierarchies, shape people’s behaviour, produce as well as result from 
discriminatory practices, and can even lay the groundwork for genocide. Although 
officially condemned in political spheres, a number of examples I have used 
throughout the chapters demonstrate that hate speech is nevertheless present in 
political arenas.  This would appear to provide additional evidence for the claim I made 
above, that hate speech could be used as a tool to generate specific conditions and to 
constitute subjects in particular ways.  It can be argued that what is being seen here is 
how such a process could take place beyond legal institutions through the use of 
executive power. 
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Justifications for either the complete or gradual erosion of the rights of the 
individual citizen should not be assumed to have merit or contain truth. In the 
examples provided in this chapter, states can be seen to use legislative means as a way 
of increasing their power over communication, information, the individual linguistic 
subject, and over hate speech. However, the examples also show how states can 
employ other means and frameworks to unleash hate speech to increase executive 
power.  In these scenarios, people can be silenced, marginalized, and they can be 
exposed to the full force of hate speech violence in its service to power.  For a moment 
it is appropriate to remember Liberty’s warning about the retention of 
communications information ‘just in case’ it is useful for law enforcement in the 
future.  ‘Just in case’ is not defined and not secure.  It removes the certainty of what 
might constitute evidence against an individual and begins to set foundations for a 
future state of exception. Given the tension that is ever present for hate speech – it is 
at once both legal and illegal, sayable and unsayable – this thought can be taken a step 
further.  Perhaps it is possible that the inevitable tension seen within any attempt to 
confront hate speech could be exploited by the state, ‘just in case,’ hate speech 
becomes a useful tool for the construction or maintenance of specific political or social 
conditions. 
The relationship between hate speech and violence must be exposed as 
twofold.  In the first sense is of the immediate violence of hate speech in the utterance 
itself, and the legal violence, that both precedes and follows the act.  In the second 
sense the violence of hate speech links with the concepts of power, force and political 
and social relations.  Damaging and tragic hate speech attacks take place every day. 
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Sadly, it does not mean they are recognised as such or are subject to the full force of 
the law in terms of protecting a victim.  Language of this type is not solely an abstract 
expression of an idea.  One need only ask a victim of hate to establish that.   
Responding to regulation. 
As is being shown within this chapter violence, through its connection to 
institutional frameworks and hate speech, seems impossible to evade.  However, there 
are sites of resistance available beyond the legal forums of the courts.  While these 
may not be free from violence they may still offer some alternative forums through 
which hate speech might be challenged. It seems to me that the arts could provide one 
of these possible areas of response.  For example, as was discussed during chapter 
two, the theatre can be a site of challenge to the traditional boundaries of acceptable 
discourse and the subjects constituted within it. 
I propose here that it is helpful to consider the work of Jurgen Habermas in ‘The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.’(Habermas 2008) For Habermas, the 
modern public sphere begins to develop in the UK during the eighteenth century.34  He 
argues that this is the case because it is when the construct of the public sphere begins 
to function in a political arena.  Habermas makes an association that relates the 
development of the public sphere to a bourgeois society, arguing that the combination 
of the two creates a bourgeois public sphere.  He describes this creation as ‘a sphere of 
private people come together as a public’ (Habermas 2008, 27)35  As the bourgeois 
public sphere develops a process of erosion is being seen between the divisions that 
                                                                 
34 The date resonates with the earlier sections relating to the construction of the concept of hate 
speech. 
35 The meaning here surrounds private individuals engaging the public authorities in a sphere governed 
by commodity exchange and social labour. 
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had separated the public and private spheres. As the erosion takes place, private 
individuals who make up the so called bourgeois public sphere, find a space within it 
through which they are able to engage and challenge public authorities (which can 
include state institutions).  What follows is the creation of a secondary public/private 
divide within the category originally designated as the private sphere.36  Habermas 
rightly points out that caution should be used in drawing simplistic divisions between 
the categories of public and private spheres.  They are inevitably and inextricably 
associated, necessarily relying upon the existence of their apparent opposite, for 
definition and power. 
A significant point must be foregrounded here which is that the public sphere 
according to Habermas, arises from theatre, arts, and literature to eventually 
encompass politics.  If the example of English PEN in chapter two is remembered, a 
new association strikes out. PEN objected to the introduction of the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act.(2006a)  The objection was not because the organisation 
considered hate acceptable.  Instead, fears were voiced that the Act would put all 
artists at risk of prosecution if the law were to be misused by the public authorities 
that implement it. Through considering the cancellation of the play Behtzi, I argued 
that the theatre poses a threat to the authorities because the authorities create the 
limitations placed upon what is acceptable speech and who recognised as able to 
speak. The theatre is able to influence civil relations, through challenging the 
limitations imposed by those authorities. This is an example of the functioning of the 
public sphere as Habermas conceptualises it.  The authorities are being challenged by 
                                                                 
36 I would also argue that a similar process is taking place in the Chishty example.  However, in that 
example it is not the public who are challenging the authorities but the authorities  challenging the 
people. 
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private individuals through the public sphere.  However, the development of the public 
sphere and the concurrent erosion of the previously distinct public and private 
divisions, creates Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere. The fracturing and destruction 
of previously held conceptions about what constitutes public and private spaces takes 
hold and comes to life in the examples from Chishty and Cameron.  This serves as a 
reminder that law courts are not the only spaces to find, confront or reinforce hate 
speech. While law may currently form the dominant framework for responses to hate 
speech, other viable alternatives exist.  The public sphere, where the public can 
challenge the authorities seems to me to be one of those sites. 
A second example from the theatre can also be considered through the following 
quotation: 
May 1969.  The Waterfront.  River Aire’s polluted waves lap at the filthy shore.  
POLICEMAN stands over a body bag.  FROGMAN puts items from a wet duffel bag into an 
evidence bag.  He looks around impatiently and lets a soggy piece of paper fall to the 
ground. (Aspden and Agboluaje 2009, 23) 
The extract is taken from the play ‘The Hounding of David Oluwale’(Aspden and 
Agboluaje 2009) performed at the West Yorkshire Playhouse between 31 January 2009 
and 17 February 2009.  The body described is that of David Oluwale and the play tells 
his story as the victim of horrific, systematic, police brutality. This is relevant not only 
due to the role of the law in this study of hate speech but also, for initiating the 
discussion of responding to regulating hate speech with a play; a response beyond the 
law.  If hate speech is regulated by law but can also exceed and legitimately evade 
those laws, then perhaps law cannot provide an adequate response to these injurious 
utterances. In fact, it has already been argued that different levels of hate speech are 
tolerated in public discourse and that often, the law is more aligned to preventing civil 
disorder than with directly protecting victims from hate speech. If institutional 
frameworks serve to reinforce the violence of hate speech, perhaps a non-violent site 
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can be found from which the stories of hate speech victims might be used to create a 
genuine and effective response to hate speech?  By creatively responding to a story of 
police brutality the play about David Oluwale, was able to reframe the debate about 
what the victim had suffered. Performed in the theatre which is arguably the type of 
forum where the public and private boundaries are dissolved, a play can be argued to 
be able to reach an audience that is not directly invested in hate speech as a victim or 
a hate speaker. As a result, the audience that witnesses the play may do so from a 
position where there is no direct risk of injury from hate speech.  A theatre provides a 
break from the original context of the events and seems to me, to generate an 
opportunity to reimagine Oluwale’s experience of brutality. Under these circumstances 
the performative power of hate speech could potentially be reduced because in this 
forum, hate speech may not be able to create the conditions that it requires to be 
sustained. Placing the horror that ended in death within this new context, may allow 
for a response to be created without the direct threat of the original brutality being 
present, or at least without the threat of being directly exposed to that violence. A play 
can remove the burden of evidencing a harm which is always a requirement of any 
legal solutions to hate speech. Though a piece of theatre may not negate the threat of 
hate speech, if Rancière is remembered for a moment, the theatre can make audible 
the inaudible.37 Perhaps a play can reveal and expose the hate speech masquerade and 
in the process attempt to diminish some of its violence.  
The final example I will provide in this section comes from Katharine Gelber who 
offers a theory she calls ‘speaking back’. The approach is designed to counteract the 
disempowering effects of hate speech and is fully explained in her book ‘Speaking 
                                                                 
37 See ‘Hate speech or hate crime’ in chapter two. 
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back: the free speech versus hate speech debate. (Gelber, 2002). Gelber’s view is that 
by providing support through institutions, material, and education, possibilities for 
victims of hate speech to respond are created. Victims are provided with an 
opportunity to ‘speak back.’ For Gelber hate speech is a public act and she considers 
public policy to be failing to provide sufficiently effective solutions to the harms hate 
speech inflicts. She identifies the root of the failure to be situated in opposing the need 
to secure individual rights to free speech against the need to improve public 
protections against hate speech.(Gelber 2002, 4) She argues that such binaries require 
private and individual solutions to what is an essentially public problem. Because 
private resolution does not allow for ‘a broader, public initiation or generation of a 
response to hate speech’(Gelber 2002, 4), the (legal) protections already in place are 
weakened. However, I have argued, that a more significant problem lies in opposing 
individual rights to freedom of expression with a requirement to tolerate forms of hate 
speech in public discourse. As a result, legislative measures to control hate speech can 
have the effect of individualising the problem, as opposed to the solution, and 
overlooking the social and political conditions that can shape hate speech and hate 
speakers. Nevertheless, Gelber’s proposal of the ‘speaking back’ theory provides a 
refreshing possibility that indicates how some state institutional frameworks could 
function in ways that can empower victims of hate speech to respond.  It seems to me 
that the empowerment of victims may not diminish the violence of hate speech but, is 
potentially powerful for exposing normalised or ‘reasonable’ hate speech.  For 
example, an educational framework could present a viable alternative to legal 
structures.  Different institutional frameworks may have the potential to be 
reconstructed in ways that could function to illuminate, the discriminatory practices 
that produce and are a product of hate speech. 
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Reinforcing violence through state institutional frameworks.  
If you consider yourself a global citizen, you are a citizen of nowhere’ May, Theresa, 
PM. [Conservative party conference, 15/10/2016].   
 
The aim of this chapter was to argue that the state can reinforce the violence of 
hate speech through its institutional frameworks.  Legal frameworks have been used as 
a focal point in order to make the argument that the violence of hate speech can 
become legitimized by the state.  I have proposed that through enacting hate speech 
legislation, the state is able to validate and reinforce the violence of hate speech.  
What has been shown is that legal frameworks can function to perpetuate the violence 
of hate speech without, ever encompassing the full force of hate speech.  Despite this 
tension the state, is to some extent, able to control and command the violence of hate 
speech.   
The chapter began by considering how hate speech can be, positioned as in 
conflict with other forms of language, through being judged against a ‘non violent’ 
standard.  However, hate speech laws have previously been shown to measure these 
utterances against other forms of offence, insult, or otherwise harmful language. As a 
result, it was argued that, hate speech is never actually judged against a standard that 
can be considered ‘non-violent.’  The imposition of the standard and the standard 
itself, have both been argued, to be forms of violence that come into conflict with hate 
speech. Consequently, hate speech can be said to be subjected to violence through 
legal institutional frameworks because, it is the law that determines what levels of 
harm inflicted by instances of hate speech are deemed unacceptable.  Possessing this 
power means that the law has the capacity to remove authority from a hate speaker 
by deeming their words illegal or unsayable. However, in order to exert control over 
hate speech itself, laws also generate a situation where freedom of expression 
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becomes inextricably tied to some level of toleration for different forms of hate 
speech. Under these circumstances, any authority attributed to a hate speaker, is 
argued to be further diminished since the legal frameworks function in a way that 
individualises the problem of hate speech.  The result of this process is to unveil how 
legal institutional frameworks, through their interaction with hate speech, serve to 
reinforce practices and structures of inequality and division.  
Legal institutional frameworks are shown to inflict a type of violence upon all 
those who encounter the law in relation to hate speech. This is evidenced by the way 
in which a legal language is imposed to encompass, a victim of hate speech, a hate 
speaker, and any group that forms a community within a society. This legal language 
signals that hate speech carries a legal penalty while simultaneously being able to, 
articulate and manipulate the boundaries that attempt to control these forms of 
expression. The legal language employed to harness the destructive force of hate 
speech can determine who is and who is not, recognised by the law as at risk from the 
harms perpetrated by hate speech. An element within legal restrictions of hate speech 
is made visible that is both inclusive and exclusionary. Recognising that some types or 
instances of hate speech are legal and tolerated means that the law, must always and 
simultaneously, fail to encompass all forms of hate speech. This contradiction, I argue, 
lies at the heart of these considerations of hate speech since the state, in order to 
exert a level of control over hate speech, must always position these utterances as 
both legal and illegal, audible and inaudible, tolerable and intolerable. When this 
uncertainty meets with the performative violence of hate speech what is revealed is, 
an opportunity for, the state to generate particular social and political conditions 
through the authorisation or legitimisation of hate speech.  
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Two main acts are argued to be taking place that show how state institutional 
frameworks can function to legitimise hate speech violence.  Firstly the law can be said 
to inflict a type of violence upon those vulnerable to hate speech by enforcing a 
judgement that determines if something is recognised as hate speech or not.  In doing 
so, the law makes the claim that this violence can be legitimate by situating hate 
speech regulation in relation to freedom of expression. Secondly, the legal institutional 
framework functions to determine where the boundaries are positioned in terms of 
what can be considered acceptable speech in the public domain.  Therefore hate 
speech that falls within the domain of the ‘sayable’ becomes legally sanctioned as 
legitimate. 
It would seem then that the law could be, considered as the ‘external authority’ 
that authorises hate speech and has been the spectre haunting proceedings from the 
start of this thesis.  However, while this is to some extent true, the overarching 
‘external authority’ can now be argued to be the executive power of the state. As has 
been shown, the law both ensures the violence of hate speech and legitimises that 
violence at the same time. The executive power possesses the capability to disrupt the 
territorial integrity of the law, and to change the construction of legal institutional 
frameworks. The executive power exerts a force over hate speech regardless of how 
those utterances may relate to law, and far beyond any intention of a hate speaker. I 
suggest that it is at this point, where executive power shows its hand, that the state 
could begin to exploit the violence of hate speech for its own ends.   
The horror of hate speech and the danger of its violence can begin to seem 
depressingly inevitable. However, this chapter has also indicated that there are 
possible sites of resistance to hate speech available beyond legal institutional 
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frameworks. While it is not possible to say that these sites are themselves free from 
violence, they nevertheless indicate that alternative forums to fight hate speech exist. 
It has been argued that the arts, and particularly the theatre, can potentially become 
productive sites of challenge to hate speech. A number of reasons are presented to 
support this view, with one being simply that, a play need not carry the burden of 
having to evidence a particular level of harm as is required for a legal response to hate 
speech. More interestingly though, art forms or forms of art, have the potential to 
temporarily reposition traditional boundaries of acceptable discourse thereby, 
transforming how linguistic subjects might be constituted within that domain. 
Additionally, a play has been argued to be able to, challenge the hate speech 
masquerade by transforming and exposing it. One outcome of this is the possibility 
that the power of the hate speech performative could be lessened. Perhaps hate 
speech could be prevented from creating the conditions that it requires to be 
sustained or, at least that process could be made significantly more difficult. The 
potential could arise for the theatre to effect a reduction in the power of hate speech 
to harm.  
More explicitly connected to state institutional frameworks is Gelber’s theory of 
‘speaking back,’ that articulates how some of these frameworks might be engaged 
with to respond more productively to hate speech. Her proposal of ‘speaking back’ 
provides a way to consider how victims of hate speech could be empowered through 
responses that are enabled by state institutional frameworks. It seems to me that, 
although Gelber’s approach does not limit or reduce the violence of hate speech, 
‘speaking back’ could prove powerful especially, for exposing forms of hate speech 
that appear as normalised or ‘reasonable.’ This chapter as a whole has demonstrated 
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how state institutional frameworks, most particularly the legal framework, reinforce 
the violence of hate speech, and that states could potentially use these frameworks to 
unleash hate speech violence for the purpose of increasing executive power. However, 
it seems to me appropriate to suggest here that, there remain possibilities for 
reconstructing institutional frameworks in ways that could mean they expose or 
diminish the violence of hate speech, as opposed to continuously reinforcing and 
reproducing, the discriminatory practices that ultimately sustain injurious language. 
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Conclusion 
Hate speech harms in subtle and extreme ways.  The violence of hate speech 
threatens individuals and tears at the fabric of society. Despite this threat, it has been 
argued here, that hate speech receives a level of authorisation from the state, and is 
both legitimised and reinforced through institutional frameworks.  The persistent and 
inevitable tension that is produced as a result plays a role in the survival of these forms 
of expression. The original aim of this thesis was to gain an understanding of the 
shadow hate speech casts through force, violence and institutional frameworks. 
Through demonstrating a mutually exploitative relationship between hate speech and 
institutional frameworks, the ways in which institutional frameworks function to 
reinforce the violence of hate speech have been exposed.   
Engaging with four definitions of hate speech has illustrated how these forms 
of expression have come to claim a place within discourse. The lack of a universally 
accepted definition of the term ‘hate speech’ makes a shared and consistent 
understanding of hate speech impossible. Nevertheless, it has been possible to argue 
that hate speech does have some identifiable common characteristics. The uncertainty 
of meaning generated by contested definitions allows hate speech to exist in a 
continual state of revision, and to maintain currency in diverse and changing social and 
political environments. As a result of existing in this site of perpetual change, it has 
been argued that, hate speech always incorporates a capacity for redefinition and 
transformation that can ensure its own continuation.  
When hate speech is named as a general term, or is legally recognised by the 
state, then hate speech can demand a place in discourse. This process of naming or 
recognising ‘hate speech,’ has been argued to normalize the appearance of these 
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forms of expression, and to be authorised by an ‘external authority’ which is separate 
from any individual hate speaker. Hate speech is performative speech and 
consequently, the agency it possess ensures these utterances are able to break with 
contexts, generating new and alternative ones that disconnect these forms of 
expression from any originating point.  Furthermore, the agency of these injurious 
utterances ensures that hate speech always exceeds a speaker and possesses a power 
that can inflict harm within civil relations. Equally the capacity of hate speech to 
generate an autonomous space in discourse, coupled with its ability to constitute 
individuals in particular ways, has been argued to make clear how vulnerable, people 
and civil relations, are to its force. The status of hate speech as a performative speech 
act has been argued to be essential to, understanding the ability of these utterances to 
invade all forms of expression, act, and inflict harm. Through the consideration of 
definitions of hate speech, it has been revealed that violence both precedes and is 
fundamentally embedded within, these forms of expression. Consequently, it has been 
argued that, violence allows hate speech to claim a place in discourse, and that it is 
violence that lies at the heart of hate speech. 
Hate speech is elusive and sometimes difficult to expose. One of the reasons 
for this has been argued to be the ability of hate speech to masquerade; to hide within 
its synonymous terms and mask the harm it inflicts. When hate speech masquerades in 
this way it can appear less dangerous than it really is. Connecting the performative 
hate speech act to the idea of masquerade, has been used to demonstrate how hate 
speech can hide in plain speech or demand a level of toleration in discourse. As a 
result, hate speech is argued to create opportunities to sanitise its own appearance 
and disguise the threat it poses. Subsequently, especially where hate speech is 
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revealed to masquerade, instances of hate speech and the harm they inflict risk going 
unseen, or worse still, being accepted as tolerable.  
To further understand the relationship of hate speech with violence, force and 
institutional frameworks, six points of influence for the concept of hate speech have 
been identified. These points of influence were: freedom of expression, hate crime, 
the concept of ‘fighting words’, becoming a performative speech act, ‘reasonable’ hate 
speech, and genocide. This approach was taken in recognition of the ability of these 
forms of expression to obscure any definitive sites of origin. It was argued, that 
because hate speech can break with originating contexts, following a linear history of 
the concept of hate speech was likely to be unproductive. Focussing instead upon sites 
of influence for the concept was designed, to illuminate some points of disruption that 
have resulted, in conflicting perceptions becoming part of the concept of hate speech 
itself. 
The root of the concept of hate speech has been argued to, be found through 
its connections to rights associated with freedom of expression. Initially this 
relationship was argued to tie the concept of hate speech to values and ideologies 
associated with Western liberal democracies. However, a common connection with 
other nations was found through international law, and as a result, it has been argued 
that hate speech has some potentially generalizable and perhaps universal qualities. 
What has been emphasised is a continual struggle for balance between requirements 
to restrict forms of hate speech and requirements to uphold commitments to rights of 
free expression. It has been argued that through legally restricting hate speech, the 
concept of hate speech comes to incorporate a site of debate, centred upon, which 
harms are judged significant enough to warrant restriction. The continual conflict 
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between tolerating hate speech and restricting hate speech has been argued, to be 
one of the elements that sustains these forms of expression.  
What has become clear throughout the course of this investigation is that hate 
speech is not always in conflict with the law and is never only found in extreme 
situations.  Where forms of hate speech are considered publicly ‘sayable ,’ the 
influence of ‘everyday’ or ‘reasonable’ hate speech has been argued to be pervasive. 
Hate speech is able to masquerade as moderate or tolerable and these forms of 
expression receive a form of authorisation that ensuring they become accepted in 
public discourse. When this masquerade takes place, hate speech is argued, to become 
imbued with a power that allows it to function in ways that reinforce structures of 
discrimination and inequality. At the same time, hate speech, is shown to function as 
both a producer of and product of those same political and social structures that it 
reinforces. While this may be considered dangerous enough, it has also been argued, 
that focusing too heavily on ‘reasonable’ appearances of hate speech can function to 
obscure the full violence of these forms of expression. The viewpoint is presented that 
where hate speech can saturate institutional frameworks in its violence, then it can 
also become dangerous enough to play a direct role in genocide. What must not be 
forgotten during the concluding statements of this thesis  is that hate speech, in its 
most extreme forms, can and does kill.    
The argument has been presented that the violence of hate speech is 
legitimized and ultimately reinforced by institutional frameworks, in particular legal 
and legislative frameworks. Rather than providing people with direct protection from 
hate speech, legal approaches that restrict these forms of expression, have been said 
to relate more directly to, defining the limits of free expression or the maintenance of 
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public order. The result has been to suggest that legal interventions to control hate 
speech create formal requirements for injurious language to be tolerated in public 
discourse. Therefore, enacting hate speech legislation, where the laws have been 
established in relation to upholding rights to freedom of expression, has been argued, 
to enable the state to legitimise and reinforce the violence of hate speech. In this 
context, the law has been said to impose a legal language that engulfs victims of hate 
speech, hate speakers, and even whole communities, especially those identified as 
most vulnerable to hate speech. One result of this imposition is a public signalling of a 
legal penalty attached to the use of hate speech. However, the legal language 
employed to restrain hate speech also has, an arguably, more important function.  
That function is to determine who is and who is not, legally recognised, as suffering 
harm from hate speech. Legal institutional frameworks are therefore argued, to fail to 
encompass the full violence of hate speech. Not all victims and not all instances of hate 
speech are recognised as such; not all hate speech comes in to conflict with the law. It 
has been argued that where the state both regulates and tolerates these forms of 
expression, then the state is to some extent, able to control and command the 
violence of hate speech through its institutional frameworks. Equally, it has been 
shown how those same institutional frameworks can simultaneously function, to 
perpetuate the violence of hate speech.  
Under these circumstances the law has been proposed as the ‘external 
authority’ that authorises hate speech. However, the overarching ‘external authority’ 
has been argued to be the executive power of the state.  This is because the executive 
power has the ability to disturb the territorial integrity of the law and alter how legal 
institutional frameworks are constructed. This leads to the statement being made that 
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when the executive power exerts its force over hate speech, a possibility is presented 
for the state to exploit the violence of hate speech in order to increase its  own power.  
The violence of hate speech appears to threaten an inescapable harm. However, 
possible sites of resistance to hate speech have been identified. And so, the thesis 
draws to a close by arguing that the arts, and more specifically the theatre, can 
potentially become productive sites of challenge to hate speech. Art forms or forms of 
art, are not burdened by a need to provide legal evidence to prove something is hate 
speech. Instead, they have been argued to have the ability to dislocate traditional 
boundaries for what determines acceptable discourse. As a result, forms of art could 
harness a power to transform how linguistic subjects become constituted, and expose 
the hate speech masquerade in ways that potentially, diminish the power of hate 
speech to harm. Consequently, a possibility arises that art forms may be able to 
prevent the conditions that hate speech requires to be sustained from being created. 
An additional possibility that has been presented for challenging hate speech is 
Gelber’s theory of ‘speaking back.’ The theory explicitly connects with state 
institutional frameworks by articulating how some of these frameworks can be used  
to empower victims of hate speech and enable responses to injurious language. 
Though Gelber’s approach does not limit or reduce the violence of hate speech, it has 
been argued, that ‘speaking back’ could prove to be an important response mechanism 
to forms of hate speech that can appear as normalised or ‘reasonable.’ The argument 
for alternative responses to hate speech is important because hate speech is always 
able to carry an underlying and sustaining threat to wound. Institutional frameworks 
have been shown to, reinforce the violence hate speech threatens and to be used to 
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exploit opportunities to harness the destruction it unleashes. In conclusion, it must not 
forgotten that, hate speech always harms.    
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